Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

DEATH OF A MEMBER

Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Sir Peter Kirk, Member for Saffron Walden, and I desire, on behalf of the House, to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the hon. Member.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

School Discipline

Miss Fookes: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she is satisfied with standards of discipline in primary and secondary schools.

The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Miss Margaret Jackson): I doubt whether any Minister has ever been wholly satisfied about this. I do not underrate the serious difficulties which can be caused in particular schools by a tiny minority, but we do not believe that these problems are widespread.

Teachers accept their professional responsibility to maintain order and discipline, and we have held discussions with them and the local education authorities about what can be done to help.

Miss Fookes: Does the hon. Lady appreciate that most teachers find it more difficult to keep order now than they have ever done, and that in some schools the classroom more nearly resembles a battlefield? What practical steps does her Department intend to take?

Miss Jackson: I am not sure that I accept that most teachers are finding it more difficult than ever to keep order. I accept that some are. As to practical steps that my Department intends to take, I think, as the hon. Lady must appreciate, the fact that these difficulties, such as they are, arise in the classroom means that they can be solved only in the classroom. Whether that is done initially in the classroom or by the use of special units, or something of that kind, what we are trying to do is to find out which practices local authorities and schools are using that are most helpful and to make sure that knowledge of them is more widespread.

Mr. Pavitt: Is my hon. Friend aware of the fact that Sladebrook School, which received a large national Press coverage, is in my constituency of Brent, South? Is she also aware that it is consistent with the traditions of this House that if another Member, in this case the hon.


Member for Brent, North (Dr. Boyson), steps into a neighbouring constituency he extends the courtesy of informing the sitting Member before he makes national Press statements?
Further, is my hon. Friend aware that this school is in a typical inner city area, suffering from not only education but housing, employment and many other problems?
To isolate education by sensational publicity of this kind does a great disservice to many devoted teachers, to a headmaster who was appointed only three years ago, and to many parents who are trying to make Sladebrook a school of which to be proud.

Miss Jackson: I accept that my hon. Friend is right in saying that it is frequently not helpful to parents, teachers or children facing enormous problems of this kind if people seek not to help but merely to use them for their own advantage. Much of what has been said about Sladebrook is both inaccurate and singularly unhelpful.

Dr. Boyson: Is the Minister aware that I did not make any statement on Sladebrook, despite a dossier being in my hand showing that 40 of the 52 children in the second year there did not know how many days there were in the year, and that only one of the 52 children knew how many yards there were in a mile? I did not make any statement until the director of education in Brent herself agreed that seven out of the nine attacks on teachers in the last three months, two of whom required medical attention, were known to the authority.
The chairman of that governing body said that when things went wrong in that school they could be "b … awful". Only at that point did I appeal for a public inquiry, because I believe that if half the things said in that dossier—of which I should gladly send copies to the Secretary of State—are true it is a disgrace for any children to have to go there and for any teachers to have to teach there, at the moment.

Miss Jackson: I should be glad if the hon. Gentleman would send copies of this anonymous document to the Department. I am aware that there is a strong possibility that less than half of the docu-

ment is true. As to the hon. Gentleman's name being associated with it, if it was without his knowledge, I am sorry, but this is a matter for the Press.

Industry and Higher Education

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what consultations she has had on strengthening the links between industry and higher and further education.

The Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mrs. Shirley Williams): I raise this important subject whenever the opportunity occurs in my frequent meetings with representatives of industry and the education service.

Mr. Roberts: Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a very serious problem here? The situation seems to be that the great mass of students seem still to be attracted to courses that have little or no meaning outside the academic walls. Will she accept, with me, that something must be done at school level to improve the present links between schools and industries, and perhaps make more teachers conscious of the nature of industry itself

Mrs. Williams: Yes, Sir. We are already taking a number of actions in this field. I remind my hon. Friend, first, that we have increased the amount that students can receive in the form of sponsorship by industry without their losing mandatory grant. Second, we are discussing the possibility of an industrial scholarship scheme. Third, we are vigorously pursuing the possibility of local links between schools and firms, and, fourth, we are considering the possibility of more work experience for teachers in the course of their training and induction work.

Mr. Nelson: Would the right hon. Lady care to make a statement about the progress that has been made in the company teaching experiment as a means of improving the relationship between people involved with students in higher education and in industry? Will she, in particular, give consideration to extending this experiment by increasing the number of companies involved, since the present very limited amount will, I believe, have hardly any impact in improving the relationship between such students and industry?

Mrs. Williams: Yes, Sir. I understand that already there are five pilot schemes which link universities with associated firms, and very shortly another three universities will be announcing their own proposals. This is not a slow development; it is in fact rather rapid, since the whole matter started only a few months ago.

Mr. MacFarquhar: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the most important ways by which her Department can help industry is to help train business men in languages that they need in selling our exports abroad? Is it not rather regrettable that her Department seems to have no information on the number of courses available to business men who might wish to acquire a foreign language? Will she investigate this matter with a view to encouraging the training of business men and also obtaining some information on what is already being done?

Mrs. Williams: I thank my hon. Friend for that question. It raises some difficulties, because most of these courses are what are called full-cost courses, which are not run by the Department of Education and Science. I assure him that one of the matters that we are discussing very urgently with the Business Education Council and the Technician Education Council is the possibility of combining foreign languages with studies of engineering and technology, so that the new generation of business men may be better equipped than the present one.

Mr. Marten: What encouragement is being given to get graduates to go out into the world for, say, three years before going on to post-graduate courses?

Mrs. Williams: One of the matters that is presently being vigorously pursued by the University Grants Committee is a project for four-year undergraduate degree courses combining an area of practical work in industry with academic studies. I understand that there will be further announcements about this shortly.

Student Grants

Mr. Newton: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she will make a statement on increases in student grants in relation to the effects

of the introduction of the child benefit scheme.

Mrs. Chalker: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she will make a statement on student grants, in view of the reduction in child tax allowances in 1977–78.

The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Mr. Gordon Oakes): The parental contribution scale announced by my right hon. Friend on 28th March, which will apply from next September, incorporates an adjustment to compensate parents of students for the loss of child tax allowance. In addition, there will be a minimum grant of £80 towards maintenance.

Mr. Newton: That statement on 28th March and the one by the Chief Secretary on the following day were very welcome, at least in the sense that they were better late than never, but does the Minister not agree that the whole affair has shown up even more clearly the grave injustices of the parental contribution system? Will he take another look at the matter before further stages of the transition to child benefit?

Mr. Oakes: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman welcomed the making of the statements. We are looking at the whole question of parental contributions, but I remind the House that it would cost £120 million to abolish the contribution system at present, and £55 million even taking into account the full extent of the loss of the child tax allowance. Surely, at a time when they are asking for greater restraint in public expenditure, the Opposition are not encouraging me to do that.

Mrs. Chalker: Is the Minister aware of the grave difficulties faced by students receiving discretionary grants? What assistance is he prepared to give to such students who live in their family home and do not receive a proper parental contribution, though they receive something in kind? Many of these students are now in grave danger of not finishing their courses.

Mr. Oakes: The discretionary award system, as the name implies, is a discretionary system dependent upon the local authorities, though I very much hope that local authorities will make adjustments to their parental contribution


scales similar to those for mandatory awards. With regard to the individual amount that is given by local authorities and the extent of discretionary awards—this arises on another Question—I can tell the hon. Lady that we will be monitoring the position.

Mr. Bryan Davies: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether she has recently raised with representatives of local education authorities the subject of discretionary awards for students; and whether she will make a statement.

Mr. Oakes: My officials met officers of the local authority associations on 23rd March. The first step is to establish to what extent, if any, local education authorities are cutting back on discretionary awards, and arrangements are being made to monitor the position.

Mr. Davies: Does my hon. Friend accept that monitoring is one thing and effective action is something entirely different? Is it not necessary to look closely at the question of the range of discretionary awards, bearing in mind the Government's declared priority of advancing the education opportunities of those in the 16 to 19 age group in particular?

Mr. Oakes: I think that my hon. Friend would agree that before one takes action one should know what the position is. That is why we shall be monitoring the position first. I share my hon. Friend's concern about the provision of education for the 16 to 19-year-old group, but I think it would be wrong to speculate what local authorities are doing until we know the exact position.

Mr. Carter-Jones: Does my hon. Friend accept that the discretionary grant system is a complete jungle? Does he also accept that the people who suffer most under discretionary grants are the children of poor parents, the disabled, and mature students seeking to obtain retraining? Would it not be better if he gave top priority to obtaining social justice for these deprived classes by reviewing discretionary grants?

Mr. Oakes: I think that we should monitor the position before any action is taken. In the recent announcement on student grants, we have included a

relaxation of the rules relating to previous study or late application, the introduction of age-related dependants' allowances, and improvements in mature student grants. I agree with my hon. Friend that we need to look at the discretionary award system. That is what we are doing, but we want the information first.

Languages

Mr. Neubert: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether she is satisfied with present levels of attainment in modern languages in local authority schools.

Miss Margaret Jackson: Her Majesty's Inspectorate's recent discussion paper, based on a survey of 83 comprehensive schools, indicates some weaknesses in the teaching of modern languages. I hope that its findings and recommendations will encourage local education authorities and others concerned with language teaching to consider how improvements may be effected within the resources currently available.

Mr. Neubert: For a country as dependent on world-wide trade as we are, is not Her Majesty's Inspectorate's report that only one comprehensive pupil out of 10 obtains an O-level pass in any foreign language thoroughly alarming? Is it not a direct consequence of the political imposition of comprehensive education on local authority schools?

Miss Jackson: The short answer to the hon. Gentleman is "No, it certainly is not". I agree with him that it is a great pity that far more children do not attain adequate standards in a modern language, but perhaps he is not aware that under the previous selective system no pupil in most secondary modem schools had any opportunity to study a modern language, let alone get a qualification in it.

Mr. MacFarquhar: As the younger one starts learning foreign languages the easier it is to get as much comprehension of them as possible, what prospects does my hon. Friend see of pushing the starting of learning languages back into primary schools more generally?

Miss Jackson: As I am sure my hon. Friend is aware, this was tried on a limited basis a few years ago and there was a considerable amount of dispute about


the results of the experiment and the value of it. However, what we intend should follow from the Inspectorate's survey is a thorough study of what is happening in modern languages and a consideration of how modern language courses can better be planned, which will take into account the full range of schooling.

Dr. Boyson: Is the Minister aware that many language teachers think that one of the reasons for the mediocrity of teaching that was brought out in that report from the Inspectorate is that English grammar is no longer taught in certain schools? Consequently, foreign language teachers spend much of their time teaching grammar from the beginning before they can go on to a foreign language. That does not enhance the enjoyment of that language, and it cuts into the time available for teaching it. Does the hon. Lady agree that it would help the teaching of foreign languages if all our schools returned primarily and secondarily to the teaching of at least the basic standards of grammar?

Miss Jackson: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's observations. It may be that an inadequate understanding of grammar in all languages is a factor, but there are many factors that affect this problem, such as the lack of enough teachers of languages. Certainly the Inspectorate's report highlighted the lack of proper planning in language studies. It is difficult to single out one factor rather than another.

Regional Conferences

Mr. Channon: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what further proposals she has for improving the standard of secondary education, in the light of her recent conferences.

Mr. Arnold: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether she is satisfied with the results of the regional conferences; and if she will make a statement.

Dr. Hampson: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she will make a statement in the light of the series of regional educational conferences.

Mr. Beith: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is

to be the next stage of the great debate on education.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: The regional conferences stimulated a great deal of interesting and thoughtful comment. I am now discussing the questions that emerged from them with those organisations whom I met last November and December. Following this, the Government's proposals will be set out in a Green Paper, which will be published during the summer.

Mr. Channon: Does the Secretary of State agree that, welcome as her conferences are, it is essential that parents, who are most intimately concerned, should have more say at those conferences? Will the right hon. Lady take steps to ensure that parents' views are expressed to her even more vigorously? Furthermore, does it not show that one of the most crucial aspects is that where there is an area in which parents in general are satisfied that a school is a good one, it should not be destroyed merely for the sake of experiment?

Mrs. Williams: The answer to the hon. Gentleman's first point is that this was the first attempt ever made by the Department of Education and Science to involve parents. However, I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that where there are effectively no organisations representing more than a small minority of parents it is difficult to set up a structure for the representation of parents.
The answer to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's remarks is that we take into account very carefully the objections of any group of parents to a Section 13 notice. The hon. Gentleman will recognise that there may be differences in parental opinion in a certain area, especially, for example, about comprehensive reorganisation.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: I shall follow the usual custom, when several Questions are answered together, of calling first those whose Questions are being answered. Mr. Tom Arnold.

Mr. Arnold: What steps has the Secretary of State managed to take to allay fears that these conferences were largely cosmetic?

Mrs. Williams: I can only say that, regrettably, although we issued an invitation to the Conservative Parliamentary Party we did not have any of its representatives present at the conferences.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: That is not true.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: Yes, we did. We invited the Chairman of the Parliamentary Education Committee to nominate those who wanted to represent him at the conferences, and nobody came. I know that this was put in hand, so we can dispute it later. I will give the hon. Gentleman a chance to dispute this, but I am saying in all good faith that such an invitation was issued and I am sorry if, perhaps, it went to the wrong quarter. I made it quite clear that the invitation was to the Chairman of the Education Committee of the Conservative Parliamentary Party, not the Shadow spokesman.
I simply say to the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Arnold) that 1,471 people were present at the conferences. It is vital to point out that invitations were issued, not to those nominated by the DES, with the exception of a small handful of experts, but to those nominated by all the organisations that approached us, including parent organisations, the CBI and the TUC. Therefore, if the conferences were cosmetic it was the decision of the many organisations that we approached to make them so. I do not believe for one moment that the criticism is justified.

Mr. Beith: Does the right hon. Lady agree that part of her consideration arising out of the regional conferences ought to be whether it is right that the Department of Education should have quite a different rôle from that which it has had hitherto? It is adopting a fairly aggressive posture in putting forward policies of its own, which may be a good thing, but should not this be considered as an important factor in the way that we deal with the education in this country?

Mrs. Williams: I think that the hon. gentleman has a fair point, but the whole purpose of having a Green Paper—which I very much hope there will be an opportunity to debate in the House before it moves forward to becoming definite regulations or, certainly, before there is any change in legislation—is to enable

all parties including, primarily, the House, to give their opinions about what the proper rôle of the Department of Education and Science ought to be in future.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: May I tell the right hon. Lady that I forgive her for her inaccuracy, because she has been misled by the erroneous statement made by the Under-Secretary during the last Question Time on education? Will she accept that I was pleased to receive from her an invitation to appoint representatives of the Conservative Party to attend the conferences, that I wrote to her and accepted that invitation, that I appointed representatives to attend every conference, and that all of them attended and made a contribution to the proceedings? Therefore, will the right hon. Lady withdraw what she has said?

Mrs. Williams: In view of what the hon. Gentleman said, of course I will. However, having myself chaired two of the conferences, I can say that the Opposition were singularly both invisible and inaudible, because no Member of Parliament spoke at either of them.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: May we have this point clear? The invitation was to representatives of the party, and we were represented by councillors, educationists and others who were specifically appointed as members of the Conservative Party. That was the invitation. It was not an invitation to appoint members of the Conservative Parliamentary Party.

Mrs. Williams: In that case, let me say straight away that there has been a perfectly genuine misunderstanding between us. We had assumed that the invitation was to the Conservative Parliamentary Party since many councillors attended in their rôle of local authority representatives. I repeat my regret that there were no Members of Parliament present at the conferences.

Mr. Bryan Davies: Was it not one of the most encouraging features of the great debate that Opposition Front Bench spokesmen were both invisible and inaudible?

Sir John Hall: Does the Secretary of State agree that one of the good suggestions that emanated from the conferences


was that centres of educational excellence should be established where intensive training could be given on Saturdays? If she believes that that is a good suggestion, will she do nothing to destroy the existing excellent centres of educational excellence in my constituency, which are known as grammar and high schools?

Mrs. Williams: The hon. Gentleman is clever enough to know the distinction. The point that was made in the regional conferences about centres for additional tuition on Saturdays was, as I recall, directed particularly towards those who required remedial and additional teaching. As a Department, we have strongly supported the idea of additional periods in which schools might be open for community uses, for homework, and so on. With respect, that is a separate question from the question whether selective education is the best system. I do not believe that it is.

Sixth Form Centres

Mr. Spearing: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what guidance she has given to local authorities or what statements have been made by her Department on the establishment of sixth form centres as an alternative to schools for pupils aged 11 to 18 years.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: I have issued no guidance on the establishment of sixth form centres. I have mentioned in several speeches the need to use our limited resources effectively for 16- to 18-year-old pupils, especially in the light of the future decline in the school population.

Mr. Spearing: But is it not a fact that when local education authorities had a choice between creating sixth form centres and 11 to 18 all-through schools, the latter were set up with the express approval both of the Department and of the Minister's predecessors? Therefore, is not the review, coming out of the blue, typical of the worst aspects of the Department, which sometimes tends to be excessively mechanistic and bureaucratic, creating uncertainty where uncertainty in the education system should not exist?

Mrs. Williams: No, Sir. I am grateful for the opportunity that my hon. Friend has given me to clear up what is obviously a misunderstanding. There has been a discussion between my Department and

the local education authorities about the ideal size of a sixth form. That is in no sense a statement of policy. The statement of policy is the one that I made to the National Association of Schoolmasters and to other conferences in the past week, to the effect that as the size of the post-16 age group falls, as it will dramatically by the middle 1980s, thought should be given to what provision can be made to offer a reasonable range of courses, both academic and non-academic, to those studying in the sixth form. I put it to them that there are three possibilities: first, the linking together of existing all-through schools; second, the sixth form college, and third, the tertiary college concept. It is for local education authorities, in consultation with teachers, to decide what suits them best. A great many of the articles that have appeared in the newspapers, including the Evening Standard today, are based upon a totally misleading misconception.

Mr. Beith: Will the Minister make clear that in expressing enthusiasm and support for the sixth form college principle, which in appropriate cases I share, she is not inviting those local authorities which have only just completed major secondary reorganisation to embark upon a further reorganisation within five, eight or even 10 years?

Mrs. Williams: Absolutely. The whole position is bound to be based upon the local pattern of the provision of education. All I am trying to say to education authorities is that if they decide that they do not wish to reorganise further—I quite appreciate why they may not want to—they should now start considering how provision can be made, between groups of schools, to offer minority subjects, which might otherwise disappear from the curriculum, to any child who wants to take them.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: May we take it, then, that the Secretary of State is repudiating as false the reports that she is carrying on any sort of vendetta against the traditional sixth form, and that she is prepared to encourage a variety of sixth form provision in which sixth form colleges will have a place but in which the traditional sixth form will have an honoured and guaranteed place as well?

Mrs. Williams: I think that that is broadly fair. The only point that I should make to the hon. Gentleman, which I think he will accept, is that where a school's sixth form is so small that it is unable to mount more than a narrow range of courses, both academic and nonacademic, that sixth form must link with other sixth forms in order to enable minority subjects to be offered. The House will be aware how great is our concern about such subjects as Italian, Russian and Spanish, which may well disappear unless arrangements can be made in local authority areas to enable all boys and girls who want to take those subjects to take them, although they may be offered by a single school.

Mr. Hardy: Although I disagree in no way with my right hon. Friend, is it not possible that the dramatic fall in sixth form population that her Department expects may be much less than is feared, since there is at least a possibility that voluntary staying on at school after the age of 16 may grow remarkably during the 1980s?

Mrs. Williams: I take on board my hon. Friend's point. We are projecting everything that we say on the assumption that about one-third of boys and girls will choose to stay on after 16, as against about one-quarter at present. But my hon. Friend will know that quite a number of youngsters decide to move to further education colleges because they want a more vocational type of training. In this situation, the House must consider how best we can offer a range of courses at sixth form level in all our schools.

Dale Abbey Primary School, Derbyshire

Mr. Rost: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she has given any further advice to the Derbyshire Education Committee on the proposed closure of the Dale Abbey Primary School.

Miss Margaret Jackson: Not since my Department wrote to the authority on 30th March. The hon. Member will have received a copy of that letter.

Mr. Rost: Will the Minister explain why she approved the closure of Dale Abbey school without first ensuring that the closure would not take place midway through an academic year? Will she

further explain why, when she discovered that the local authority intended to close the school with indecent haste this Easter, she did not use her powers to defer the closure?

Miss Jackson: When a local authority has been given permission to close a school, after careful consideration of all the factors involved, it is always for that authority to decide when the closure should be implemented. Derbyshire had indicated in its initial proposals that it was thinking of closing the school this Easter. It is a matter within the discretion of the authority. Once the decision to allow the authority to close the school has been made, the timing is up to the authority. The hon. Gentleman is mistaken if he thinks that we have power to order the authority to defer the closure once we have given permission for the school to be closed.

Mr. Rost: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, Mr. Speaker, I beg to give notice that I shall seek an early opportunity to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Schools (Derbyshire)

Mr. Skinner: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what further steps she is taking to assist in replacing nineteenth-century schools in Derbyshire.

Miss Margaret Jackson: My right hon. Friend is anxious to resume, and maintain, a programme for replacing old and unsatisfactory school buildings in Derbyshire, as elsewhere, as soon as the economic circumstances permit.

Mr. Skinner: The Government seem to be finding plenty of money for other things. Should not the great education debate be not so much about the question of what the syllabus ought to be as about how much money we should put into education, into providing better education facilities and replacing some of the out-of-date schools, particularly in Derbyshire, where there are, I believe, more than 200 such schools? Will my hon. Friend follow the example of the Labour group in Derby—which will be fighting like hell to retain control of the county council during the next few weeks—by fighting the Tories on the question of education expenditure and not seeming to agree with them, as has been the case


with this Government during the past two years?

Miss Jackson: I agree with my hon. Friend that we need an increase in education expenditure—there is nothing that Ministers in the Department would like to see more—but I differ from him in not thinking that this makes the great debate irrelevant. It seems to me that as part of arguing for more resources one also argues about where they are most needed.

Mr. Whitehead: Does my hon. Friend agree that the problem, at least in Derbyshire, is one not merely of replacing outdated nineteenth-century schools but of providing supplementary accommodation in some cases for nineteenth-century and twentieth-century schools? Will she ask the Derbyshire County Council to provide figures on the amount of overcrowding that now exists in schools, notably in my constituency, where there are primary schools for which supplementary accommodation really should be provided?

Miss Jackson: I shall write to my hon. Friend about this. As he knows, since resources are scarce they tend to be concentrated in areas where there is a need for roofs over heads. But, of course, Derbyshire, like other counties, has a problem of school provision, and it may be that that is why his constituency is not receiving the priority that he would like.

Industrial Needs

Mr. Forman: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what proposals her Department is intending to put forward with a view to seeing that the education system takes full account of the needs of British industry.

Mr. Oakes: My right hon. Friend intends to publish a consultative document containing her conclusions and proposals in the light of the regional conferences and other recent consultations about education in the schools. In the field of higher and further education she is in touch with local education authorities, the University Grants Committee, the Council for National Academic Awards and other bodies with a view to ensuring that young people are given the best possible preparation for industrial careers.

Mr. Forman: Notwithstanding the recent evidence of a partial swing back towards engineering and the applied

sciences, at least at university level, is the Minister satisfied that his Department is doing everything necessary at all levels in the education system to ensure that industrialists and employers are getting the quality of young people that they are looking for?

Mr. Oakes: Yes, Sir, we are doing everything possible.

Mrs. Bain: Is the Minister satisfied that British industry is taking advantage of opportunities that exist already in the education system, particularly in the context of new industries and the need for research and development? Will he give particular attention to the possibility of experimentation and research and development in the offshore oil industry as it exists in Scotland leading to a situation in which the country could be a dollar earner when the offshore oil industry moves into mid-ocean?

Mr. Oakes: I think that industry is increasingly aware of using the opportunities of the education system. I agree with the hon. Lady that there needs to be more liaison, both in England and in Scotland, between schools, universities and industry, for the very reason that she has given.

Mr. Spearing: My hon. Friend mentioned further and higher education. Does he agree that one of the greatest needs is for basic manipulative skills in secondary schools? Will his document cover the shortages that exist among teachers in these sectors? Does he agree that it may be possible for some mature entry teachers to teach pupils skills, now in short supply, which are becoming of increasing importance?

Mr. Oakes: My right hon. Friend announced recently the training and retraining provision, particularly for teachers of science, mathematics and crafts, where there is a shortage of teachers.
We are looking at the question of basic skills in schools from the point of view not only of higher and further education but of schools as well, trying to increase liaison between individual firms and individual schools. For example, the Schools Council, in co-operation with the TUC and the CBI, is mounting a project to provide material for schools and colleges


dealing with the structure of industry and the complexities of industrial society.

Comprehensive Reorganisation

Mr. Ovenden: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science which local education authorities have now replied to her request under the Education Act 1976 for comprehensive reorganisation plans and which authorities have not.

Miss Margaret Jackson: My right hon. Friend wrote to eight local education authorities on 24th November 1976, a further 26 on 17th January 1977, and a further one—Walsall—on 14th April 1977, requiring them to submit, within six months, proposals for the completion of secondary reorganisation in their areas. No proposals have yet been received from any authority or from the governors of any voluntary school.

Mr. Ovenden: Has my hon. Friend received any approaches from any of the authorities involved about the availability of resources for reorganisation, and is she in a position to give the House an assurance that comprehensive reorganisation will not be further delayed in areas where it has been held back for long enough because of a lack of resources?

Miss Jackson: Some local authorities have commented on the difficulties that they expect to face. However, until we receive full proposals for reorganisation from any of these areas we are not prepared to make any decisions. We wish to see the proposals as a whole. The question of resources—as with other questions—will then be taken into account.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: Does the Department have any recognised way of measuring the academic or educational change following reorganisation?

Miss Jackson: I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman means by that question. If he is asking whether we monitor closely the progress of individual schools, the answer is "No", but local authorities may do so.

Mr. Forman: Is the hon. Lady aware that one of the consequences of the reorganisation proposals that she has called for is that some good schools have been threatened with closure, particularly in my area of the London Borough of

Sutton? Is she satisfied that that should be a consequence of her policy?

Miss Jackson: No, we are not satisfied, and we have made efforts to see that a number of schools are kept open and that they offer their facilities to a wider range of children than has been able to experience them in the past. We greatly regret the loss of any good school, but some, unfortunately, have preferred to withdraw rather than become part of the State system.

Arts Council (Grants)

Mr. Strauss: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what she estimates will be the actual average increase in grants that the Arts Council will be able to make to its subsidised activities during 1977–78 after taking into account the demands arising from the new enterprises that have recently been launched or are planned to come into operation, such as the National Theatre.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: The council's grant for recurrent expenses has been increased from £36 million last year to £41·2 million for 1977–78—an increase of 14·4 per cent.

Mr. Alan Williams: Far too much.

Mrs. Williams: It is for the council to decide how this increase is distributed among its clients.

Mr. Strauss: We all appreciate that there has been a considerable increase in the Treasury grant to the Arts Council, but is my right hon. Friend aware that a significant part of that goes to new enterprises, such as the National Theatre and the new Bromley theatre? That means that unless compensatory action is taken existing enterprises—musical and dramatic—will suffer a significant cut in their Arts Council subsidy this year and that quality will suffer accordingly. Is that my right hon. Friend's policy, or is she prepared to take action to prevent this serious cut in the artistic standards of the organisations that are helped by the Arts Council? [Interruption.]

Mrs. Williams: I shall ignore the backwoods hoots from some of the Opposition Benches and say straight away that the increase in the grant for the Arts Council compares favourably with that for other aspects of education. However, I


do not think that it would be right totally to exclude the arts from any of the constraints and severities of our present financial situation. We give the arts a certain preference, but I do not believe that they can be wholly exempted from as rigid a view of their priorities as the rest of education and science, nor do I think that that would be right.

Mr. St. John-Stevas: If I may give a Front Bench hoot in general agreement with what the Secretary of State has said, does she agree also that it is as important for the Arts Council to have adequate notice of what it is to receive as of the amount that it is to receive? As, this year, the council received notice only a few days before the opening of the financial year, will the right hon. Lady set about remedying the situation so that in future the council receives six months' notice at least? Better still, why not go back to the old system of making triennial grants to the council?

Mrs. Williams: As the hon. Gentleman will know, from the parallel of the universities, we are trying to move back to a longer-term approach to the financing of bodies such as the Arts Council, but there were particular difficulties this year. I also add, however, that some new ventures are supported from outside the Arts Council. The point raised by my right hon. Friend about the National Theatre is a good example. The National Theatre is supported, in capital terms, by a direct grant-in-aid from the South Bank Theatre Board and not by the Arts Council.

Nursery Schools

Miss Joan Lestor: asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many local education authority nursery schools provided as a result of the urban programme are to be closed as a result of the cuts in public expenditure.

Miss Margaret Jackson: Local education authorities are not obliged to inform my right hon. Friend of their intention to close maintained nursery schools. My Department knows of only one such closure, and the school concerned was not provided under the urban programme.

Miss Lestor: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, but does she agree that schools and classes made available under

the urban programme were provided because of a desperate need in areas of special provision? Will she say how she intends to ensure that the statement in the 1976 public expenditure White Paper, that areas of special need will continue to have provision, is carried out?

Miss Jackson: We are hoping that that statement will be carried through and that provision will be maintained. Whether it is done through the urban programme or in some other way is another matter. At the moment, I am not aware that nursery schools provided under the urban programme are under threat; nor, I hope, will they be.

Oral Answers to Questions — GOVERNMENT-LIBERAL PARTY (JOINT CONSULTATIONS)

Mr. Blaker: asked the Prime Minister how many meetings he has had with the Leader of the Liberal Party pursuant to the arrangements announced to the House on 23rd March.

Mr. Canavan: asked the Prime Minister how many meetings he has had with the Leader of the Liberal Party since 23rd March.

Mr. Rost: asked the Prime Minister when he last had a meeting with the Leader of the Liberal Party as a result of his announcement on 23rd March.

Mr. Skinner: asked the Prime Minister how many meetings he has had with the Leader of the Liberal Party in accordance with the recently announced arrangements.

The Prime Minister (Mr. James Callaghan): I refer the hon. Members and my hon. Friends to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Dykes) on 5th April.

Mr. Blaker: Does the Prime Minister believe that the Leader of the Liberal Party has yet tumbled to the fact that since his party is keeping the Government in office it must share responsibility for the present alarming rate of price increases? Will he offer the Leader of the Liberal Party at least a crumb of comfort and say that he agrees with the forecast of the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection that the


rate of price increase on an annual basis will fall to 12 per cent. to 13 per cent. by Christmas?

The Prime Minister: I have not discussed this matter with the Leader of the Liberal Party and therefore I do not believe that the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's question arises.

Mr. Alan Clark: Do not bother.

The Prime Minister: It would be unfair not to bother about it. As for retail prices, inflation is of course the major problem that this country has still to overcome. [Interruption.] I should be delighted to have some help from the Opposition. It is to this problem that the Government will continue to direct their attention.
What is quite clear is that in its discussions the Liberal Party is placing the national interest first. I hope that the Conservatives will do the same.

Mr. Rost: As the purpose of the coalition is to keep the Government in office longer than the electors want and longer than the national interest can afford, why is the Prime Minister putting up Labour candidates against his Liberal partners in the local elections?

The Prime Minister: It would be a bad day for democracy if the advent of the Gallup Poll, or any other poll, meant that the Government, half way through their term of office, should yield office on the basis of temporary unpopularity. [An HON. MEMBER: "It is not temporary."] It is temporary at the moment.
What is quite clear is that it would be unfair to expose the country to a General Election until the Opposition have made up their minds what their policies are in relation to incomes or, for example, the future of Leyland, on which there was some difference during the recess, or, indeed, until they have made up their minds as between China and Russia. It would not be fair to ask the country to decide on these issues until we know Conservative policy in some detail.

Mr. Skinner: Does my right hon Friend recall that in 1975—on 20th March, I believe—when we were on to free collective bargaining last time round, the Government introduced legislation that provided the Liberal Party, along

with some other minority parties, a sum of £33,500 to oppose the Government? Now that the Liberal Party is rendering support one day and seemingly withdrawing it another, should it not go on half pay? Does the Prime Minister think that the taxpayers are getting value for their money?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. Not only am I certain that the taxpayers are getting value for money; I think that the Liberal allocation should now be doubled. After all, the allocation was given to the Liberals not to oppose the Government but to assist them in their work. Their work has now improved, and the quality has now improved. However, if there is to be any easing in the pay policy, clearly differentials should apply there.

Mr. David Steel: Is the Prime Minister aware that the Liberal Party supports the efforts, difficult though they may be for the Government, to get wage inflation and price inflation under control? In any meetings with the Leader of the Opposition, will the Prime Minister receive similar support from that quarter?

The Prime Minister: I have grave doubts about that. If the right hon. Lady came on her own I might, but what I fear is that she might be flanked by the right hon. Member for Leeds, North-East (Sir K. Joseph) and the right hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Prior), with the right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker) popping up between the two of them. It really is time the Opposition told us what their policy on future incomes is.

Oral Answers to Questions — JAPAN

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: asked the Prime Minister if he will seek to pay an official visit to Japan.

The Prime Minister: I have no immediate plans to pay an official visit to Japan. Meanwhile, I look forward to meeting the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Finance Minister of Japan at the Downing Street Summit on 7th May.

Mr. Roberts: Does my right hon. Friend accept that there is an urgent need for him to visit the Far East to offset some of the damage done by the Leader


of the Opposition, who spent her time in Japan running down the British worker and British industry and her time in China stimulating a third world war by furthering a Russian menace phobia?

The Prime Minister: If I went to Japan—I should be very happy to do so—I should have better things to discuss than the animadversions of the Leader of the Opposition on these matters. As for the representation of our interests, I was very glad to read the robust speech made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade yesterday, which I thought formed a very good coda to the previous visit.

Mr. McCrindle: As my right hon. Friend has just visited Japan in her capacity as Leader of the Opposition, should not the Prime Minister defer any visit he has in mind for a few months so that he can go in a similar capacity?

The Prime Minister: I am told that
Hope deferred maketh the heart sick.
I have a feeling that the hon. Gentleman is going to be feeling awfully queasy for a long time to come.

Mr. Roy Hughes: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the right hon. Lady's time would have been better spent criticising Britain's investment strikers, who have so let this country down? For example, the Japanese car worker has about 12 times more power to his elbow than does his British equivalent. Is not this the major factor in Britain's low productivity record?

The Prime Minister: It is a partial factor that investment in this country has not been sufficiently high. [An HON. MEMBER: "Tell us why."] Not in the course of a supplementary answer; it is a matter for debate.
It is also the case that we have not made sufficient use of the investment we already have. It is no use trying to pin blame on one aspect of Britain's problem. It is a wide-ranging and deep-seated problem, which involves increased productivity, better use of our machinery, better and more activity by middle-management, and the removal of trade union restrictive practices. All of these come together. I do not accept that one can isolate one element and say that that is the only thing that one has to remedy, and then the whole situation will come right.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER (ENGAGEMENTS)

Mr. Neubert: asked the Prime Minister whether he will list his engagements for 19th April 1977.

The Prime Minister: In addition to my duties in this House I shall be holding meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. This evening I shall be the guest of Her Majesty the Queen at Windsor.

Mr. Neubert: While on the way to Windsor will the Prime Minister stop off at Heathrow Airport and endeavour to do something to resolve the two-week dispute amongst British Airways engineering workers, which is costing the taxpayer millions of pounds and causing immense inconvenience to many air passengers?

The Prime Minister: That is one visit that I should certainly think was very relevant in some ways, but I fear that I shall not be making it. I think that it would be better left to the Chairman of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, who has called a meeting today of all the parties to the dispute. It would be better if I refrained from comment at this stage, although I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is costing British Airways, at a favourable time for the corporation, a substantial sum, which comes out of the taxpayer's pocket.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: On his way to Windsor, could my right hon. Friend visit the headquarters of the Building Societies Association and ask it why, as the minimum lending rate has been reduced 12 times since its peak of 15 per cent., the rate for mortgages has been reduced by only 1 per cent.? Does my right hon. Friend not think that the building societies could have reduced their lending rate by a greater percentage than they have?

The Prime Minister: It is true that the minimum lending rate has been substantially reduced and is now at 9 per cent.—a fall of 6 per cent. since last October, and 3½ per cent. lower than when the Opposition were last in office, which is a substantial reduction. As for future building society rates, I hope that the societies will continue to review their


rates carefully, because they can both help to make a difference to the rate of inflation and ease the burden on the house owner. I trust that they will make a further reduction as soon as they can.

Mr. Henderson: Is the Prime Minister aware that the credibility and seriousness of his intentions regarding devolution have been seriously undermined by the decision to discontinue some of the work on the Royal High School building in Edinburgh? Will the Prime Minister tell us when he has arranged to meet his hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) and other members of the Unionist wing in his party who are preventing devolution from coming into effect?

The Prime Minister: It is my view that the Government's credibility on devolution has been substantially improved as a result of our arrangements with the Liberal Party, and I hope that this will enable us to move ahead with some of this legislation in the not too distant future. Whether work on a particular building is continued is not germane to that.

Mr. Henderson: Yes, it is.

The Prime Minister: No, because the Government intend to press ahead with the devolution proposals as soon as they can secure a majority for them, however changed or amended they may have to be.

Oral Answers to Questions — EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (DIRECT ELECTIONS)

Mr. Channon: asked the Prime Minister if he will initiate discussions with the Prime Minister of Belgium, after the Belgian elections, about the progress of direct elections to the European Parliament.

The Prime Minister: I have at present no plans to do so.

Mr. Channon: Apart from having discussions with the Belgian Prime Minister, will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House what the Government's intentions are regarding direct elections? Will he tell the House today, so that we may be fully informed before the debate, whether the Government propose to allow a separate debate at an early date on the

system to be used for direct elections, so that the House may come to a clear decision about that before the Second Reading of the Bill, in order to avoid confusion for the House and to allow people to make a decision knowing which system of election is to be used?

The Prime Minister: I shall discuss this with my right hon. Friend. It is an interesting suggestion. It was not our intention to do that now. We assumed that tomorrow's White Paper debate and the one on Monday next would be sufficient for the purpose. However, my right hon. Friend has heard what has been said, and we can consider these matters. I do not rule it out.

Mr. Whitehead: Has my right hon. Friend seen yesterday's announcement by M. Marchais, the leader of the French Communists, that they were not now opposing the principle of direct elections? This means that only the most reactionary elements of the Gaullist Party are now opposed to the principle. Will he urge this unanimity upon our own party, in the hope that we shall not follow the Gaullist path?

The Prime Minister: I noticed that M. Marchais had, for electoral reasons, I understand, decided to support the idea of direct elections. Opposition to them in this country is not limited to our own party. I believe that some hon. Members on the Opposition Benches oppose them. Nevertheless, I say to hon. Members in our own party and in the Conservative Party that the country decided this issue in the referendum—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]. Those who shout "No" must look the facts in the face.

Mr. John Mendelson: We say "No", because it is not true.

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend does not make it not true by saying that it is not true. It is contained in the treaty. All this will be debated tomorrow. I know that we shall never shift my hon. Friend, but the Government's position on this is clear. When we acceded to the treaty, we said that we would introduce the Bill, and we shall do so. My hon. Friends will have to make up their minds about it. I shall use my best endeavours to get the Bill through.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Secretary Owen—statement.

Mr. John Mendelson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. After the Prime Minister has referred to some of us directly, will you not allow further opportunity for comment on this important question?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I understood that the Prime Minister was referring to a group, not to any individual.

RHODESIA

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Dr. David Owen): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement on my recent visit to eight countries in Africa. My main purpose was to see whether it would be possible to resume progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem. As the House knows, violence has been increasing and, while a long and bloody struggle might, in the end, produce an independent Zimbabwe, it will do so only at grave cost. Many lives will be lost, the economy will be destroyed, there will be severe damage to the stability of the neighbouring States and it will leave a legacy of lasting bitterness between the races. We are all well aware of the immense difficulties of resolving this problem.
I was encouraged to attempt a new approach by the support of the United States Government, with whom there has been the closest possible co-operation. It is our joint determination to work for reconciliation in Southern Africa, on the firm basis of majority rule, the fullest regard for human rights, and the ending of racial discrimination.
The starting point for the present initiative goes back to the statement of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 22nd March 1976 and to the crucial achievement of Dr. Kissinger when Mr. Smith spoke of majority rule within two years. It is true that Mr. Smith's speech mentioned other conditions which were not subsequently realised, but I believed that his statements then and since suggested that he might be persuaded to accept the objective of majority rule in 1978.
The Geneva negotiations stalled, not over majority rule, though there were doubts as to the extent to which this had been agreed by the Rhodesian Front, but on the powers and composition of the interim Government who were to draw up the independence constitution.
In March, on my visit to Washington with the Prime Minister, I suggested to the United States Administration that we should work jointly on a strategy to promote a peaceful transition to majority rule and this they readily agreed to do. On my visit to Africa I was able to discuss the possibility of the United Kingdom and the United States co-sponsoring a conference to develop a clear timetable for achieving majority rule in 1978.
Such a conference would draw up a constitution protecting basic human rights and define an acceptable democratic process for an automatic transfer to an independent nation. It would also discuss the rôle of an international development fund to help promote the economic stability of an independent Zimbabwe and encourage the minority white population to stay and contribute to the country's future. The constitution would aim to be broadly acceptable to 6 million people, black and white, who would actually live under its provisions but, as chairman of the conference, I should retain the final responsibility for bringing any constitutional Bill to this House for its approval. The British Government's proposals of January for an interim Government remain open for discussion. It may be that there is more likely to be agreement to a caretaker Government, who would be responsible for the conduct of elections prior to the granting of independence.
If Mr. Smith's Administration did not accept the constitution and the arrangements leading up to it, no immediate progress would be possible, sanctions would continue and so would the war, but I suspect at an increased tempo. If there were agreement, Mr. Smith's Administration would resign, the caretaker Government would supervise the elections and anyone participating in the election would have to forsake violence; sanctions should also be lifted.
I am convinced that many of the Africans who currently believe that the armed struggle is the only way forward are essentially men of peace. It is not


difficult to understand the motives of those who feel that they have no recourse but to arms. Much as we all wish violence to stop, we cannot immediately expect it to stop while the wall of scepticism and disbelief, which I met all over Africa, remains about the intentions of the Smith Administration. Until those who currently carry arms are convinced that they will have majority rule, I regret that it looks inevitable that violence will continue. The reactions to this strategy have been sufficiently encouraging for me to feel it right, in close consultation and co-operation with the United States Government, to continue discussions with the various parties. I hope to be in a position soon to inform the House whether we and the Americans feel that it would be worthwhile to co-sponsor a conference.
My visit to Africa lasted only eight days. But I am convinced, even more than before I left, of the urgent need to end the war in Rhodesia. Genuine concern about the dangers of the continued confrontation was clearly expressed to me by the five front-line Presidents, by Mr. Vorster and by the Rhodesian leaders, black and white. I found a widespread belief in the necessity for a nonracial majority Government. There is, however, a desperate lack of trust which must now be rebuilt.

Mr. John Davies: In thanking the Secretary of State for his statement, may I first offer him my sincere congratulations on the success of his exacting and rigorous mission? We on this side of the House greatly welcome the whole visit, particularly to Rhodesia, which we thought was essential. We welcome his continued adherence to the breakthrough achieved by Dr. Kissinger. We particularly welcome his own personal involvement, both now and in the conference which he seeks to call. All these are matters which we on this side have long advocated, and we are indeed glad to see them fulfilled.
The change in the attitude of mind of the United States in so firmly offering its co-operation to the Secretary of State and to the Government is very welcome. It is one which has moved from simply backing whatever judgment might exist on the Government side to active participation. That, too, is greatly to be welcomed.
I hope that the Secretary of State will accept that the conference has our good will in principle, but we shall need to know much more about its terms before we can reach a real judgment on its purpose.
Meanwhile, may I put three questions to the Secretary of State? First, is he not concerned that the continued deferment of any reference to a consultation of the people of Rhodesia as a whole is bound to lead to doubts about whether we still adhere to the fifth principle, to which we were all earlier parties?
Secondly, does he not think that the time has come for the installation of a permanent mission in Salisbury in order that the Government, and perhaps the whole people, should be better informed on a day-to-day basis of the developments in that country and able to reach a more sound judgment as to its future?
Thirdly, will the Secretary of State clarify his position on the continuation of the guerrilla warfare? In an emergency debate we had some time ago on the subject of the disappearance of some children into Botswana, I referred to the undertakings we gave under the United Nations Charter. The condonation of violence in the settlement of international disputes is a matter from which we have deliberately debarred ourselves and any participation we might have. It is desirable that the Secretary of State should make further reference to this matter in order that there should be no doubt that we still adhere to the firmness of those principles.

Dr. Owen: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his kind remarks. I note and appreciate his welcome to the United States involvement and active participation. When and if the decision is taken to convene a conference, I shall, of course, explain all its aspects to the House.
I come to the three questions I was asked. On the question of consulting the people of Rhodesia as a whole, an integral part of the whole strategy is that there should effectively be a General Election. The question of the franchise is one which, clearly, will be dealt with in the constitution, but I believe that it ought to be the broadest possible franchise.
As to the question of a permanent mission, the House will know from answers to questions on this subject some weeks ago that I said that I was completely open-minded. It very much depends on whether one decides to go ahead with the conference. Certainly, if there were a conference, there would need to be intensive consultation prior to the opening of any formal conference. Much of that consultation would necessarily have to take place in Rhodesia.
As to the guerrilla warfare, the House should be under no illusion. I never spoke to anyone who advocated armed force without making it quite clear—I thought I spoke for the whole House—that we condemned guerrilla violence. We believe that there could be a peaceful transition, but that does not exclude one from understanding why people not offered any political dialogue or any hope of a peaceful transition have taken to violence. The determination of people to use violence is, I fear, very strong when they are faced with what they see as the failure of the West to deliver majority rule in Rhodesia over the past 13 years.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that he is wholly right to be extremely cautious in view of past experience and present bitterness in Africa? I congratulate him on the way in which he has appeared to be changing the climate of opinion in all quarters in a constructive direction. He has certainly achieved far more than his sceptics in this country thought possible when he set out.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will accept that the co-sponsorship of the United States is regarded by many of us as of extreme importance? Can he confirm that what is at stake is that the only hope for a peaceful settlement is if Mr. Smith genuinely accepts both the principle and the time factor involved in majority rule? Finally, did he have any talks about the whereabouts of Mr. Edson Sithole, who disappeared long before Geneva?

Dr. Owen: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. I can only reiterate that I am under no illusions about the difficulties and can offer no guarantee of success. The prospects, however, of not even attempting to achieve a peaceful transition are, in my view, extremely dire.
The co-sponsorship of the United States is a crucial element, and there is no question of doubt about that. As to Mr. Smith's intentions, this is the key to the whole issue. I have made it clear that in conducting any negotiations I am forced to conclude that he believes what he says and that he means what he says. But I have explained to Mr. Smith that there is considerable doubt about his intentions and that it would greatly ease the anxieties and the doubts, and might help to reduce the present level of violence, if his Administration in the next few months—when negotiations might possibly be started—would start to remove some of the racial discrimination legislation that is on the statute book in the illegal Government and many of the practices which have taken place over the last few years which are found to be abhorrent by many people on both sides of the House.

Mr. Arthur Bottomley: Although there are continuing doubts about whether the Rhodesia Front and Mr. Smith can be trusted, would my right hon. Friend accept my congratulations on the success of his mission and, in particular, on the fact that it is his aim to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia next year? With this end in view, would he make yet a further appeal to my old friends, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, to give the maximum help to make this possible, thereby avoiding unnecessary bloodshed and suffering to all Rhodesians?

Dr. Owen: I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend, whose experience in this matter the whole House knows. I think that his scepticism is shared by many Members. But as to the question of the Patriotic Front and the two nationalist leaders, I attach immense importance to their full co-operation, were we to call a conference. This was one of the reasons that I not only saw them early on in my own mission but went to see all the five front-line Presidents, including a visit to President Machel in Mozambique and President Neto in Angola. I believe that we have shown that what we are interested in is a peaceful settlement in Africa, and I hope that we have removed some of their anxieties that we were in any way trying to introduce Western or super-power politics into


what is essentially a freedom struggle for black national opinion.

Mr. Powell: Is it too late for the Foreign Secretary to avoid involving the United Kingdom in a rôle which implies power, influence, and, consequently, the responsibility in Southern Africa which we do not possess and of which the result could be only humiliation for this country and even further bloodshed and confusion for others?

Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman's consistency on many issues is well known to the House and he has consistently taken this view. I must tell him, however, that I think there is a greater humiliation: it is when a proud country with a great record of colonial rule, faced with the choice of trying to achieve a peaceful transition, at considerable risk, ducks out of it and allows violence to triumph, and also to see the possible destruction of democracy going far wider than the boundaries of Rhodesia. There are major issues involved. Great struggles are taking place in Africa. If we believe in democracy, we should be prepared to fight for democracy.

Mr. Hooley: Will my right hon. Friend say how far the Anglo-American plan for progress back to constitutional rule in Rhodesia has the assent and support of the five front-line Presidents?

Dr. Owen: Although the front-line Presidents made it utterly clear that they would continue to support the armed struggle until they were convinced that majority rule was a reality, they supported this strategy as giving some hope of a peaceful transition, but they raised many objections on the problems that we would encounter. They showed considerable scepticism about the intentions of the Rhodesian Front and Mr. Smith.
But, on the issue of representation where there was a difference with the Patriotic Front, claiming that they were the only people who should be consulted, they understood that a constitutional Bill that would come before this House could not possibly pass if we had restricted the consultation to only one sector of black nationalist opinion. They were quite agreeable to our consulting as well not only Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Sithole, who were consulted along with

the Patriotic Front in Geneva. I believe that we shall have to go wider in our consultations, even though not formally, perhaps, in a conference.

Mr. Blaker: If the opportunity for progress which exists is to be seized, is it not clear that the two essentials are that the nationalist leaders should be prepared to work together more closely than they have done in the past and that the white Rhodesians should have some assurance about their future in an independent Rhodesia? Since it is relevant to both points, can the Foreign Secretary say whether the offer of an aid and guarantee fund, which was put forward at the time of Dr. Kissinger's tour of Africa, is still valid?

Dr. Owen: I made it clear that an international development fund would be part of the agenda of any conference were one to be called. As the United States Government would be one of the major contributors to this fund, this explains in many ways why this is not just a constitutional conference. I think it would be appropriate to have wide consultations. In Rhodesia I saw black and white trade unionists, and representatives from public sector unions also had the right to be consulted about issues of this sort as well as the black nationalist leaders. It is essentially a fund about the economic stability of an independent Zimbabwe and to help that country in its early years of its independence, which is often the most fragile period of a country's history.

Miss Joan Lestor: When my right hon. Friend met Mr. Ian Smith and indicated to him that he expected or hoped to see some indications from him in relation to good will, did he discuss with him the future of the political detainees in Zimbabwe and the rôle that they are expected to play in any negotiations that take place towards a transition?

Dr. Owen: I made it clear to Mr. Smith that, just as the racial discrimination legislation was offensive to people in the Western world generally, I also thought that he ought to look at the whole question of detention and that, particularly if the climate improved prior to an election period, it would be very helpful if normal political activity could take


place again. I hoped that it was an indication of Mr. Smith's feelings on this that when, in Cape Town, before I went to Rhodesia, I made a specific request, but not a demand, to see some of Robert Mugabe's supporters and, in particular, the Reverend Banana, who was in detention, he agreed to allow out of detention two of these people, who came to see me and I had consultations with them and their other colleagues in Rhodesia. I look on this as a hopeful sign of Mr. Smith's intentions to live up to what he has been saying.

Sir J. Eden: May I, too, welcome the fact that the right hon. Gentleman's efforts have led to this new and more hopeful stage? As it is the desire of everyone in this House that there should be an ending as quickly as possible to violence and bloodshed, could the right hon. Gentleman say whether any representations are being made to Moscow as one of the principal sources of the supply of arms to those who are waging terrorist campaigns?

Dr. Owen: I made it clear throughout Africa that I did not believe that the West resented the Soviet Union's presence in Africa. They have the right to be there, as we have the right to be there. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Oh, yes. They have the right to help. I said it was wrong that their help was almost entirely confined to the supply of arms and not to development. It would be a great mistake for the House to think that Africa was something in which only the West could be involved. Many nationalist countries are genuinely non-aligned. They attach importance to this. It is important that, as my visit to Mozambique and Angola made clear, the West is not taking sides in individual nationalist aspirations.
What is wrong is that the Soviet Union's overall aid budget is extraordinarily low. Attention was drawn to this fact in the Rome European Council. Most of the Soviet Union's money is spent on supplying arms to guerrilla activities and on fomenting discontent against democracy.

Mr. Robert Hughes: May I add my congratulations to my right hon. Friend on his arduous visit to Southern Africa? Would he reaffirm that the object of the exercise is to achieve majority rule on the basis of "one man, one vote" and that there will be no legislation passed through

this House and that sanctions will not be lifted until such majority rule is guaranteed?
Could my right hon. Friend also say how quickly the inquiry into oil sanctions-busting will begin and when the results will be published?

Dr. Owen: On the question of the constitution, one cannot rule out any aspect of the constitution, and the franchise is an important aspect. As I have already made clear, I consider that the franchise should be on the widest possible basis. In any constitution it would be wiser to consider safeguarding the fears of minority groups by other mechanisms than by restricting the franchise. I made it clear to Mr. Smith that the Western world will look at the question of majority rule as meaning what it says. It means a genuinely elected black majority Government—as it undoubtedly will be. I hope that, as many other African countries have done, they will have enough sense to incorporate whites within the Government and that some whites will hold governmental posts. The franchise, however, should be on the widest possible basis. Clearly, that is one of the subjects which would be discussed if a conference were called.

Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: May I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman particularly on having taken the trouble to visit Rhodesia? This gives many hon. Members on the Opposition Benches the greatest of pleasure.
I note from the right hon. Gentleman's statement that he has reserved the Government's position on an interim Government in Rhodesia. Could he tell the House now whether that is the route preferred, and, as a result of the forthcoming negotiations, what effect will this have on the timing? Will it still be possible, if there is an interim Government, to achieve majority rule by 1978? Furthermore, if the right hon. Gentleman follows that route, what arrangements will he be making to ensure that there is a reference to the people so that the Africans can decide which leaders are to play a part in that interim Government?

Dr. Owen: The question of an interim Government requires possibly more trust at an earlier stage than the strategy which


I have indicated. It may be that that trust will be established after early discussions on a constitution and it would be possible to go to an interim Government. That is why I have not excluded it. But the trouble was that a trust certainly did not exist in Geneva and it is my view that it will be difficult to establish that trust because the interim Government proposals were dependent on violence ceasing and sanctions being lifted and, in the view of many black nationalists, it did not give them the absolute guarantee of majority rule which they wished. But it is on the table and it certainly can be considered.

Mr. Spearing: The Foreign Secretary referred in his statement to the black majority and the white minority. But would he not agree that, in emerging African countries, there have also been problems with other sorts of minorities? As, in particular, Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere have pointed out these facts, does my right hon. Friend expect that this aspect will be discussed in the consultations leading to a new constitution?

Dr. Owen: Yes. There is no doubt that we would have to look at all the minority groups. There is a significant coloured minority group which, at the moment, under the racial legislation, tends to be separately represented. Indeed, I saw a group of coloured representatives when I was in Salisbury.

Mr. Michael Latham: Regarding a constitutional conference, is the Secretary of State aware that, in my own visit to Rhodesia a week before him, on which I have reported to him, many people expressed to me the view that it would be unwise to proceed on that basis at present and that further bilateral negotiations were necessary before any such step was taken?

Dr. Owen: The hon. Gentleman's impressions may have been formed a little early, in that the full extent of the proposals and strategy had not been developed. However, I have no doubt that any steps forward that we take need to be carefully prepared. I have already made clear that I do not believe that one can go straight into a formal conference. There will need to be some months of the most careful preparation and bilateral discussions, as he has indicated.

Dr. McDonald: Would my right hon. Friend elucidate the meaning of the phrase "widest possible franchise"? Does it mean "one man one vote", or not?

Dr. Owen: Clearly, the widest franchise is one man one vote, one woman one vote. My hon. Friend ought to know that in Rhodesia at the moment there is not a wide franchise for women—in fact, it is very restricted. I personally think that that is the sort of world in which we are now living, and I told Mr. Smith that. But it would be wrong to call a constitutional conference on important issues like that and to rule out any discussion of other issues. There is a tradition of restricting the franchise in some respects in some post-colonial independence constitutions, but I think that it is important to recognise the general feeling in the Western world.
I believe that the objective of giving confidence to minority groups can best be achieved through other mechanisms—possibly white Members of Parliament in the first initial years, possibly a blocking mechanism for the first few years on constitutional change. There are many different ramifications of confidence-building measures for minority opinions, rather than going for a restriction, still less a restriction of the franchise. These are issues that will be discussed.

Sir Nigel Fisher: Arising out of a question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes), to the last part of which the Foreign Secretary did not reply, and in view of the right hon. Gentleman's own recent statement that an inquiry is to be instituted into the supply of oil to Rhodesia, could he indicate what form that inquiry will take and could he ensure, as the Government themselves are one of the major shareholders in a large oil company, that the inquiry will be completely independent?

Dr. Owen: I can certainly give the hon. Gentleman the assurance of a totally independent inquiry. It is because we have been at great pains to follow the strict legal interpretation that we chose to use the form of inquiry that was envisaged as a possibility in the original sanctions order. We hope to be in a position very soon to announce the name of the chairman of the inquiry, in which case it can start work very early.
I agree that there is a need to get the inquiry under way. What follows then is entirely, as I understand, a judicial procedure, and the question whether there has been any breach of sanctions would eventually involve probably the Director of Public Prosecutions, if he wished to make a judgment. There will be no political interference whatever in this issue. It is particularly important, because of the Government's shareholding in British Petroleum, that that is made clear.

Mr. MacFarquhar: In adding my congratulations to my right hon. Friend, may we ask him, whether, in his conversations with the front-line Presidents or with the black nationalist leaders, any desire was expressed for a concrete British presence on the ground in Rhodesia—quite apart from any diplomatic mission—during the period up to majority rule, and what his own feelings are on this matter?

Dr. Owen: I made it clear that the British Government had no intention of committing troops in any major way in this area because I do not believe that we would contemplate such a situation.
In the proposals that we tabled for an interim government there occurred the suggestion of a resident commissioner. It may be—this is certainly one of the issues that will have to be most extensively worked out, particularly jointly with the United States—that this could provide some stability for the short period of a caretaker government who would only supervise an election. The question of providing stability and a fair election is one of the important issues which the conference must look into.
There is no doubt that black nationalist leaders would not accept an election that was supervised by the current Smith Administration. Therefore, with some form of caretaker government—who might be for only a short period and who would not have to make very many decisions—the problems that arose over the interim government would not come in such an acute form.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Five hon. Members have been trying to catch my eye. I shall call them before we conclude.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Will the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary avoid confining his scepticism to Mr. Smith without questioning the motives and reliability of such leaders as Mugabe and Nkomo? Will he avoid giving the impression of constant bias against the British? Will he also have in mind the danger which some of us foresee of a settlement being arrived at which is not that wanted by the majority of people in Rhodesia but which is acceptable to the so-called front-line Presidents and the leaders of the American nationalist movements? The order in which things happen in Africa is very important and the fact that there will be a General Election will not cure the errors of an initial settlement.

Dr. Owen: I am quite clear that one of the problems will come in 1978. If one has achieved agreement on a constitution and on an electoral process, one will have to ask Mr. Smith to give up the powers of government to a caretaker government, and one will have to ask the Patriotic Front to give up the armed struggle. That may be difficult.
Therefore, when I spoke to the five Presidents, I warned them that I could envisage a time when I would ask them to withdraw their support for the armed struggle on the guarantee of majority rule and of the need for a peaceful election. I think that is an absolutely essential principle, and I will stand by it.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Will the Secretary of State agree that the welcome and, indeed, indispensable assistance of President Carter is in striking contrast to the unhelpful meddling of the Russians which the Prime Minister was right to condemn?
On the American understanding, can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the United States Government are now pressing the front-line Presidents to stop supporting guerrillas? Does he expect that they will be represented, perhaps only as observers, at any conference he is able to call, and will he not rule out the possibility of perhaps persuading the United States to be involved in some form of guarantee of the frontiers of an independent Rhodesia?

Dr. Owen: The last question is purely one for the United States Administration.


But, as regards the conference, I want to make it clear that the United States is co-sponsoring the conference, it will attend the conference in its own right and, unlike as in Geneva, it will attend the plenary sessions and will speak and question with the same access and facilities as the United Kingdom. The only difference in our relationship has been that we decided that I should chair the conference. However, I should tell the House that I shall chair the conference only for those parts of the conference that have a political content. Much of the conference, if it is called, will be on a technical and legal level.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: May I congratulate the Secretary of State not only on his energy and comparative open-mindedness, which he clearly brought to these frequently over-simplified and immensely complex problems in Southern Africa, but also on his endorsement of the proposition, which I put forward as long ago as 1966 in Salisbury, that there would be no solution of this problem until there was something equivalent to Marshall Aid? I very much welcome that.
Since the right hon. Gentleman places so much emphasis, again understandably, on the question of majority rule, and since he now has some personal experience of Africa, may I ask him to define more clearly how he will avoid some form of tribal majority emerging in Rhodesia and say what form of rule it will be? Will it be similar to that in Mozambique which has followed the achievement of so-called majority rule there, and, if so, for how long?

Dr. Owen: The hon. Gentleman should have made it clear that what they achieve will be democratically elected by the people of an independent Zimbabwe, a black government. That is the inevitable consequence of giving majority rule. The question of the franchise has been extensively discussed, but I have made it clear that it should be on the widest possible basis. I have always held that it should be "one man, one vote", but that is an issue to be discussed at the conference.
As to the hon. Gentleman's endorsement of an equivalent to Marshall Aid, he should recollect that Rhodesia at

present is relatively well off compared with many African countries. On the question of a development fund, we have to see that we help an independent Zimbabwe, but not at the expense of other African countries. In looking at the fund one is looking at the infrastructure of society in Rhodesia which has made it a relatively prosperous African country, one important ingredient being the white skills and technical abilities.

Mr. Townsend: The Secretary of State mentioned his visit to Angola. What is the British Government's attitude to the recent invasion of Zaire from Angola, possibly with Cuban support? Will he now turn his attention to trying to achieve better co-ordination of policy in the European Community towards this vital part of Africa?

Dr. Owen: That question goes a good deal wider than the subject, but I would refer the hon. Gentleman to a statement made public yesterday by the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting to discuss the question of Africa. It had an extensive discussion of the complex issues that underlie the severe problems of Zaire.

Mr. Nelson: In adding my congratulations to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, may I ask whether he would care to comment further on the emergency motion of the Rhodesian Front yesterday, that the rights of all minority groups must be meaningfully guaranteed? Will he agree that such guarantees extend beyond purely financial rights? In view of the failure of the Geneva talks, partly because of the question of the institution of security administration, what are his views on a possible security council for an interim government, or the administration of adequate security and protection for minority groups after the introduction of majority rule?

Dr. Owen: I must tell the House that if anyone believes that guarantees can be built into constitutions, or into statements, he is living in a fool's paradise. The best guarantee of stability for an independent Zimbabwe and of good relations between the races will be the way the present Smith Administration carry through, over the next few difficult months, the transition to majority rule, the way they build up confidence again


between black and white Rhodesians—I am sure that it can be built up again—and the way they try to ensure a constitution that will be seen by the rest of the world to be a fair interpretation of majority rule. The more they are seen to restrict the franchise to resist any form of effective black Government, the more doubts will be raised in people's minds about the seriousness of their intention.

PASSENGER VEHICLES (EXPERIMENTAL AREAS) BILL [Lords]

Motion made, and Question put,
That the Passenger Vehicles (Experimental Areas) Bill [Lords] be referred to a Second Reading Committee.—[Mr. Frank R. White.]

The House proceeded to a Division—

Mr. HARPER and Mr. COLEMAN were appointed Tellers for the Ayes, but, no Member being willing to act as Teller for the Noes, Mr. SPEAKER declared that the Ayes had it.

Question accordingly agreed to.

WATER CHARGES (AMENDMENT)

4.11 p.m.

Dr. Edmund Marshall: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to extend the liability to pay general sewerage and sewerage disposal charges levied by water authorities to all domestic ratepayers in their areas whose hereditaments are without sewerage and to remove from such ratepayers any liability to pay other charges levied by local authorities and water authorities in respect of collection and disposal of the contents of cesspools and septic tanks.
The purpose of this Bill is to change the legal basis for payment for the disposal of sewage from those domestic properties, nearly all in rural areas, that are not connected to main sewers. Sewage from such properties usually flows into cesspools or septic tanks buried at the bottom of the garden, and these have to be emptied from time to time and the contents taken away.
Before local government reorganisation, the emptying of cesspools and septic tanks was generally undertaken by rural district councils, most of which provided this service financed by the rates, although I understand that there was no legal obligation for them to provide the service free of extra charge.
When reorganisation took place, responsibility for sewerage and sewage disposal passed to the new water authorities, which are distinct from local authorities, and it appears to have been the general intention, in applying the provisions of the Water Act 1973, that all domestic ratepayers should be liable to pay the general sewerage charges of the water authorities, irrespective of whether their properties were connected to the main sewers.
Whether that was the policy of the Government of the day who brought in the Water Act is not for me to say, but what has become clear is that the wording of the Act has not achieved the objective that was generally intended in regard to sewerage charges. When the rate demands went out in 1974, including amounts for general sewerage charges, some ratepayers with properties not connected to sewers challenged the validity of the charges in their case. The eventual decision of their Lordships in the Daymond case was that no liability


imposed by the Water Act 1973 for general sewerage charges extended to ratepayers without sewerage, so no general sewerage charges have since been levied on those ratepayers.
However, their sewage still has to be collected, and most district councils have continued to provide the collection and disposal service for ratepayers without sewerage. But, as they have not been paying for the service in any other way, these ratepayers have found that local authorities have devised their own charging schemes for the collection and disposal of sewage, and in many areas these charges came into effect only this month.
The pattern of charges varies considerably from one area to another depending upon the policy of the local authority, but I have the impression that most authorities doing this are charging a set fee for each visit to collect sewage. Such schemes bear particularly heavily on those ratepayers who have cesspools rather than septic tanks, because cesspools allow for no liquid seepage into the ground and therefore soon fill up. Septic tanks, on the other hand, need emptying much less frequently, in some instances only once every two or three years.
The problem for cesspool owners has recently been clearly demonstrated in that part of my constituency which lies in the Doncaster metropolitan borough, particularly in the rural communities of Fishlake, Sykehouse and Hatfield Woodhouse. Because that area is low lying with a high water table, property owners without sewerage must have cesspools rather than septic tanks. The borough council, when first devising a charges scheme for cesspool emptying, proposed a fee of £7 for each 1,000 gallons collected.
For some of my constituents this would have produced an annual bill of some £400 to £500 per household—an intoler-

able burden. Not unnaturally, they made strong protests. I have received more letters on this subject than on any other single problem since I first became the Member for the constituency six years ago. As a result, I feel duty bound to press for a change in the law on this question so that all domestic ratepayers will become liable for the general sewerage charges of water authorities, whether or not their properties are connected to main sewers, and that they should then have no other liability for charges levied by district councils for the collection and disposal of sewage. That is what this Bill aims to achieve.
In terms of general principle it seems right that all citizens should pay for the removal of their sewage on the same basis, whether that removal is through pipes into main sewers or by the emptying of the contents of cesspools or septic tanks. I ask the House now to approve that general principle by giving leave for this Bill to be introduced.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Dr. Edmund Marshall, Mr. Peter Hardy, Mr. Richard Kelley, Mr. John Mendelson, Mr. Edwin Wainwright, Mr. Michael Ward, Mr. John Watkinson and Mr. Alec Woodall.

WATER CHARGES (AMENDMENT)

Dr. Edmund Marshall accordingly presented a Bill to extend the liability to pay general sewerage and sewage disposal charges levied by water authorities to all domestic ratepayers in their areas whose hereditaments are without sewerage and to remove from such ratepayers any liability to pay other charges levied by local authorities and water authorities in respect of collection and disposal of the contents of cesspools and septic tanks: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 20th May and to be printed. [Bill 105.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[12TH ALLOTTED DAY]—considered.

Orders of the Day — THE ARMY

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Frank R. White.]

4.18 p.m.

Mr. Philip Goodhart: In this debate on the Army it is certainly not my intention to attack the energy or the enthusiasm of Ministers who have been responsible for military affairs in the course of the past year. They have been put in their present position to implement the Government's general defence policy, which seems to be based on the hope that the meek shall inherit the earth, while doing their best to ignore every bit of evidence that the strong are intent on contesting the will.
One inevitable result of this policy is that ministerial defence posts tend to be inherited by those who lack independent political strength. It suits the Prime Minister well enough to staff the Ministry with men whose resistance to defence cuts would attract scant attention and whose resignation would cause little stir.
I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army has done his best to protect the Army from the economic storms that have blown in the course of the past year, but looking across the Dispatch Box at him I am reminded of the devastating school report received by a friend of mine whose son finished near the bottom of the form and whose report contained the comment "I am sorry to say that Robert is trying."
Let me first turn to the good news. Recruitment seems to be going well. In the early 1960s, the principal feature of Army debates centred on the question of whether we could get sufficient officers and men to match our commitments. We can now leave that particular subject in a few sentences, partly because our commitments have been cut to bedrock and partly because of unemployment.
When he was Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for Leeds,

East (Mr. Healey) was an indifferent recruiting sergeant, but as Chancellor of the Exchequer he has been the best friend the recruiting authorities have ever had. For reasons we need not go into this afternoon, the high level of unemployment that affects so much of this country is concentrated with tragic force on the age groups from which the Army traditionally recruits most heavily. That has meant that the Army can afford to be highly selective in those it recruits.
Towards the end of the recruiting year, I visited my local Army careers office. A substantial number of potential recruits were still being processed. But in the past 10 months, while 61 recruits have been accepted, 58 have been rejected, mostly for educational reasons. This is in an area well above the national average in educational standards and rather below average as regards delinquency.
There are, however, still causes for concern in recruiting, particularly as regards officers. I am particularly worried because almost every bright young middle-ranking officer I have talked to during the past 12 months has been seriously considering leaving the Army. The reason that they invariably give is that they see little worthwhile future in a contracting force where petty restrictions seem to mount daily.
And the long process of military withdrawal continues. This month, the military element in the Commandos is withdrawing from Malta. At the end of last month, the Royal Air Force relinquished control of airfields in Oman, at Masirah and Sallallha. There will, in the course of the coming 12 months, be a substantial reduction in the number of seconded Army officers and men in Oman.
Paragraph 258 of the Defence White Paper states:
The gradual reduction of our military assistance to Oman will continue, now that hostilities in Dhofar have ceased and as Omanis are trained to occupy positions now held by British personnel on secondment.
This seems to be a deadpan way of recording that British forces have made a major contribution to the victory of the Omani army in a nasty little war fostered by the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen, one of the world's major havens of terrorism. The Sultan of Oman has treated our seconded and contract


forces very fairly—one could say generously. I hope that in his speech the Under-Secretary will feel able to pay a rather more eloquent tribute than that which appears in the White Paper to those British officers and men whose skill has achieved a substantial victory in an important small conflict in a vital area of the world.
There is yet another reference, in paragraph 219(a) of the White Paper, to the fact that
Consultations continue on the withdrawal of the Gurkha battalion from Brunei.
The Sultan of Brunei, as we know, pays for the whole of this particular force, and if as a result of Left-wing pressure this battalion is needlessly withdrawn the effect on the whole Gurkha Brigade will be exceptionally damaging. I believe that it would need a dramatist of the tragicomic force of, perhaps, Tom Stoppard to do justice to the whole absurd story of the negotiations for the withdrawal of this battalion. Meanwhile, we must all hope that inertia and common sense will help to preserve the status quo.
Nearer home, our forces in Cyprus have been cut to the bone. May I ask the Under-Secretary of State for an assurance that there will be no further withdrawals in the foreseeable future from that sensitive and vital island?
There is, however, one part of the world—indeed, a part of this country—where we are all pleased to note that Ministers have reiterated their determination to preserve the Army's rôle. That, of course, is Northern Ireland. It has in the last seven years been something of a ritual to pay tribute to the conduct of our Service men there. The danger continues and the death toll mounts, and now there is the awful frustration of soldiers going back for a sixth or seventh tour and finding that there has been little visible improvement in the security situation.
We have had a number of debates on security in Northern Ireland in recent months when we have been able to discuss the strength and level of activity of the Army in Northern Ireland, so this afternoon I wish to confine myself to three brief points on Northern Ireland.
First, there is, I believe, substantial agreement between the two sides of the

House that more of the war against terrorism should be undertaken whenever possible by the inhabitants of Northern Ireland themselves. From both sides of the House there has been agreement that the Ulster Defence Regiment should be strengthened. The IRA clearly recognises the strength of the threat from the Ulster Defence Regiment, because, out of the 29 soldiers who were killed in Northern Ireland last year, no fewer than 15 were members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. As we know, that tragic toll has continued this year.
Early last year the Government set up a ministerial committee to examine the forces required to maintain law and order in Northern Ireland for the next few years. As a result, it was decided to increase the number of full-time members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. The Government, however, seem to be thinking in terms of an increase of some 200 to 250 men. We were hoping for an initial increase of 800 or 1,000 full-time Ulster Defence Regiment men. Is a further increase in the full-time strength of the UDR contemplated? If so, by how much? This is a matter to which we attach substantial importance.
Consideration must be given to the vital question of Army pay and conditions in Northern Ireland. For years I have argued—sometimes against Conservative Ministers—that no one posted to Northern Ireland from a safer and more comfortable billet should be worse off financially. However, over the years thousands of Service men posted on emergency tours from BAOR have been out of pocket as a result of their transfer to Northern Ireland.
I am delighted to see that the Daily Express and The Guardian have taken up the plight of the families of soldiers in regiments and headquarters who are doing extended tours. In one regiment in Northern Ireland, no less than 46 per cent. of all privates and 23 per cent. of all lance corporals living in married quarters are receiving rent rebates. In other words, they are considered to be below the poverty line.
That is a scandalous situation that has split up families. Service wives with children in Northern Ireland live in a security situation that is not normal. The wives cannot get outside to work.


The cost of living is abnormally high for many items. The one benefit that most people in Northern Ireland enjoy—namely, cheap housing—is denied to them. This is one area in which the military salary system is doing harm.
The remedy lies in the Minister's hands. Let him cut the rent of married quarters in Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman could do this if he persuaded the Treasury that it should be done. This is an abnormal situation. Very well, let us charge an abnormal rent. Better still, let us waive altogether the rent demanded from lower ranks. I ask the Minister to take emergency action on rent and heating and lighting charges and then to consider at greater leisure the discrepancies in pay that have arisen between the different sections of the security forces.
Men doing the same job and facing the same dangers have enormous discrepancies in their take-home pay. That is not good for morale, and it is one of the difficulties that has bedevilled the sensible experiment of mounting joint patrols of military policemen and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. That experiment has run into considerable difficulties because of the enormous differences in take-home pay between the two groups going out on the same patrols.
I turn to another suggestion that I have pressed on earlier occasions, which would cost virtually no money. It is generally accepted that the most hazardous rôle in Northern Ireland is played by the bomb disposal squads. There have been suggestions that they should have a special allowance. When they were asked, the squads were divided on the issue. I understand, however, that a special clasp on the Northern Ireland Medal ribbon would be very welcome. Will the Under-Secretary of State tell us why that simple honour cannot now be conferred on the bomb disposal men? Let us remember the continuing strain that the men are under. Last year they had to deal with more than two bombs every day of the year. This year the strain is no less.
I turn from Northern Ireland—

Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Before my hon. Friend leaves Northern Ireland and the financial dis-

advantages of Her Majesty's Forces in the Province, may I ask whether he has in mind the additional handicap that they suffer—namely, that insurance companies require heavier premiums from those serving in Northern Ireland than from others? Although this is understandable and although there is not an easy answer, is it not something that we should have in mind and a matter that the Minister should take up?

Mr. Goodhart: I am sure that my hon. Friend has raised a most valuable point. I hope that it will be borne in mind by the Minister and the pay review body, which has recently been spending some time in Northern Ireland.
I turn from Northern Ireland to the Government's main claim in defence matters—namely, that they are concentrating all their strength in the NATO area. Our contribution to the southern flank has been slashed. Our ability to help the northern flank has been reduced. It is true that the commandos are concentrating more on Arctic warfare. To offset the reduction in amphibious capability, the number of commandos specially trained in Arctic warfare is to be increased from 1,000 to 2,500 in the next two years.
The commandos will receive Arctic clothing worth £350 per man, but it seems that there is not enough money left in the kitty to equip them all with skis. The extraordinary colour of my face is due to my assiduous attention to my duties as Vice-President of the Lords and Commons Ski Club during the recent recess. Therefore, this is a subject on which I feel strongly. Surely we can afford skis for our commandos in the Arctic. We have rented foreign ferries to carry our forces in the past. Perhaps we should ask the Norwegian Tourist Board to hire us skis in an emergency at a reduced rate.
It is the Army's strength on the central front of NATO on which Ministers have particularly asked to be judged. They have been judged by the all-party Expenditure Committee and they have been found wanting. The Expenditure Committee, in investigating the effect of recent defence cuts, was worried about the Army's air defence system and the fact that our excellent Rapier SAM system was not equipped with the blindfire


radar system, which would greatly increase its capability. The Committee was rightly concerned with the cancellation of the long-term RS80 artillery project, which leaves the Army without an area weapon system that can disrupt enemy supply columns, except, of course, for the nuclear Lance missiles. Once again we see the weakness of conventional forces leading to a reduction in the nuclear threshold.
The Committee is concerned about the deferment of a replacement for our ageing armoured personnel carriers and the seemingly indefinite deferment of the medium-lift helicopter. Above all, the Committee is concerned about our wholly inadequate anti-tank weapons in the face of an ominous mass of Soviet armour.
The long-delayed date for the introduction of the Milan anti-tank missile has slipped by another year. Then there is the extraordinary story of the evaluation of the helicopter-borne Hawkswing replacement. There are two systems—the Franco-German HOT and the American TOW, which have been under evaluation since 1969. I note that the Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy was a professor of economics at Drew University in New Jersey when this evaluation began. If things continue at their present pace, I have no doubt that he will be a professor again, at the London School of Economics, before this evaluation is completed. I can only conclude from the snail's pace at which the evaluation has gone that the Government do not want any new anti-tank helicopter system.
Meanwhile, the Expenditure Committee has been doing much valuable work in the areas of reserves and reinforcements. Even if we do not yet have the Committee's report, much of the evidence is already available. We all know that before it can become a fully efficient fighting force BAOR needs massive reinforcements, both of Regulars and reservists. Indeed the Committee, in its preliminary tour of Germany, found that for various reasons many battalions are now at only 70 per cent. of their authorised strength.
Anyone who reads the evidence given by those responsible for the mobilisation and reinforcement plans of the Ministry

of Defence must be impressed both by their enthusiasm and by their faith. Everyone agrees that for the plan to work at all there must be some warning time, and the politicians concerned must be prepared to act decisively when warning of an attack is received.
Even their worst enemies would agree that the Israelis have the most efficient reserve mobilisation system in the world. But in October 1973 Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir and the Israeli High Command hesitated for too long. If Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir were half caught on the hop, can anyone seriously believe that our Cabinet would act with speed and resolution?
Who knows, perhaps there is some secret protocol in the Lib-Lab pact that says that the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) must be consulted as well before the reserves are called out.

Mr. Julian Critchley: Where are the Liberals?

Mr. Goodhart: It is equally true that the Americans, who have made a substantial study of these matters, have come to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact would have to give only a few hours' warning before launching a mass attack. I am not by nature a betting man, but, after studying the evidence given to the Expenditure Committee and the American Defence Report for the financial year 1978, I would have thought that the chances of one-third of the necessary reserves for BAOR actually getting to the right place at the right time must be less than the chance that Red Rum will win the Grand National in both 1978 and 1979. The limitations of our reinforcement plans do not in any way reduce the importance of TAVR. The spirit of the men in the Reserve is superb, and in these depressed days it is marvelously cost-effective.
If and when reservists reach BAOR, they will find that a certain degree of reorganisation has taken place and that the new divisions that they will join do not look quite like the old divisions. But the field exercises carried out in the autumn of 1976 thoroughly justified our criticisms two years ago of the plan to do away with brigade headquarters altogether. This scheme, put forward in the defence review, might have worked


in 1980 if the right communication equipment were available then. It could never have worked with the signals equipment available now. Therefore, brigade headquarters are back under a different name.
Paragraph 215 of the Defence White Paper provides a tongue-in-cheek obituary of the great defence review reorganisation when it says:
The results of these trials have generally validated the reorganisation plans although a number of modifications have proved necessary, chiefly in the arrangements for command and control within the division. Each new armoured divisional headquarters will be given the capability of deploying, when required, two tactical command posts to exercise direct operational command of battle-groups. The command posts will be known as Task Force Headquarters when they are deployed.
This is, no doubt, to get away from any possible idea that they might be brigade headquarters. The paragraph continues:
They will be headed by brigadiers who in peacetime will be garrison commanders.
The weakness of the new plan will be lack of training. The old brigades exercised together. The ad hoc battle groups with their garrison commanders will not—unless there is, as I hope, another change of plans. The possibility for confusion is thus greatly increased.
The probability of confusion on the central front has also, alas, been increased by tragic errors on the part of those responsible for NATO tactical communications. In the course of the next two years, no fewer than seven NATO countries will be introducing new battlefield communications systems. Only two of those seven systems will be inter-operable. These systems are likely to survive until 1995. We can look forward to at least a dozen years of confusion on the potential battelfield.
It is true that black boxes can be devised to make these various systems inter-operable. There is one important snag: no one has yet invented the black boxes that will be needed. The chances of those black boxes being invented and produced in sufficient quantities and being available in the right numbers in the right place are as probable as the appointment of Lady Falkender by the next Conservative Government to advise on administration at No. 10 Downing Street. In other words, it just will not happen.
I understand that there is some overcapacity at the moment in our signals and radar research establishments, particularly at Malvern. I ask the Under-Secretary whether we are undertaking any research into the development of the black boxes that are so necessary if NATO is not to suffer from a nervous breakdown in the signals area.
Indeed, when we look at the Government's plans for research and development we see the usual cut-back. As usual, however, we have not been told where or how this is to be done. I suppose that it will be an across-the-board cut with equal misery for all. However, I hope that the Army establishments dealing with artillery and small arms will be spared from the common axe.
It is enormously important as regards arms sales that the improved 120-mm tank gun should be ready for tests in America by November. In the small arms sector, the new British 4·85 mm weapon development is clearly of enormous importance with great foreign sales potential. It would be folly to impose cuts on this research at this time. When I look at our research budget of £123 million, which is included in the £826 million for research and development as a whole, I thank heaven that the Americans this year are planning to spend $11·1 billion on research, development, testing and evaluation. That is more than our total defence budget for the coming year.
Finally, I turn to the welfare side of the Armed Forces. I am delighted that it was mainly Conservative votes that rammed through a maverick Labour amendment cutting the tax on war widows' pensions. Our next priority in this field is that of the pre-1950 widows who get no Service pension at the moment. Then there is the problem of housing for the Service man when he leaves the Army or when he is posted away. My hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) has repeatedly drawn attention to these problems, which are caused primarily by the 1974 Rent Act. There has been no visible improvement here, although we live in hopes.
Then there has been the publication of the Spencer Report, which advocates the establishment of an expensive Army welfare service. Clearly, Ministers are


in no financial position to implement that report at present. However, there is talk of running a pilot scheme, which consists, as I understand it, of employing one more trained social worker in the Greater London area.
I declare a partial interest as I am a member of the council of SSAFA, which deals with the social problems of all three Services. It is with some regret that, following the Seebohm and Spencer Reports, we find Service welfare unity, presently embodied in SSAFA, coming apart at the seams. If senior staff at the Ministry of Defence spent a little less time arguing against tiny increases in allowances for SSAFA social workers in Germany, we might not need some of the expensive new systems proposed in this important field.
The Spencer Report uncovered a number of grumbles about conditions. I am not surprised. I have talked to soldiers from the highest to the lowest ranks, and in the past 12 months grumbling has been the keynote of today's Army. As one senior general recently said to me:
Everything is getting progressively harder to do
A junior training officer put it more vividly when he said:
Do you think that you could do an effective job as an MP if you were given one biro pen at the beginning of the year and told that it would have to last 12 months? That is the sort of position the Government are putting me into.
There is grumbling about the present and real apprehension about the future. As the Under-Secretary knows, a grumbling appendix can quickly become acutely inflamed.
This year's cuts were bad enough, but if next year's cuts are allowed to go forward irreparable damage will be done to our whole defence system. Unless present plans are discarded, this Government will be guilty of dismantling our own defences at a time when the capacity of our potential enemies is growing every day. I hope that an early General Election will see the return of a Government who recognise that the defence of the realm is the overriding duty of any proper Government. I fear that this one does not recognise that fact.

4.56 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army (Mr. Robert C. Brown): It is a pleasure to follow the speech of the hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart). He has a longstanding interest in defence, and particularly in Army matters. The House listens to him with interest and respect on these subjects. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not attempt to deal with all the points—some valuable and some not so valuable—that he raised.
I am delighted that hostilities in Oman have finished. I am happy to join with the hon. Member for Beckenham in paying tribute to the contribution that our forces made to the cessation of hostilities. I am particularly happy to mention what I think is the most satisfying activity that our forces undertook there—normalising the situation by drilling wells, building medical centres and providing aid to the community to settle. This is the most valuable thing that we have contributed in Oman.
The hon. Member asked for an assurance about our future plans on Cyprus. We have no plans to withdraw from Cyprus. Indeed, any such proposal would be likely at this time to complicate further the delicate political situation in the island. Nor have we any plans to reduce our force levels there in the near future.
When I spoke in the defence debate of 22nd March this year I made the point that the efficient management of defence resources was as important as the overall level of those resources. I should like to tell the House a little more about what this, in my judgment, responsible and serious approach means for the Army.
First, because it is of the greatest importance, I should like to report to the House what further progress has been made with the planned restructuring of the Army since I described the concept in the debate on the Army on 6th May last year. I make no apology for returning to this subject, because it is fundamental to the careful planning that the Government believe to be right for the Service. It may help if I recount briefly the main features of the plan.
In the United Kingdom, with the elimination of the brigade level of command, Regular and reserve forces will come under the command of 10 district


headquarters. Three of these will provide a new kind of formation to meet our war-time commitments. These formations are to be known as field forces, each of which will have five infantry battalions and support arms appropriate to its rôle. By April 1978 each of these formations, the 6th, 7th and 8th Field Forces, will be operational; indeed the 8th Field Force, which has a home defence rôle and is located in South-West District, is already operational. The 6th Field Force, to be located in South-East District, will take over the rôle of the land element of the United Kingdom mobile force. The 7th Field Force, which will be located in Eastern District, will constitute the major formation required to place BAOR on a full war footing. The action needed to achieve this reorganisation is proceeding well to plan.
In BAOR the restructuring of the 1st British Corps is also well in hand, and in one or two areas we now expect to improve on the original timetable. Because we are committed in advance of MBFR to maintain our Brussels Treaty force level of 55,000, the object here is not so much to save manpower as to improve the weapon-to-man ratio within broadly the present manpower levels. When the reorganisation is complete the 1st British Corps will consist of four armoured divisions, each rather smaller than the three that exist at present, an artillery division, and a new formation in the shape of the 5th Field Force. The 5th Field Force is now operational and one of the BAOR divisions, the 2nd Armoured Division, has completed its reorganisation.
As I said in the debate last year, the restructuring timetable has provided for a carefully phased programme of trials to test the planned organisation. These trials have yielded valuable results, and where changes to the plan have been shown to be necessary they have been made. I see nothing wrong in that. If one is developing a new concept one must surely by trial and error improve it as one goes along. In particular, we have decided to provide divisional commanders with the ability to deploy up to two task force headquarters or command posts to take control of particular operations or parts of the battle. Hon. Members will know that we held a major exercise in BAOR last autumn, code-

named Spearpoint, involving 18,000 men. The report of the exercise has yet to be fully evaluated, but I can say that the outcome was generally satisfactory.
This is the new structure with which the Army will undertake its NATO commitments. What of equipment? We hear much comment on alleged deficiencies in our equipment programme. The Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee made this a critical point of its recent report. I would just say that it is our aim to ensure that the Army continues to receive the most modern equipment available. I should like to respond to some of the adverse public comment on the degree to which we have succeeded in this field by mentioning some of the decisions that we have taken during the past year with the purpose of ensuring that this aim is met.
In October of last year we signed the memorandum of understanding with the French and German Governments for the procurement of the Milan crew-portable anti-tank guided weapon. In order to ensure that the system is in service as soon as possible, initial deliveries, which are due later this year, will be from the Franco-German consortium, Euromissile, although the bulk of the requirement will be manufactured in the United Kingdom, providing employment for several thousand people.
Last September formal acceptance and approval of the 155mm towed field howitzer, FH70, was agreed with our German and Italian partners. Main production has now begun and the system is expected to enter service about the end of the decade. We shall be procuring 71 guns. Meanwhile, development of the self-propelled version, the SP 70, continues.
As my right hon. Friend announced in the defence debate, we have agreed with the Federal German Government not to proceed with a collaborative solution for the next generation of the main battle tank. Studies are already in hand on the best way of meeting our requirement while ensuring that a new tank enters service by the late 1980s, but meanwhile a number of improvements to Chieftain are under way to maintain its effectiveness into the 1980s. A laser sight and muzzle reference system are already in production and further improvements to the fire control system are planned.
As part of our continuing studies on ways of countering the mounting Warsaw Pact threat, it has been decided to form a regiment with an electronic warfare capability. This regiment will take its place in the order of battle of the 1st British Corps from 1st July this year. Hon. Members will not expect me to go into details, but I can say that this decision is only the first stage, and a long term programme to improve our electronic warfare has been identified and will be carried out as resources permit.
A number of new equipments are entering service this year. Deliveries of a blindfire tracking radar for Rapier, which will enable this fine anti-aircraft missile to operate in all weathers by day and night, have already begun. This will be followed later this year by the Striker tracked reconnaissance vehicle which carries the Swingfire anti-tank guided missile.
I hope that these examples will illustrate our determination to have a well-equipped and well-organised Army. I believe that there is widespread recognition of the first-class quality of our Army's personnel, equipment and professional standards.
Whenever I make an overseas visit, I hear compliments on our Forces from those foreign countries with which, and in which, they serve. These indicate to me that the military men and the people whose judgment one respects in these countries, both NATO and others, do not share the excesses of pessimism or disparagement which one sees from time to time displayed by commentators in this country. It appears to be a national British pastime to talk down our national coinage.
Last week I visited our forces in Cyprus. I saw the troops in our own sovereign base areas and some of those who make up our contingent in the United Nations' peace-keeping force on the island. In both cases they seemed to me professional, versatile and thoroughly strongly motivated in their work—a stabilising influence in an uncertain environment. All ranks showed a well-articulated understanding of their tasks—incidentally, in the most horrible weather I have experienced for a long time in Cyprus or anywhere else.
Our military contingent with the United Nations Force is the largest one amongst the seven nations participating. In addition, we provide, from the sovereign base areas, logistic support for the whole force. The United Nations officers and others to whom I spoke had the highest praise for our contribution. As an example, my attention was drawn to the case of one young corporal in a regiment about to leave the force whose work in the demilitarised zone between Greek and Turk was so highly esteemed in keeping the temperature down that the local communities on both sides asked that he be retained beyond his normal tour.
I mention this simply to illustrate the high quality of achievement which I know the House will have expected from the Army in this unusual and tense situation. It is typical of the contribution which we are making not only there, but wherever the Army is to be found stationed—one of military efficiency tempered with discretion and humanity. I know that other hon. Members have also experienced this for themselves.
In the light of what I have said about the standards being achieved by the Army the House will not be surprised to learn that recruiting during the last year has been very encouraging, both in number and, perhaps even more important, in the quality of those joining the Army. There are some areas where there has been a shortfall against the recruiting target, and during the coming year we shall be devoting an increased proportion of our recruiting effort to these areas. Nevertheless, the general level of recruiting is highly satisfactory.
The number of officers recruited for the major arms and Services was 677, an increase of 22 per cent. over the previous year's total. The short service limited commission has continued to increase in popularity—70 were awarded last year, an increase of 25 per cent. over the previous year. The number joining Sandhurst on the standard military and graduate courses during the year was, however, below the annual officer target, and officer recruiting is one area where increased effort will be made during this year. An encouraging feature was the record number—no fewer than 118—of university cadetships and bursaries awarded. The holders of these will be


entering Sandhurst in about three years' time, after graduating.
The House will also be interested to know that some 37 per cent. of Army officers are drawn from the ranks. This reflects credit both on the high quality of our soldier entrants and on the open-minded and flexible system of man-management that enables the Army to spot the talent available and to make the best use of its manpower resources. I hope that this will continue and that the percentage of Army officers rising through the ranks will be in excess of 40 per cent. next year.
The general improvement in officer recruiting can be attributed largely to two factors. The current economic climate has meant a reduction in recruitment by certain industries and professions, and there has also been a discernible change in the attitude of young people towards the Services as a career.
Turning now to soldier recruiting, the adult and young soldier recruiting requirement for 1976–77 was reduced in January 1977 because the number of serving soldiers terminating their engagements was lower than expected. The reduction in the requirement was made by suspending the young soldier entry, and the reduced target was met almost exactly. We do not expect to have any difficulty in the coming year in achieving our targets for soldier recruiting with the exception of a few specialised technician employments. It will, in fact, be necessary to continue the suspension of the young soldier entry and to apply a high degree of selectivity in accepting recruits.
Recruiting for the Women's Royal Army Corps was also very satisfactory, particularly for officers, where the supply of excellent candidates is far in excess of the number of vacancies available.
The size of the recruiting organisation is being kept under review—a number of military and civilian posts were abolished, and further studies are in progress with a view to financial savings and the redeployment of military manpower into operational units. The number and location of careers information offices are also kept under continuous review, and a number of unproductive offices have been closed or are planned to close. Wherever

possible, the offices of two or all three Services are co-located.
Expenditure On recruiting has borne a share of the reductions in defence spending. Because of, the present buoyant level of recruiting, we have been able to reduce considerably the expenditure on television and national Press advertising. A certain minimum level of advertising is, of course, necessary to support the recruiting effort, and, as I have said, we shall be concentrating effort in the coming months on those areas where there is still room for improvement in the level of recruiting.
To summarise, therefore, there is no doubt that young men and women today regard the Army as a worthwhile and stimulating career. It is the Government's intention that our policies and use of resources shall be such as to reinforce and promote this attitude. The efficient management of resources means good housekeeping, too. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to report to the House the progress that we have achieved in implementing the proposals of the Defence Lands Committee. I know, of course, full well the continuing interest—shown by hon. Members on both sides of the House—in the defence estate and the purposes for which it is used. That is evident during Defence Questions each month.
It remains our aim to dispose of all land and property for which no defence requirement is foreseen so that it may become available for recreational or other use for the public good. Hon. Members will recall that the Defence Lands Committee reported in 1973 and the Government's views were published in August 1974. In short, we then agreed that 22,500 acres of defence land would be given up, and already more than 17,500 acres on 90 of the sites considered by the Committee have been released for disposal. Of that total 3,300 acres were formerly occupied or used by the Army. We have, for example, given up more than 500 acres of land on Dartmoor, more than 200 acres at Manorbier in South Wales, 380 acres at Sennybridge near Brecon and more than 100 acres at Barry Buddon on the Tay Estuary in Scotland.
The reviews of defence expenditure that have been conducted over the last two or three years have inevitably meant


that we have had to look again at exactly where our needs will lie in future. As a result, some land planned for disposal will now be retained—particularly where its disposal would lead to heavy capital expenditure in replacing facilities elsewhere—but we shall be able to release additional land previously recommended for retention. I have every hope that we shall reach the total acreage promised in 1974, if we cannot surpass it.
I should like, if I may, to turn now to the subject of Northern Ireland. Some aspects of the Army's presence there have received considerable publicity recently, and I feel it right that the House should know the Government's view on these. In the defence debate last month I paid tribute to the work of the Armed Forces there, and I am glad to do so again today. Theirs is an exacting and often dangerous task, carried out in difficult circumstances with skill, determination and resourcefulness. I very much regret that so far this year six Regular Army soldiers and five members of the UDR have lost their lives in the service of peace in the Province. I am sure that the House will wish to join me in expressing our deep sorrow at their deaths.
It goes without saying that, quite apart from the toll of death and injury, the continuing commitment to the Province imposes a heavy burden on the Army. In financial terms the additional cost of the commitment is now running at more than £60 million a year. Operationally, less time is available than would be ideal for training for the Army's wartime rôle. For families there is the continuing problem to be faced of separation at all too frequent intervals. These are strains that naturally, the Army would rather be without—I make no bones about that.
I want to take this opportunity of making it clear once again that there is no truth whatever in the rumours that have been prevalent lately to the effect that there either have been or are about to be further reductions in the force level in Northern Ireland. The Armed Forces are there for a purpose—that is to assist in the establishment and maintenance of law and order. Until that purpose is achieved they will remain in support of the RUC, and they will remain in the strength that the level of violence requires. Despite the problems and strains

that the commitment imposes, I am confident that not a single member of the Armed Forces would wish it to be otherwise. The Armed Forces have a job to do and they want to see it through to a finish.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Is the Minister aware of the persistent rumours that circulate in Northern Ireland—they may be malicious in origin—that the strength of the Army there is grossly overstated at the figure of 14,000? Will the hon. Gentleman say something to assist those of us who are engaged in attempting to dispel such an absurd but damaging rumour?

Mr. Brown: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because it underlines the point that I am trying to make—that there has been no reduction at all in the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland except that which was announced earlier this year.
As was stated in the defence White Paper, there are at present 12 major units serving in the Province in the infantry rôle. In addition there have for some time been two armoured reconnaissance regiments, making a total force level of 14 major units of the combat arms. There are also SAS, engineer, signals, aviation, transport, military police and administrative and logistic support units. Numerically, the total Army strength is about 14,000, excluding the UDR. The Government have no plans to reduce the present force level for the time being.
Our forces in Northern Ireland naturally have the highest priority when it comes to new equipment required for operations, and there are special procedures for ensuring that new operational requirements are met as quickly as possible. The range of equipment available to our forces in the Province is extensive, including riot control weapons, protective clothing, devices for night vision and observation, and special equipment for the dangerous tasks of neutralising bombs and incendiary devices.
In the research and development programme every advantage is taken of advances in all fields of technology, applying them to the development of equipment designed to help the forces in their task of supporting the police. Automatic data processing has, for example,


been used successfully for some time to assist the security forces in checking suspect vehicles—a straightforward application of modern technology to an essential security task. As the House was informed last year, a new information system, based on automatic data processing, is being introduced in the Province to handle the existing records on terrorist activity.
I underline that point for people who have expressed fears about the data processing. We are dealing only with information which is already on the files. The advantage of automatic data processing is that we can get a response at the flick of a switch rather than having to sort through the files. This is a tremendous advantage in the maintenance of law and order.
Our security policy is based on the detection, arrest and conviction through the courts of those responsible for terrorist crimes, and the provision of accurate and timely information to the security forces is a fundamental requirement if this policy is to be successfully pursued. The use of automatic data processing enables this vital information to be processed and acted upon more quickly—and I am sure the House will recognise the important contribution that this improvement will make to the fight against terrorism in the Province.
On another issue, I have read the reports of the measure of dissatisfaction expressed by Service families in Northern Ireland. I emphasise that the problem is mainly about the families of Service men who serve in Northern Ireland for longer than the roulement period of four months. It is the resident battalions about which these reports have been dealing, that is, five out of 14 major units of the combat arms. On my last visit to the Province I visited the resident battalion stationed at Omagh and discussed some of its problems with its commanding officer. All of us have been concerned about the problem over costs and lack of job opportunities for wives, but this is not, of course, peculiar to Northern Ireland.
There is also the problem of the security of families and the effects on families of separation. The Armed Forces Pay Review Body and the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee have visited Service men in Northern Ireland in

recent months and these problems were brought to their attention, as they have been to mine whenever visiting the Province. Some of the problems are not easily remedied, because they arise from the security situation in Northern Ireland. The present rate of unemployment and the dangers mean the job opportunities and social contacts are made far more difficult. There is also the problem of the costs of heating and lighting in Northern Ireland, which I understand are certainly higher than the average in Great Britain, but we are about to start a programme of improving the insulation of married quarters in the United Kingdom and I have instructed that the first priority of this programme should be Northern Ireland and other parts of Great Britain with similar problems.
The Guardian article of the 14th April quoted average council house rents in Northern Ireland as being about £4 per week, whereas Service men pay accommodation charges of between £7 and £8 per week. This is broadly correct, but it must be remembered that married quarters charges include, as well as rent and rates, elements for furniture and household equipment and extra maintenance, which are not provided for council house tenants.
Rents for Service married quarters are based on average council house rents, which means in practice average rents in England, where most council houses are. There are wide local departures from the average. In some areas Service rents may be a good deal higher or lower than council rents in those areas. In Northern Ireland they are unfortunately higher.
I am aware of the disparities in Northern Ireland in rents and, indeed, in many other respects and I have called for a full report. When I have received it, I shall consider what further action could and should be taken.

Mr. Goodhart: How long is that likely to take—a month, six weeks?

Mr. Brown: I have called for an urgent report and I hope that it will be weeks rather than months.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Can the hon. Gentleman deal with the point that I raised about insurance?

Mr. Brown: That point has not been brought to my notice on my visits to


Northern Ireland. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising it and I shall certainly look at it.
Northern Ireland is a subject in itself, yet in many ways it illustrates the burden of the message which I have sought to make to the House today. I hope that all hon. Members will take every opportunity to acquaint themselves with the reality of the Army in the field. They will find it in good order, well equipped, well led—a volunteer, professional force which continues to do us credit wherever it serves and which is a first-rate element in our contribution to NATO.
On 7th July Her Majesty the Queen will herself see the Army in the field in Germany. She will review a representative parade of the British Army at Senile-lager in the Federal Republic of Germany as part of the Silver Jubilee celebrations. This will provide an excellent opportunity for Her Majesty to see the work of our troops in the British Army of the Rhine. His Excellency President Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, will also be present at the review.
Some 3,800 troops will take part in the review, including elements of the 4th Division and the 6th and 20th Armoured Brigades. The armoured regiments taking part will be the 16th/5th Lancers, the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars, the Royal Hussars and the Blues and Royals. The infantry battalions on parade will be the 1st Battalion of the Queen's Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the 2nd Light Infantry and the 2nd Royal Irish Rangers. Others on parade will include elements of the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Royal Corps of Transport, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. The massed bands of the regiments of the British Army of the Rhine will also take part.
The vehicles and equipment taking part in the review will include the Chieftain main battle tank, the FV430 series of armoured personnel carriers and recovery vehicles, Scimitar and Scorpion reconnaissance vehicles, Stalwart vehicles, the Abbott self-propelled gun, the M107, M109 and M110 guns, the Lance missile system, Cymbeline radar, armoured bridging equipment and helicopters.
After the review, the Queen will meet informally a representative number of British soldiers and their families, and will visit a number of displays by units of the British Army of the Rhine. Certain hon. Members will similarly have the opportunity to witness this review at first hand. I should be interested to hear their views afterwards. If they are not impressed by what they see, I shall be very surprised. I refer not to the pageantry but to the quality of the military fighting force which will be on parade before Her Majesty.
I am pleased to have had the opportunity to make this report to the House this afternoon. I have sought to paint a positive picture. I do not pretend that there are no problems or that everything in the garden is lovely, because it is not. These are difficult economic times for us all, and defence has had to take its share of the burden of national economic recovery. However, I believe that our policies have been found by experience to be well-judged and effective. The character of the Army in the field is the proof of this and it is a matter of pride to me that I have the honour of speaking for the Army in this House and taking ministerial responsibility for such a fine Service.

5.31 p.m.

Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison: It would be presumptions of me to try to answer the points he mentioned or to take up what the Minister has said, but I congratulate him on what he said about recruiting. He said that it is good at the moment. I have always thought that it is much better to get a man who is in the Army already to sign on for a further period than to have any raw recruit. This information about recruiting is therefore a very good sign.
I wish to deal with a few points that have struck me during the last year in the course of visits that I have made, either with my Committee—the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee—or individually, to various centres of the Army. They may be rather disjointed but I should like the Minister to take note of them.
I mention first the Marchwood port. In case you feel that I am out of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and have had an


aberration in referring to a Royal Navy depot, I point out at once that this is not so. I did not know where March-wood military port was until I went there, but it is fairly close to Southampton, and until 1968 it was used particularly as a training establishment. Since then its rôle has undergone a considerable change. It now provides logistic support for operations, exercises and routine re-supply to various parts of the world.
According to Ministry of Defence figures, nearly 54,000 tons of freight, vehicles and explosives were handled there in 1975. In the light of these considerations, and in the context of our inquiry into the movement of reinforcements, the Committee visited Marchwood last December, and was greatly impressed with the efficient manner in which the port is operated. We were all the more concerned, therefore, to hear of some of the physical limitations that have been brought to light by the increased burden that Marchwood is now bearing. We were told, for instance, that inadequate berthing facilities and deep water channels restrict the use of the port to landing ships and logistic and other relatively shallow-draught vehicles. Moreover, the narrow 35-year-old jetty constricts the working area and leads to uneconomical double handling.
Secondly, the port has only one roll-on/roll-off terminal. The steadily increasing number of tanks and vehicles handled and the use of the roll-on/roll-off container trailers demonstrates the need for improved roll-on/roll-off facilities.
Thirdly, the port lacks adequate covered facilities. I understand that a comprehensive three-phase development plan, costing £13 million—not a vast amount—has been drawn up, based on the assessment of operational requirements and a development study by the Property Services Agency. These proposals were first submitted to the Treasury, I understand, in January 1976. I shall be grateful if the Minister, when he makes his winding-up speech, will give some indication of the stage that consideration of the plan has now reached, and say whether there is any likelihood of approval being given perhaps to a phased improvement scheme.
The Army's need for an all-military port to avoid reliance on civilian facili

ties cannot, in my view, be stressed too strongly, and I hope that these much-needed improvements to Marchwood have the highest priority in the spending plans of the Ministry.
We have to remember that, as compared with what happened in the last war, there would be a longer sea passage across the Channel, either to Belgium or to Holland, which are our allies, in NATO, because we cannot know at the moment what the situation in France will be. We are committed to getting our reserves across to the central front—this is the whole importance of Marchwood, in my Committee's view—so that they can play their rôle during the time of tension, which may be a good deal shorter than many of us have been led to believe.
Next, I should like to mention the TAVR, particularly as a result of what we saw when the Committee made a visit to Scotland. The Committee feels that it is essential to pay other visits, and we are trying to arrange them. We hope to visit the South-West in July and the North-East in October. When we were in Scotland, demonstrations were laid on by small groups of men of different units in the Edinburgh area during the afternoon, and in the evening we visited them in some of their drill halls. It was probably not their normal night to go there but they were so keen that they turned up and we were able to speak to many of the commanding officers and men. My Committee was greatly impressed by the obvious dedication and enthusiasm of both officers and men, and also by the enthusiasm of the women. As an old Territorial soldier, I was surprised to find them volunteering and training with the men. The reliance that we place on the TAVR and, indeed, on our reserve forces generally, is not generally appreciated in the country as a whole, or possibly even in this House.
Money is often mentioned in these defence debates, and I have always maintained that the Territorial Army, or the TAVR as it is now called, is the cheapest form of Army that we can possibly have. The cardinal rôle that it has to play on the outbreak of war—which none of us wants to see—is as a reserve to our Regular forces in the BAOR and elsewhere, should that emergency arise. I am sure, from what I have seen and heard, that the TAVR will give an extremely


good account of itself, provided that it is furnished with adequate supplies of modern weapons and equipment.
The TAVR is now called upon to play a rôle that it has never undertaken before. Many battalions know their expected rôle in war time, which will take many of these young men straight from civilian life and put them in the front line of the central front, right into the battle area. This is completely different from the position when we trained 40 years ago, when we had a longer time. I am glad that this is reflected in the better equipment and vehicles that are given to the TAVR, particularly those whose rôle is to reinforce on any front of war immediately.
I suggest that whenever hon. Members see men on leave in their constituencies—constituents or others this applies to all three Services—they should say "We are very pleased with you. You are doing a jolly good job." By showing themselves resolute and prepared for all emergencies, those men help to keep peace in the world.
My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) made a number of points. If I repeat them, it is because they are important.
First, I should like to refer to the Milan anti-tank guided weapon. When my Committee paid its last visit to BAOR, every general impressed his view upon us that it was imperative that the Army had that weapon. One might have thought that it was a British-made weapon. One almost felt that they had some ulterior motive in pressing for it, but I suggest that they were thinking of having the best for the Army. I understand that we are to build that weapon under licence in this country. That will provide much-needed employment. It is essential that any troops who may have to engage in battle should be supplied with that weapon. I was a little disappointed when the Minister said that the Army would be getting it by the end of the decade. I hoped that it might be before that. It seems that a slippage has occurred.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman misheard me. I said that the Milan would be available later this year, not at the end of the decade.

Sir H. Harrison: I obviously misheard the Minister. I put the best possible front on it. I though that he meant by the end of 1980. I am glad that it is to be available later this year. I presume that it will go first to the Regular troops on the central front. I hope that it will then go to the TAVR units, which will have an important rôle to play if everything goes wrong and we are engaged in war. It is essential for them to give a good account of themselves in battle if they have to take part. Therefore, they should have that weapon as well.
I should like now to mention our visit to Norway. We saw the commandos training in the Arctic Circle north of Narvik, in all the snow. It was good to see the enthusiasm of those men. Since 1969 45 Commando has been designated the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Commando and has been earmarked primarily for support of the northern flank under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe.
We were particularly impressed with the high morale and general proficiency of the men. We were also struck by the high degree of co-operation that obtains between not only the Marines and local Norwegian commanding officers but the Marines and men of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. Dutch units constantly train with their British counterparts. Common tactical doctrines have been evolved and progress has been made towards standardising equipment and vehicles. This is a fine example, on a small scale, of the potential that exists for military co-operation and interoperabiliy, which, sadly, is followed all too rarely in the rest of the Alliance.
We also visited Northern Ireland. We had perhaps been unnecessarily worried by what we had been told in Germany about the reluctance of troops to go for a fifth or sixth visit to Northern Ireland. We did not find that that was so. We were told that as soon as the men arrived, because they were there for a fifth or sixth time, they knew the job and what had to be done and they carried it out extremely well. There was no sign of their not wanting to be there. A soldier goes where he is told to go and carries out the job that he is assigned to do.
However, there is one grave matter that I should mention. The Minister has this point in mind and my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham also mentioned it. I refer to the difficulty of the pay of men in Northern Ireland. They seem to be getting less than their counterparts carrying out similar jobs in emergencies elsewhere.
We had a long discussion with various staff officers. I asked them to submit a paper to us so that we could get it right and give the right views to the Ministry. I am glad that the Minister has also called for a report. I am sure that the report for which I have called will go through his Ministry before it gets to me. If not, I shall be delighted to give it to him with any comments that the Committee may make. We are extremely worried about this matter. Men should not be financially worse off because they go to a trouble spot for which we have responsibility.
I went into one married quarter and met a soldier's wife who had a three- or four-year-old boy and a small baby. She could not get out to the shops in one of the local towns and she complained bitterly about the NAAFI. As an old soldier, I have heard this complaint quite often. Will the Minister see whether the NAAFI is doing the job that it normally does so proficiently for the Army in Northern Ireland? I know that it supplies everything and that it may have only small sales, but there must be some give and take. I should like to know that it is doing its job properly. No one likes to think that the men doing this dangerous job in Northern Ireland—the Minister gave the figures of those who had been killed and wounded—and their families, are suffering financially as a result.
I should like to think that our visit to Northern Ireland added some weight to what the Minister saw and that what I have outlined will be considered in any review on pay or allowances. Soldiers have a dangerous job to do in Northern Ireland. One has only to open a newspaper or listen to the wireless to know that that is so. Such conditions must have an effect on the soldier and his family. When their husbands go out wives do not know just how they will come back. Therefore, I ask the Minister to consider that point. I assure him

that he will have the support of my Committee in any attempt to achieve better financial conditions for our men in Northern Ireland.

5.50 p.m.

Mr. John Cronin: The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) made a very helpful contribution to the debate. As Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee, he has special experience of these matters. I agree with all that he said about Northern Ireland—a topic that was also dealt with in great detail by the hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart). I was glad to hear from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that he is to have a full report on the problem of housing for our soldiers in Northern Ireland, and I hope that he will look into all their economic difficulties. Not only are there the problems of housing, of the high cost of living and of the inability of their wives to obtain work; it seems quite wrong that soldiers serving in such hazardous conditions should suffer economic penalties that are not suffered by soldiers serving in other parts of the world.
My hon. Friend said that the charges for soldiers' accommodation were based upon council rents in most parts of Britain. I should have thought that there was room for some flexibility in the Army's charges for accommodation. There is no reason why they should be exactly the same in Northern Ireland as they are in other parts of Britain. It may be that my hon. Friend's Committee will suggest some improvements from that point of view.
The hon. Member for Beckenham also suggested that there should be more recognition for our soldiers in Northern Ireland, and he referred specifically to bomb disposal squads. I think that there is a strong case for their being allowed to have at least a clasp on their ribbons as a minor recognition of their hazardous and responsible duties.
The hon. Member for Beckenham went into considerable detail. I was astonished to hear him go so far as to say that commandos should be equipped with skis. This seems to be a detailed point of military equipment, though there may be some force in it. I was waiting to hear the hon. Gentleman recommend some


form of après-ski equipment as well, but that did not materialise.
The hon. Member for Beckenham made some lugubrious comments about the morale of junior commanding officers in the Army. I was rather surprised to hear that he had met junior officers who were so unhappy about their life in the Services. For various reasons associated with my equestrian hobbies, I meet junior officers in the Army quite frequently. I am always impressed by their high morale. Admittedly, they do not like the idea of cuts in defence expenditure, but they have had cuts in defence expenditure ever since the days of the Conservative Government, who first introduced them on a substantial scale. They have grown to live with them and they take them as a matter of course. Any suggestion that morale in the Army is impaired by the action of this Government is quite wrong and a slander on the high morale and efficiency of the officers and soldiers in our Army.
In the latter part of last summer, with some of my hon. Friends, I had the advantage of visiting Northern Ireland and I was very impressed by the high standard of efficiency with which duties were carried out there. I was especially impressed with how well the junior commanders carried their burdens. It has to be remembered that they are isolated in decision making. They have to make on the-spot decisions about matters involving life and death and the possibilities of provoking riots and of creating grave ill effects. They have the spotlight of television and radio reporters on them the whole time. Despite a very close examination of their conduct by the media, they carry out their duties in an excellent manner.
I should like my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary to give us some idea of the way in which he envisages the future of operations in Northern Ireland. Despite the excellence with which the Army is carrying out its duties, there is no escaping the fact that, year after year, several hundred people are killed and about 1,500 people are injured. We know that at present there are about 1,500 Provisional IRA activists at large.
It is a war of attrition. But is there any real sign that that war is being won?

I cannot see it. We know that about 1,000 gunmen are charged every year, but such is the effect of intimidation that only a relatively small proportion of those charged are actually sentenced. The Catholic and Protestant activists have a Mafia-like grip on the areas that they control. The facts seem very prejudicial to the success of any military operations carried out, bearing in mind the restrictions that are imposed upon them.
How long will the Government accept this stalemate? How long will the Army accept it? No one can pretend that there is a steady flow of success. There is nothing to show that it will end. Some time ago, I carried my worries to a general officer, who has since retired, who had a very large part to play in Northern Ireland affairs. I asked him when he expected the Army to be able to terminate its duties in Northern Ireland. He replied "In, say, about 100 years' time." He may have used an element of hyperbole in saying 100 years' time, but he was no doubt conveying that no immediate termination was in sight. I wonder what the Government think about the future. Are they thinking, for instance, of enabling the Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC to take over more from the Army to a greater extent? Are they thinking in terms of the people of Northern Ireland becoming more and more involved in looking after their own security? Are they thinking in terms of reducing—not now, nor next year, but some time in the future—the commitments of the Army in Northern Ireland?
Clausewitz said that war was the pursuit of policy by other means. It is true that this is a guerrilla war. Will the policy justify the methods of pursuing it? I should like to have some idea from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary.
Devolution has become a very popular word, if not construed into parliamentary action in this House. At a time when we are thinking so much of giving increased responsibilities to the Scottish and Welsh in their own affairs. I wonder whether it would be possible to give the people of Northern Ireland more responsibility for maintaining order in their own Province and thereby decreasing the very heavy burden on the British Army. I appreciate that there are immense difficulties about that, and I do not expect my hon. Friend


to give a detailed and comprehensive answer—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern): It would be strictly out of order if the Minister attempted to answer the last part of the remarks of the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin).

Mr. Cronin: In that event, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I must ask to be excused. I shall leave the subject of Northern Ireland and turn to that of Central Europe. Here, we have the British Army, supremely efficient and well equipped, with its NATO allies being confronted by the Warsaw Pact forces. They face odds of 1·5 to 1 in manpower, of 3 to 1 in tanks, of 2 to 1 in guns and of 2 to 1 in aircraft. From the military point of view, that is a rather unattractive situation. In my view there is no case at all for making any further reductions in expenditure on our forces in Central Europe.
At the same time, there seems to be an overall balance. It is obvious that if there were any military aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces it would be an unattractive prospect for them. It would commit them to a full-scale war, with incalculable consequences. So long as the NATO forces are as efficient as they are at present, even despite the disparities in numbers and equipment, they form an effective deterrent to military adventures by the Warsaw Pact.
What progress is there in the talks on mutual and balance force reductions? Negotiations have been going on since October 1973. The NATO Alliance first of all proposed proportional reductions in ground forces, and subsequently proposed reductions, also of a proportional nature, in tactical nuclear forces, but there has been no progress, largely, one gathers, because the Warsaw Pact wants equal reductions in numbers, which would have the effect of making the odds against the NATO forces more unfavourable than ever. What progress is there in the talks? Is there any possibility of making some concessions which would not be of a damaging nature but would at least get the negotiations off the ground?
What is the present situation in relation to support costs in West Germany? Because of the fall in the value of the pound, there has been a greatly increased

burden of defence expenditure on our forces stationed in West Germany. Have the Federal German Government been approached to give more help, financially or economically, towards our support costs? There are many ways in which this could be done. They could, for example, buy British securities in proportion to the increased expenditure resulting purely from the depreciation of the pound. In terms of equity, the West German Government should at least carry some of the burden that we are carrying purely as a result of the depreciation of the pound, over which we have no control. No one in this country or in the Government can tell the money markets of the world what they are to pay for the pound note — it is as simple as that.
I turn now to the welfare of the Army. What is to happen as a result of the report of the Spencer Committee, set up in 1974? Quite a few of its recommendations were valuable, particularly those concerning the difficulties of Service families when soldiers are posted overseas. It expressed deep concern about long periods of unaccompanied postings, which, it said, sometimes give rise to complex cases of social distress. It recommended that there should be more full-term social workers for the Army. I hope that that suggestion is being given more consideration that it has been given so far.
There is a good case for there being some progress towards fewer unaccompanied tours abroad. Has progress been made in that direction? Has more been done to help soldiers get home leave when they are on unaccompanied tours? I have had a great deal to do in helping with the problems involved in this aspect.
I hope that my hon. Friend will say something about the problem of housing when soldiers leave the Army. Most of us have found this to be a great problem. A soldier retires from the Army and wants a house for his family, but finds himself number 3,050 on the housing list of a local authority, with no prospect of a house in the foreseeable future. This causes great distress, and it is a very sudden change for a family that has been living in pleasant Army quarters to find itself with no housing at all at what it can afford to pay, which is often very little. What is being done to help provide housing for soldiers when their service terminates?
I ask my hon. Friend also to deal with the problems of the children. There is a strong case for having pre-school playgroups in every barracks. Some have them, and they are a great success, but many do not have provision for children below school age. With relatively small expenditure, such provision could surely be arranged in nearly all barracks.
There is also much to be done for handicapped children. In the Army in Britain, they are being helped considerably, but handicapped children of soldiers serving overseas are in special difficulties, and I hope that the Ministry can do something about that.
Could more be done to improve the social life in married quarters—for example, through the setting up of community centres in more married quarters and a more liberal interpretation of the regulations governing the use of transport for non-duty purposes when they are in isolated places? A lot could be done on these lines to help soldiers and their families living in married quarters.
It is pleasant that we here are all dedicated to improving the lot of the Army in its service to the nation. Certainly, in Northern Ireland and other places our troops are having a difficult time and are coping with a dedication and devotion that command the admiration and respect of us all.

6.7 p.m.

Mr. William Craig: I join the Minister in paying tribute to the Army and its services in Northern Ireland and in condoling with the relatives of those who, unhappily, have died in the past year. I shall speak principally about Northern Ireland, and I ask the Minister to ponder on the remarks of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Select Committee on Public Expenditure, which was told by an under-secretary of the General Staff that the need for reducing the force levels of the Army in Northern Ireland was urgent and that some progress had been made in that direction.
I believe that to be a correct conclusion in the interests of the Army, but I would like some assurance that, as the Ministry acts in the best interests of the Army, it will not leave a security void in Northern Ireland. It is commonly said

that the Army is there in support of the RUC, but I believe that that is fictional. I believe that the Army is the primary force in Northern Ireland, and that as long as the Government are prepared to accept that situation we shall have some difficulty in following their policy in relation to the Army. I was pleased to hear the hon. Gentleman say that there are still 14,000 troops in Northern Ireland, in that that statement refutes those who are trying, for the wrong reasons, to distort the situation. I believe, however, that 14,000 troops are too many.
I would like the Minister to have a look at the rôle of the Army in Northern Ireland. After all, it has been there since 1969, but terrorism continues to menace the people of Northern Ireland. By no stretch of the imagination can anyone describe it as a successful policy. I am not blaming the Army, the officers or the soldiers. The rôle of the Army has been misconstrued. I strongly support those who advocate a more specialised rôle for the Army in support of the police, but that presupposes that we are to have a police force that is capable of discharging its responsibility to the people of the Province.
I am continually dismayed when Government spokesmen talk about not having Para-military police but about having civilian police. Such talk is meaningless. What we need is a police force to maintain law and order in Northern Ireland, equipped and trained for whatever the law may require. The Army could then envisage itself being there in support of the RUC, with its specialised technical services that are appropriate to a guerrilla war, but this would not involve anything like 14,000 men.
I should like the Minister, when he looks at the rôle of the Army, to consider the rôle of the UDR, a fine body of men operating in difficult circumstances and doing a good job. But is it the best job that they could do? Is the UDR the right sort of organisation to support the RUC? Should it be an Army auxiliary at all? Perhaps it would be better organised as a police auxiliary. These questions are all relevant to the well-being of the Army as a whole. When we are looking at the resources at the disposal of the Army, we must remember that these concern the whole of the United Kingdom. I share the concern for the whole United Kingdom and I do not speak


purely from a limited Northern Ireland point of view.
It is very difficult to pretend any longer that the policy that has been followed in Northern Ireland is for the good of Northern Ireland or for the good of the Army as a whole. I should like to hear from the Government—if not today, at a fairly early date—how they propose, in the interest of the Army, to reduce force levels in Northern Ireland and how they intend to ensure that there will be adequate support for the police and that adequate thought has been given to the formation of specialist antiterrorist units in the Army.
Since 1969 we have endured too much for to long. We are grateful for what the Army has done, but we want to see a speedy end to the situation in Northern Ireland. It is impossible for any of us here to persuade the people of Northern Ireland that we cannot defeat the terrorists in a short time. The IRA should have been defeated years ago. We want to hear from the Government, in much more positive and precise terms, how it will be done. We do not want any talk of its being a hundred years. It has to be done quickly.
I appeal to the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army to reassess its rôle and its organisation in Northern Ireland and, in the interests of the whole of the Army, to get better value from the very limited resources available.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. W. E. Garrett: All hon. Members present will have been moved by the speech of the right hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Craig). He has certainly given the Minister food for thought about the rôle of the 14,000 troops in Northern Ireland, and I should imagine that it will be quite a problem to reply to the points which have been raised.
The hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) is not present at the moment. When he opened the debate I thought for one dreadful moment that he was going to be as gloomy as the noble Lord who professes a real expertise when discussing military matters—namely Lord Chalfont, who in a recent television series gave a picture of absolute gloom. I thought that the hon. Member for Beckenham was falling into that trap, but he seemed

to retrieve himself and made some constructive points. I was also very pleased with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary's highly competent speech, with its mass of detail and complete rebuttal of many of the charges brought by the hon. Member.
The hon. Member for Beckenham also touched on the subject of recruitment, and I should like the Minister to give a reasonable breakdown of the recruitment figures. I should be interested to see the figures for the North-East, particularly Northumberland and Durham, an area that the Army has traditionally used as a major source of recruitment and from which, throughout the years, it has always had good value for money. I believe that recruitment could have been improved more if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he was Secretary of State for Defence, had not abolished the county regiments.
It was an odd decision that regiments such as the Durham Light Infantry and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers should be merged into meaningless groups but regiments like the Green Howards and the King's Own Scottish Borderers were allowed to survive. The King's Own Scottish Borderers have their regimental headquarters in Berwick and the Green Howards have their headquarters at Richmond. If the old county regiments had been kept in being, there would have been a sense of involvement and pride in serving in them and recruitment would have been easier. At present there is a tremendous reservoir of young people who would be excellent volunteers for the Armed Services. A breakdown of the figures would be useful.
Much has been said about pay for the forces, but no one has mentioned that the civilian back-up side of the Army is not too well paid either. If family income supplement is being paid to Regular troops, a fair amount of FIS must also be paid to civilians at many of the Army camps up and down the country. In this period of pay restraint it would be difficult for those civilians to be given a large increase, but I would like those responsible for pay to consider the civilian back-up side of the Armed Forces when pay restraint is eased.
The Armed Forces have been run down, but, funnily enough, in the county of Northumberland there has been an


expansion. I refer to the former RAF station which has been transformed into a recruitment training base and has been restyled the Albemarle Barracks. It has provided a considerable number of jobs in the region, which are welcomed, and I look forward to further expansion of the barracks. I understand that planning permission has been sought for a small arms training centre. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister, representing Newcastle upon Tyne, West as he does, will know that there is still a lot of land for the Armed Forces to train in. We have the famous camp at Otterburn in Northumberland which is intensely used, and it is intended that it should stay there for a considerable time.
I am also pleased that the Minister has resisted the one-man campaign by the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter), who has been waging a campaign over the years to abolish Army bands. I am extremely proud of the skill and expertise of our Army musicians. I would hate to think of places such as Kneller Hall, the Army centre of music, being abolished. The British public are as thrilled as I am to see a military band in its full splendour and pageantry, but the Minister should from time to time emphasise that these men are also trained for other duties in the Armed Forces. I hope that in this Jubilee year the public will get the opportunity to see the bands in the various events that will be taking place.

Mr. Cronin: Perhaps I may reinforce my hon. Friend's point. The Army bands are not only aesthetically pleasing; they raise morale. They also have a tremendously valuable economic purpose. In combination with troops employed on ceremonial duties, they attract tourists to this country, and that must be worth many millions of pounds to the balance of payments.

Mr. Garrett: That is a very important point. I should add that Kneller Hall is famous world-wide, because many personnel from abroad go there for their musical training. We therefore earn foreign currency in that way. A vigorous attack should be made at some time on the views of the hon. Member for Tyne-mouth.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: I recall that one of my hon. Friends at one time ran a campaign against Army bands. The hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) must have been running his campaign when I was out of the country, because I have seen nothing of it. If he is conducting such a campaign, however, I shall invite him to Kneller Hall to see the summer concert. That will open his eyes about the merit of military bands.

Mr. Garrett: My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary must have overlooked the fact that he has replied to Questions on this subject from the hon. Member for Tynemouth.
The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) referred to our reserve forces in the form of the TAVR. We in the North-East are proud of our units. They do a good job, and we are grateful for the hours of leisure that these men and women give up to provide the necessary back-up to the Regular forces. I think that the House should give a quiet vote of thanks to the wives and sweethearts of the men. They must miss the men a great deal, particularly at weekends.
The pay of the men has been improved a good deal. There has been a great improvement in their training rôle, and there is a greater awareness among them of the importance of the part they play in providing the back-up. I am a layman, but when I visit the units I observe that some of the equipment is getting on a bit. Some of the vehicles could possibly be put on the scrap-heap. I should like an assurance that more modem equipment can be issued to the reserve forces. They would welcome it and it would increase their motivation in the tasks they are carrying out on our behalf.
The Minister completely rebutted some of the pessimistic statements of the hon. Member for Beckenham. His speech reassured me, too. I was beginning to succumb to the dripping propaganda that we have cut our forces to the bone, that we have impaired their efficiency and that we have prevented them from being the competent units that we would wish. I hope, therefore, that the widest possible publicity will be given to the statement by my hon. Friend the Minister that those pessimistic utterings are blatantly untrue.
The people of this country get damned good value for money from the Armed Forces. We tend to forget about them when things are peaceful, and when things go wrong we tend to get alarmed when they do not react as we would expect them to do. They will react with skill, efficiency and professionalism only if we, the taxpayers, are prepared to give them the necessary back-up of equipment and, above all, act to keep their morale high.
In my limited knowledge of the forces I have so far seen no lowering of morale. I do not meet many officers, but I meet a lot of young men who are serving in different units of the Army. When they are home on leave and I drink with them in a pub, I notice that they are smart, clean and confident, and, above all, they are very proud to be soldiers of the Queen.

6.25 p.m.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson: I am sure that the whole House will agree with the hon. and musical Member for Wallsend (Mr. Garrett) in his praise of military bands and of their efficacy and desirability on the modern scene. The hon. Member referred to pessimism and optimism over our approach to the defence effort. I believe that we need to be neither pessimistic nor optimistic. We need to be realistic.
I did not see Lord Chalfont's television programme about the Russian build-up. It is important that the people who have to foot the bill for our defence realise what it is all about. It is, therefore, important that we appreciate that for a variety of reasons the Soviet Union has had a very considerable military buildup. It is important for us to take a realistic view of our contribution to NATO defence.
I think it is highly unlikely that there will ever be a frontal attack by the Soviet Union on the West. One can never be dogmatic about the intentions of another country, and one never knows how quickly intentions may change. We know only that history has taught us that military capacity often leads to changes of policy, and we must safeguard against that.
The chief reason for the Soviet military build-up is, I believe, to increase that country's ability to exercise unwanted and undesirable military pressure which

could be used to facilitate or assist internal insurrection. It is, therefore, important for us to get the balance right. If we have economic chaos, internal insurrection becomes that much more likely. It is, therefore, important to get a balance between our military expenditure and the economic state of the country.
We must all be concerned to ensure that we do not cut our defence effort more than is necessary to meet our economic circumstances. I believe that it is much more important to try to avoid next year's projected cuts than to cry over the spilt milk of this year's cuts. I believe that next year's cuts are much more likely to affect our military capacity and our contribution to NATO.
The hon. Member for Wallsend saved this debate from becoming a debate on Northern Ireland, since the two Members who preceded him dealt with the subject. It is very easy to argue about the rôle of the Army in Northern Ireland. The late Aneurin Bevan once said of the Suez adventure that this country put its foot down there but its real trouble arose when it decided to lift it up again. That applies to Northern Ireland. I was against sending the Army in at all in 1969. The real problem now is how to change the Army's rôle there and how to bring the Army out. That is not a subject for this debate, however.
There should be a separate Vote for defence spending on Northern Ireland. Tributes have already been paid to the Army and its rôle in Northern Ireland. To the individual soldier it is a highly undesirable rôle. I am sure that soldiers did not join the Army to fulfil such a rôle. Northern Ireland is also a millstone around the Army's neck. The Under-Secretary said that this operation was now costing £60 million a year, but that money is being spent for a specific purpose unconnected really with the major defence effort of this country. As such it deserves a separate Vote.
Pay, allowances and conditions of service must be made fair and attractive in Northern Ireland. The Under-Secretary referred to the study on housing conditions and the relativity of rents for Service dwellings and council dwellings, but there is a supreme difference. People who live in council houses in Northern Ireland choose to live there, but Army personnel in married quarters are there


through necessity, and it is grossly unfair that they have to pay much higher rents than those paid by council tenants. Because of the difficult rôle that the Army has to play in Northern Ireland, the country ought to finance the necessary improvements in this sphere, and that is an added reason why Northern Ireland deserves a separate Vote.
As I have said on a number of occasions, and as has been said many times by the hon. Member for Petersfield (Mr. Mates), service in Northern Ireland interferes considerably with the training régime that is required for the British Army of the Rhine. That is all that I have to say about Northern Ireland.
I now come to the position of the British Army of the Rhine, which is the Army's main contribution to the defence of Western Europe. As I understand it, we are supposed to provide a credible conventional response in the central sphere for at least two or three weeks. It is important, from the public point of view, that we should be demonstrably able to do that, otherwise the nuclear threshold is clearly lowered. Fulfilment of our rôle means that ammunition and spares on the ground must be at realistic scales. That is why I emphasise that it is important that we try to avoid the projected cuts for next year which might mean cutting ammunition and spares much more than the savings this year have done.
The Minister was right to mention the arrangements for the reinforcement of the British Army of the Rhine. I understand from what he said that the Eastern Field Force will be the main means of doing that, but have exercises been carried out to find out how long the reinforcements would take to get to the British Army of the Rhine? I suspect that the answer is "No".
We were told by the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) that there is only one roll-on/roll-off facility in the military port near Southampton. Have any exercises taken place using civilian facilities for this purpose? It is necessary for this exercise to be undertaken at some time.

Mr. W. E. Garrett: The hon. and learned Gentleman might not be aware of it, but the Army hired a ship from

the Norwegian Bergen Line, embarked troops at Newcastle and took them to Norway for exercises. There was a public outcry that a civilian ship had been used for that purpose.

Mr. Hooson: I do not know about that problem, but I think that at a time of straitened economic circumstances there are greater priorities for the Army than acquiring another roll-on/roll-off facility. I do not know how many roll-on/roll-off facilities there are in the South-East of England where they are required, but an additional purely military one cannot, as a matter of commonsense, be one of the top priorities.
I come now to some detailed items on which my hon. Friends and I would like some information. The first matter is that of the main battle tank. At the moment, it seems that the deal between ourselves and Germany for the production of this tank has fallen through. I think that the Minister touched on this, but he did not give any details.
The Chieftain tank should be modernised when time and finance allow that to be done, but the Army must have a programme for that, and we want to know how it will be affected by any projected cuts. What steps have been taken to update the Chieftain's engine? Are there any plans to update the fuel control equipment? The main armament, the gun, should be the subject of continuous development, because I am advised that at the moment we have a lead in this matter. I am no expert on this subject, and I am going on what experts tell me. I am told that the existing tank is the basis of a very good tank indeed, on condition that it is updated and modernised in the way that has been suggested.

Mr. Critchley: Is not the situation rather worse than the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests? Is it not a fact that the more efficient mark of the Chieftain tank, which could cure many of the failings of the existing mark, is being sold to the Iranians rather than being supplied to the British Army of the Rhine?

Mr. Hooson: I am not in a position to answer that question, but I am sure that the Minister heard it, and no doubt it can be dealt with when he replies to the debate. It is an important matter.
I turn now to the replacement of the infantry track carrier, the AFV432. I am informed that this is out of date and needs replacement. Can the Minister give an assurance that a replacement for this track carrier is in the pipelie?
I turn now to the question of training facilities. There are inadequate training areas in BAOR and in the United Kingdom. It is essential, therefore, that we keep hold of the Suffield training area in Canada. Is the maximum use being made of that area? What investment is taking place in it so that it is kept up as an effective training organisation? Is it intended to keep going overseas training—which is essential—in, for example, Kenya, Gambia and so on in order to avoid an inexperienced and narrow-based Army that we might otherwise have?
Is there any intention to economise on adventure training, which is important to keep up morale and also as a recruitment aid? There have been suspicions that Army youth teams would be cut as an economy measure. These teams are important, and there is always a danger that they will fall a ready victim to those with a knife looking for smaller areas in which to achieve economies. In many ways they are the Army's contribution to society. They do all sorts of things, such as training local lads, and they get among the community. Can the Minister deal with this aspect of the matter and give us some reassurances?
We have heard a great deal in the debate about the Milan anti-tank missile and its development. I do not think that what the Minister said was very clear. In his intervention, the hon. and gallant Member for Eye elicited that the Milan will be available to the Army this year. As I understand it, the British production line will come later, in about 1980. Have I got it right? How expensive is this project? How expensive is it to produce in this way? Have comparable methods been considered? We have heard a good deal about the need for standardisation, and a good deal was said about this during the main defence debate. Another viewpoint put to me is that if we press for standardisation we could end up by, failing agreement, falling behind in the equipment that we require.
I think that standardisation is desirable within NATO, but it is important to know, for example, the economics of one

country developing a weapon, say the Milan, and other countries all within NATO having their own production lines for the weapon. Is that the cheapest way of achieving the kind of standardisation or inter-operability that we desire? Inter-operability is important. It is a difficult word to pronounce, and I hope that it is more functional than its pronunciation suggests. Anti-tank weaponry is important in view of the tremendous armoury that seems to be available to the Warsaw Pact countries.
Little has been said on the question of conventional artillery. We are facing a potential enemy which has almost the whole of its army under armour. We must be assured that our Army has the right ammunition in conventional as well as missile terms. We must have a clear statement on the rôle of the artillery. I am told—again I point out that I am not an expert in these matters, but I am advised by people who are—that we need much more smoke and illuminating shell. Is this forthcoming?
Have we sufficient medium-range and short-range anti-tank weapons of the right design? I mentioned in the defence debate the danger of cutting down on such weapons. I thought that of the current cuts the cut in helicopters, and possibly helicopter-borne anti-tank weaponry, was potentially the most damaging of all. The whole spectrum of anti-tank weaponry is vital because of the overwhelming Soviet tank threat.
I have raised a number of important technical points because I have always understood that this debate particularly is concerned with such points and that the defence debate is concerned with the general strategy. I suggested at the outset that it is important to be not pessimistic or optimistic but entirely realistic. While the Russians are building up their forces, this country, with its allies, must make sure that it has sufficient forces sufficiently well equipped to meet any threat and to remove the option in Soviet foreign policy which arises from its capacity. That does not mean that we should denude ourselves and make our selves economically vulnerable to internal insurrection in order to have an outer shell of defence, because we should then be destroying the very purpose for which we exist. It is, therefore, an important matter of balance.
The Government have gone as far in their cuts as they dare. All hon. Members are concerned to ensure that this country is adequately defended, and the sooner we restore next year's projected cuts the better.

6.43 p.m.

Dr. Alan Glyn: I am honoured to follow the Liberal Party spokesman, the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson). I agree with many of his remarks. The most important word which he used was "realistic". We must be realistic in our approach to the matter. I was particularly impressed by what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about informing the public of the dangers facing this country from Russia and of the massive conventional and nuclear buildup. After all, it is the taxpayer who must foot the bill. I was also impressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman's comment that we cannot do anything this year but we can do something next year because if we further reduce our defences we reduce them to a level which narrows the nuclear threshold.
The hon. and learned Gentleman made one point with which I could not agree. He referred to our forces in Northern Ireland, saying that they cost £60 million, none of which was military expenditure. But our soldiers are getting some military training, although it is not the ideal form of training them.

Mr. Hooson: I agree that there is an element of military training in it. My point was that the Defence Estimates are virtually £60 million more than they would otherwise be. That is why, to be fair to all concerned, it should Le regarded as a separate Vote.

Dr. Glyn: I take the hon. and learned Gentleman's point.
The hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) also referred to this matter. He said that the ideal situation would be one in which we had no troops in Northern Ireland and we had their replacement by some other force such as the UDR. I agree. However, I cannot agree with the hon. Gentleman's statement that no solution is possible. We must, over a period of years, ensure that the military forces are replaced by other forces, because it is not a proper task

for an army to be indefinitely employed in such a rôle. It undoubtedly interferes with men's military training and their domestic lives.
The hon. Member for Loughborough mentioned the possibility of instituting a special award for bomb disposal units. I agree with him. He also referred to the subject of housing, about which I shall say a few words later.
I wish to echo what the Under-Secretary of State said about Oman and our troops who carried out such a difficult rôle there. I am glad that the Government have put their appreciation on public record. The hon. Gentleman also paid tribute to our forces not only in Cyprus but in Northern Ireland. I was not altogether happy about what he said on the question of restructuring. He has had to perform an extremely difficult task in cutting down the forces within the budget allowed by the Treasury. He has done his best. I was fascinated by his explanation of the way in which it was proposed to introduce to a greater extent the important electronic equipment which we need so desperately. But we must maintain the equipment in other units. The hon. Gentleman had a delicate balance to strike, and he has struck it as best he can within his financial limits.
I was pleased that the Under-Secretary of State referred to the visit of Her Majesty the Queen to BAOR and to the fact that my former regiment, the Blues and Royals, all will be involved in the manoeuvres. The regiment is based in Windsor.
I wish to refer to a matter of considerable importance which was dealt with in the Second Report of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee. The Committee was right to say that
Short-term defence cuts may cause disruption out of proportion to their amount
and that
The United Kingdom's contribution to collective defence cannot be significantly reduced without risking a serious loss of confidence among members of the NATO Alliance… A future war could allow no time to make good weaknesses".
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison), in an earlier debate, made it clear that the costs of defence should be judged on no other basis than the cost required to defend this country against outside


aggression. That should be the yardstick. The more we reduce our conventional forces, the more this country becomes dependent on the nuclear deterrent. It is as simple as that. If we had no conventional forces, we should be entirely dependent on it. The greater our conventional forces, the less is the danger of nuclear involvement. No one will dispute that. Therefore, I regret that this has been the result of the cuts in our conventional forces in the Army.
I must admit that my party, when it was in office, was equally guilty in this respect. I take my share of the responsibility as a member of the party which started the cuts. But that does not mean that we should continue with cuts, because I do not think that they are in the interests of the country.
I was interested when I read in the White Paper to know that 11 to 12 per cent. of the Soviet gross national product is devoted to defence projects. But what does that mean? Is that Russia's spending alone, or does that percentage apply to the Warsaw Pact countries together? If it is Russia's spending alone, the amount that is being spent is terrifying. As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery made clear, the British people should appreciate the extent of the build-up of Soviet forces and should be prepared to pay for the adequate defence of this country. That is a matter that is appreciated by our NATO allies.
Consideration must be given to the reinforcement of our Regular forces by the TAVR and, presumably, by our forces stationed in Northern Ireland, who make up our NATO complement. It was said in the defence debate that the buildup of Russian Forces has been appreciated only in the past two years. I do not agree. We all recognise that there has been a build-up for many years. I am worried about the time interval that is involved in mobilising our forces—for example, bringing them from Northern Ireland—and transporting them to whichever theatre happens to be most threatened in NATO.
I remember my maiden speech in this place as two years earlier I had been involved in the Hungarian Revolution. At that time no one in Budapest knew where the Russian armies would come from. I was in Budapest at the time, and when

I looked at the map it was clear that there were two alternatives. If that situation could arise all those years ago—it was 1956—it could well happen today. I remember that I had the misfortune, or fortune, of going through the Russian armies. In fact, they came from an entirely unexpected direction. As the House is well aware, the results were disastrous.
Early warning is vital, and I do not know whether we shall have it. We must press the Government to ensure that we have adequate transport and that the time factor is properly known. I am pleased to see that the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence is making a note. I am sure that he recognises the wisdom of my remarks and that all his colleagues are considering the matter with great care. What transport would be used? Would it be civilian transport? Have we sufficient military transport? How long does it take to mobilise our troops? This is the crux of the conventional defence system in Europe. If our forces do not arrive in time, we shall have no alternative but to fall back on what is the ultimate deterrent. I hope that the Minister will give us some assurance.
As the scope of the debate is limited I am unable to refer to our nuclear deterrent directly, but I shall attempt to do so obliquely. Are the Government satisfied that the time interval is sufficient to avoid using the nuclear deterrent? If it is, are we confident that we have a sufficient nuclear deterrent to ensure that the country is adequately defended?
The Northern Ireland situation has been fully aired but I shall make one or two small points. There are different views about Northern Ireland. When they return from Northern Ireland, many soldiers say that they rather liked it. They say that it is preferable to Cyprus or elsewhere. However, NCOs do not seem to be so willing to go there time and time again. What is the maximum tour of duty in Northern Ireland of any one unit?
How long would it take completely to phase out the Army from Northern Ireland? This is a matter that was raised indirectly by the hon. Member for Loughborough. Irrespective of the political situation in Northern Ireland, I am sure that we all want to see our troops out of the area as fast as possible.
I shall refer to married quarters and the housing of those who have left the Services. The Minister was good enough to send me the excellent pamphlet dealing with housing for ex-Service men and Service women. I have a feeling that many local authorities are faced with extraordinarily difficult problems. As is set out in the pamphlet, it is particularly difficult for local authorities which have responsibilities for garrison towns. The number of ex-Service men and women seeking housing in the garrison towns is disproportionate to the number in any other area. Many suggestions are made in the pamphlet, but we must recognise the difficulties and the present cost of housing. I know that various schemes exist, but I do not think that they are adequate to enable Service men and women to save so that they are in a position to buy a house. Perhaps the remedy is to release some of the hirelings. If the Government own them, consideration should be given to selling them or renting them to ex-Service men and women.
Housing difficulties often deter men from staying in the forces. They are genuinely worried about their position when they leave. Many of us have had individual experience of people spending many years in the forces and finding that when they come out, after having done all they can while in the Services, the money they have saved is insufficient to provide a deposit, owing to inflation.
I ask the Minister to give consideration to the length of training at Sandhurst. I do not think that it is long enough. I listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said about graduates, but I understand that his remarks applied to a great extent to the technical people—for example, the engineers. It has been said that many of the young officers may be trained academically, but even if they have been through the ranks many of them need a longer period of training at Sandhurst to appreciate the difference between Army life and civilian life.
I am sure that there is no one in the House who does not wish to pay tribute to our forces and the rôle they perform. I believe it is our duty to point out to the country that there is a real danger in the massive build-up of the Soviet forces. The Chinese have a long frontier with

Russia, and presumably the Russians would not want to fight on two fronts, but why is there an enormous Russian build-up of conventional forces, especially tanks, infantry and naval forces?
Is the Russian build-up taking place for protection? I cannot believe that that is so. We must ensure that Britain is adequately defended. We cannot rely on the possibility that China might suddenly operate against Russia and force the Russians to fight on two fronts. Britain should accept that it has tremendous obligations to the whole of Western civilisation. I hope the House will appreciate that those duties are on the shoulders of the Government and that it is up to them to ensure that they are carried out.

6.58 p.m.

Mr. Michael Mates: Despite the strictures of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson), I make no apology for confining my few remarks to one narrow subject, tempting as it is to range a little wider, as others have done. I wish to return in some detail to the pay and conditions of service of the troops and their families serving in Ulster.
Every time that I catch your eye during a defence debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, it seems to be my misfortune to find that it is the Minister's supper hour. I hope that the Minister of State will be able to—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman wishes to change the Minister or the occupant of the Chair.

Mr. Mates: My prayers have been answered, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I see that the Under-Secretary of State is entering the Chamber.
I know that in trying to put some of the problems to the Minister I am treading a path through a complex system in which the pay and conditions of service are determined. Although I agree in principle with the sentiments that have been expressed by other hon. Members, I do not believe that we can make detailed, valid comparisons between the take-home pay of the soldier and the policeman with whom he may be working, be he a member of the RUC, the UDR


or another force. It is a much more complex problem than that.
We have now reached a point when something must be done beyond expressing a general intention to look into the matter. I am not talking about paying a soldier or any Service man extra money for the danger involved in his job. This is a personal view, which is probably shared by many hon. Members and those in the Services. I do not believe that the majority of soldiers would want that. I ask the Minister a specific question which requires either a "yes" or a "no". Are the Government determined that no soldier shall suffer a financial penalty by virtue of the necessity to serve in Northern Ireland in the present situation? There is a long pause. If the Minister cannot answer that truthfully and say that he intends that there shall be no financial penalty, he will find little support in the House and no support in the country.
It must be basic to our discussion on conditions of service in Ulster that no soldier is financially penalised by having to go to Ulster to do a pretty awful job.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: The hon. Member will recall that I said that I had urgently called for a report on housing and other issues in Northern Ireland and added that I would look at the report and decide what action could and should be taken. I said that because I do not know, any more than does the hon. Member, what might take the place of phase 2. Presumably the hon. Member is not suggesting that the Services should receive special consideration on the question of any incomes policy for the nation.

Mr. Mates: That was not my question and I believe that the Minister knows it. I ask the question again. Is it the Government's policy that no soldier shall suffer a financial penalty because he is required to serve in Northern Ireland? I do not think that I will get an immediate answer. It is a perfectly simple question which must form the basis for any inspection of the problem. I am not talking about pay policy or increments. I am saying that, if we as politicians send soldiers to Ulster to do a job, we must see that they are not financially penalised. I cannot appreciate why the Minister does not instantly agree with this.
I know that there are many factors to be taken into account when looking at a soldier's conditions of service. This is why I am rather worried over the Minister's remark about leaving this to the Armed Forces Review Body. This is a standing committee which advises the Minister on pay and conditions of service world-wide. The only time I ever came face to face with it was in Texas when it wanted me to try to compare my pay and conditions of service there with pay and conditions of soldiers elsewhere in the world. That body would not be looking at Northern Ireland in isolation.
I am prepared to accept that by and large, over his career, a Service man will take a bit of the rough with a bit of the smooth. The present terms of service in Ulster are alleged to be comparable throughout the United Kingdom. There is no special allowance, aside from the 50p a day. The treatment for families is no different. There is no difference in any of the terms of service. Even before the troubles started, it was accepted that it was more expensive to live with a family in the garrison in Northern Ireland than it was on the mainland of Great Britain, if one was English, Scots or Welsh. That was to do with taking the rough with the smooth.
The problem is now becoming much more serious because of its cumulative effect. We can in no sense accept that a soldier, whether he be stationed in the garrison or under the roulement scheme serving for four months, is living under conditions in any way comparable to those in the rest of the United Kingdom. The restrictions are different. He is not free to live the life he would live elsewhere on the mainland. These restrictions affect the way he spends his leisure and how he can travel. We are looking at a completely new set of circumstances.
Whatever body the Minister sets up to examine this question, it cannot possibly look, as the Armed Forces Review Body is compelled to look, at terms and conditions of service world-wide. These have to be balanced out by the review body to arrive at a fair assessment of what a soldier or officer should be paid. This is completely different. The first thing the Minister has to do—and I would be interested to hear his preliminary views tonight—is to make the firm decision that terms and conditions


of service for soldiers and their families in Ulster are quite different from those anywhere else in the United Kingdom.
The Minister expressed some surprise when my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) raised the question of insurance. He said that he had not heard of this. There may be many other factors about which he has not heard. For a moment or two I shall try to help. Has the hon. Gentleman, or have his officials, seen an excellent document called "Regional Surveys, Cost of Living Report" published by Reward Regional Surveys Ltd.? This is a non-Government document which sets out for business purposes the difference between the cost of everyday life in Ulster and in the rest of the United Kingdom. It does not need me to say that the cost of living is more expensive in Ulster. Every right hon. and hon. Member who represents an Ulster constituency knows that this is part and parcel of civilian life in Ulster. While one has sympathy with this, one has nevertheless to say that those who live and work in Ulster do so ultimately by choice. They know that the cost of living is higher. It may well be that if they wanted to leave they could do so.
That is not the case with the British Army. The soldiers are posted there, and at the moment it is a United Kingdom posting. They are supposed to go there with their families and lead a normal family life. When they go elsewhere in the world, the difference in the cost of living is assessed. This is true of Germany, Cyprus, the United States and wherever else the British Army is stationed. A calculation is made against a set pattern of expenditures. This is averaged out and a complex answer is reached, expressed as a local overseas allowance. That allowance is not payable in Ulster, because Ulster has always been considered to be part of the United Kingdom garrison.
That position, I suggest, is no longer tenable, not only because of the frequency with which soldiers have to go to Ulster but because they are unable to take the swings with the roundabouts. In some countries life may be a little more expensive in one way and the soldier and his family must change their way of life. While it may be more expen-

sive to eat, it may be cheaper to take holidays. If a soldier is stationed on the Continent, he can travel to the South of France, Italy and Switzerland much more easily than he could from England. That is the sort of thing that is balanced out to an extent in the mind of the Armed Forces Review Body, and certainly in the mind of the soldier.
But when the soldier goes with his family to Ulster there is no compensation. To draw from personal experience, 10 years ago I was in the garrison in Omagh, in peace time. It was more expensive to live there, chiefly because of the stretch of water between Ulster and Great Britain, to which I shall come in a moment. It was more expensive to send children home to see grandparents. But life was very agreeable; there were the beauties of Ulster to enjoy, the company of Northern Ireland friends with whom one could freely associate, and the opportunity to go south and enjoy the Republic of Ireland without restriction. But those days are gone. Now there is nothing for a soldier and his family to do except live a semi-prison existence. The security precautions totally restrict ordinary family life and make it almost unrecognisable from service anywhere else, and considerably more expensive as well.
I do not want to bore the House with figures, but the survey covering the basic cost of living in Northern Ireland proves that Ulster comes out worst on almost every subject. Compared with the regions of England, Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland's retail price index is higher than that of anywhere else in the United Kingdom, and that fact is not recognised in the soldiers' pay packet. The cost of fuel is higher; services, leisure and transport all cost more, and so on right through the spectrum. According to this very detailed survey, in almost every case there is a significant difference between the basic cost of living in Northern Ireland and that of the rest of the United Kingdom. In fact, the overall cost of living is 8·9 per cent. higher, and that is considerable.
One must also consider the inevitable fact that almost all the soldiers in Ulster come from other parts of the United Kingdom. Therefore, they have families on the mainland. It is part and parcel of anybody's life—not just a soldier's—to


visit relatives at weekends or to go and show a new child to grandparents. For the majority of soldiers in Ulster, the only way they can get their families across to the mainland, if they have a car, is by car ferry. It costs £20 a time for the car and £7·35 per passenger. No grant or allowance is made to soldiers to cover this expense because of the myth that Ulster is the same as the rest of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Anthony Nelson: While I am well persuaded by my hon. Friend's argument, does he not feel that there is the slightest danger that our resolve to retain Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom—which indeed it is—might in any way be diluted, or appear to the public apparently to be diluted, by regarding the military presence in Northern Ireland as no longer part of the United Kingdom garrison? Does he not feel that by treating Northern Ireland as a foreign military garrison our political commitment to that country might in some way appear to have been diluted?

Mr. Mates: I am not suggesting that. I would be the last person to suggest that the Northern Ireland military presence should be part of anything other than what it is. It is, however, a fact of Service life that things have changed in Ulster. The basis upon which the calculations are made in the Ministry of Defence must be changed also. I have pointed out to the Minister the facts as they exist. There are a million other little items which, taken together, mean financial penalties for certain members of the garrison, especially those on short tours. These penalties are quite considerable and contribute towards the desire of the middle range of management in the Army—at officer and NCO level—not to go back to serve in Northern Ireland any more.
I am not suggesting that the decline in morale that has been mentioned by some hon. Members is anything to do with the job. Although it is unpleasant, all soldiers accept that the job has to be done. But the fact that it is costing them money to do that job must be debilitating. I would have thought that this sentiment was acceptable to all hon. Members. Imagine any trade union lobbies accepting that any one of their members should do a job for the sake

of the nation and suffer financially as a result. That would be considered intolerable. It would be considered an insult to trade unionists, and Labour Members would be horrified if we should contemplate it. I think that we all owe a debt to Mr. Derek Brown of The Guardian for the way in which he presented the facts about this matter before they were sensationalised in one or two other newspapers.
It may be difficult for the Ministry of Defence to accept Ulster as a special case, but I must point out that this has already happened. The Minister has accepted the fact that the circumstances are so special that there must be a special allowance. It was claimed when this allowance was introduced that it was nothing to do with danger money. The soldiers were paid 50p a day as a special compensation for the financial penalties involved in service in Ulster. That was three years ago, and nothing has happened since then. We all welcomed the allowance when it came, but now it is almost totally irrelevant.
If the Minister wants to be seen to be doing something which is not breaking the pay policy but compensating soldiers for the increasing financial penalties of returning to Ulster, he should act quickly and courageously in the manner which would be accepted in all parts of the House. There is no hon. Member who wants to see soldiers inadequately compensated for doing a very nasty job. If the Minister can give an encouraging reply and show that he understands the problem by answering the question directly, and saying that he will not be content to penalise soldiers serving in Ulster, this debate will have been of some use.

7.17 p.m.

Mr. John P. Mackintosh: The hon. Member for Petersfield (Mr. Mates) made his single point with considerable force and effectiveness for a considerable period of time, and I am sure that the House was impressed by the figures that he produced. I do not follow him on the specifically limited point of the Northern Ireland situation, important though that may be, but I go back to the speeches of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) and the hon. Member for Windsor and Maidenhead


(Dr. Glyn). I was impressed by both those speeches and their tone.
I am speaking in a defence debate for the first time in 11 years in this House and I feel rather guilty about that. Like many hon. Members, I do a considerable amount of work with the Armed Forces I have the privilege of working with them, teaching them and talking to them at Camberley, Greenwich and the Royal College of Defence Studies.
I have noticed in the last year the note of genuine alarm and worry in what many senior officers have said to me. The House should take note of that. We should be concerned at the fact that there is not an adequate means for them to present their worries to the House. Naturally, serving officers are somewhat reticent in talking about these matters, and very properly so. At the same time, they have a duty to let people know what is worrying them. There is no mechanism for doing this, and one picks it up only by visits to Service establishments, and by talking to soldiers. I find this very disturbing.
The general view of the defence situation is set out admirably in the 1977 Statement on the Defence Estimates. The point there is perfectly clear—our basic defence rests on a balance of power in Europe. That is the balance between NATO and the forces on the other side. It is not a man-for-man or a tank-for-tank balance; we lost that years ago. It is a political and military balance, which guarantees that at any time if the Warsaw Pact powers decided to solve a local argument by swift, immediate action, the West would be presented with the intolerable alternatives either of fighting a conventional war against the Warsaw Pact Powers or of escalating it into a nuclear confrontation. These alternatives are too horrible to contemplate. The position for the Warsaw Pact Powers in central Europe could become more and more dominant, and we would be less able to assert ourselves in diplomatic arguments about the future of Berlin and the problems that might arise if, for example, there were a change of réime in Yugoslavia. All these problems are in the grey areas between East and West.
The defence White Paper—I pay credit to the Ministers who wrote it—put things in perspective when it said that NATO was not capable of an ade-

quate and quick conventional response sufficient to make the Warsaw Pact Powers realise that a swift local sharp action would not succeed without a great deal of resistance. What matters is that if the Warsaw Pact Powers think that our desire or capacity or will to do this job has deteriorated our whole defence posture will fail.
I have spoken to members of the Armed Forces who have no desire to spread alarm, and I am beginning to think that we are not in a satisfactory position to make a determined conventional response to a short, sharp local attempt to solve a situation by the assertion of force.
I wish to make four points in areas about which I am worried. I do not wish to exaggerate the situation, but these are worries that concern me.
The first worry relates to force levels. The White Paper tells us that we are supposed to have 55,000 men in the British Army, but the force levels are considerably lower. Part of the Northern Irish contingent is made up of BAOR troops. Therefore, there are not at present 55,000 men in combat readiness in BAOR.
I have spoken to senior officers about this matter, and obviously they did not wish to give away any facts and figures, but when one considers the situation in Northern Ireland and realises that some men will be on leave, others on training courses, and all the rest of it, one realises that the overall figure of 55,000 men must be re-examined.
I should be grateful if my right hon. Friend the Minister, for whom I have the greatest respect, could give some idea of the size of our forces. My impression is that in North Germany there are not more than 40,000 men on the ground, if that is the case, we have to ask whether this will weaken the sector of the front that we are supposed to defend. We must ask how quickly the force could be transported to where it is wanted.
There is a further matter that is thrown up when one looks into these matters, and it is somewhat alarming. Under the plans set up by the Supreme Allied Command, in the event of attack we are supposed to deploy an actual army of 120,000 men in our sector. When one asks where those men come from, the


answer is that they come from reservists and Territorial Army forces, mobilised and taken over to North Germany.
I attempted to follow through this exercise, because it is a matter of great importance. If there were an attack on the NATO front, or any indication of such an event, there would be an attempt by this country to bring up the front line commitment of BAOR to 120,000 men. The process by which this is supposed to happen is interesting. The first thing that will happen if such an attack is expected is that reservists and Territorial Army personnel will be informed by post—I hasten to add, first-class post. I appreciate that these matters will be broadcast on television and radio, and I do not wish to exaggerate the situation, but the letters that are sent out will tell the personnel concerned to which depot to report in order to collect their equipment.
I understand—I am not sure about the precise details—that the bulk of the Territorial Army personnel and reservists would then be flown to Germany. However, since there would be an insufficient number of transport aircraft to take them, they would be flown by British Airways charter. One hopes that in such an event Heathrow would be more accessible than it now is. Since those aircraft could not take heavy equipment, such equipment could not be transported by the Navy, it would go by roll-on/roll-off ferries utilising British Rail and, I gather, Townsend Ferries. The heavy equipment for use by the soldiers in the front line would have to be transported in that round-about way.
My information—I hope that it is reasonably accurate, because I have no reason to doubt it—is that the equipment concerned would reach the personnel eight days after the launching of an attack, or after news of an attack had reached our authorities. In other words, it would take eight days to mobilise the full force of 120,000 in front line positions.
This matter deeply disturbs me. I am not deeply informed on military matters but I try to keep up with what is going on. My impression is that the Warsaw Pact armies are on a ready-to-go basis. The whole of our thinking appears to depend on warning and on the assumption that somehow or other satellites

would detect the fact that forces were collecting on the other side of borders. I doubt whether that would be the situation.
What upset me was the fact that the able and clever Israelis were taken by surprise in the Yom Kippur war when the Syrians and Egyptians reached the front between the opposing forces. We must also remember that a force of 500,000 men, together with tanks and heavy equipment, reached Prague within 24 hours of trouble arising there.

Mr. Mates: I am grateful for the encouraging words on this subject from the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh). It would have assisted if we had heard those words a year or two ago, when the deficiencies of which he complains were being exposed by the Opposition. Will the hon. Gentleman follow the realistic assessment of what is worrying him by telling the Government what they must do to put it right?

Mr. Mackintosh: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's offer of help, but I have never needed any assistance from the Opposition in telling my Front Bench what I believe it should do. However, I am grateful for his encouragement.
If I may continue with my point, I am worried about the concept of the eight-day mobilisation period compared with the way in which modern armies, particularly professional armies such as those in the Warsaw Pact, can move. I am doubtful whether NATO at the front line could hold out for long enough to allow the immediate mobilisation of reserves to arrive.

Dr. Glyn: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that exactly the same thing happened in the Hungarian uprising, when Soviet troops moved with all their communications, fully equipped, with tanks and all the rest of it, without anybody knowing, almost up to the gates of the capital?

Mr. Mackintosh: I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I take the point. When one examines the front-line strength of the Warsaw Pact nations one concludes that there would be no need for any mobilisation, because those forces would be in a position to move immediately.


That is the situation, and that is why the concept involving bringing BAOR up to strength is inadequate.
If these arguments are true of the British Army, I fear that they may also be true of other elements of NATO forces. If that is the case, the problem is multiplied. Naturally, in this debate we are concentrating on the British situation, but do we know whether the same can be said of other armies alongside the British forces? A somewhat alarmist book was written by a Belgian general, who said that if the Warsaw Pact armies decided to move on a Sunday they would find little or no obstacle in their way, because most NATO troops on the Rhine would be on leave for 24 hours. That may be an alarmist argument, but it must be borne in mind when one considers the mobilisation time scale.
I turn to the serious problem of ammunition supplies. We are so far removed from any occasion on which our armies had to use ammunition in war that I became worried about whether we have updated our requirements. I am told that the problem is that although BAOR has a 30-day stock of ammunition for its purposes, that estimate is based on a Second World War rate of firing.
Again, on this matter we should look at the most highly competent and careful armies that have recently been fighting with modern weapons and that have no motive for using one bullet more than necessary. We should consider their rates of firing. If one examines the Yom Kippur war and the standards that the Israelis used in the battles in that war—which were precisely the kind of tank thrusts that NATO would be expected to resist—one finds that such a rate of firing, even though the Israelis were concerned to take the greatest care with their ammunition, would clearly mean that our stocks of ammunition would last only five days. With an eight-day period for mobilisation and five days' stocks of ammunition, one can understand why an Army officer looks disturbed when contemplating the situation.
I do not wish to detain the House too long, but I do want to raise the question of equipment. I am grateful to the Select Committee for its work on the matter and I do not wish to be repetitious, but

the points that it made about equipment are serious. It is quite clear from previous wars that infantry anti-tank weapons are crucial, particularly against huge armoured forces. The matter is worrying when one considers the equipment that is necessary. I am particularly concerned that the Milan has not been issued to our troops at all and that it will not be issued this year. When will it be generally available to reservists as well—because they are part of our frontline troops? I am worried about helicopter support and medium-range support of that kind, and about the infantry point. There is one section in the report that is presumably designed to baffle this country's enemies. I quote:
The fighting capability of forward troops will be seriously affected by the *** year deferment of the ***, versions of which are already in service with other NATO as well as Warsaw Pact countries. In consequence, the Army will have to persevere with the existing ageing vehicle ***.
I am sure that those dots must completely confuse our opponents, who can have no idea of what the Select Committee was talking about, but they do not help us. I gather that the Committee was worried about something that we do not know about.
There is a serious problem, in that we are lagging behind our major opponents and even our allies on equipment. It is serious for our soldiers to know, when they are facing modern armies, that they do not have such equipment. When I was on the Golan Heights in a British Chieftain tank I was told by Israeli army officers that the Chieftain was a super British tank but that in battle they had found that it needed some modifications. The Israelis have carried out these modifications, but our tanks have not had them.

Mr. Mates: The hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh) is talking about the Centurion tank, which has been modified, to the extent that we abolished it five years ago.

Mr. Mackintosh: It was the Chieftain. The hon. Member may wish to press the point that our tanks are adequate, but I am concerned that we are not re-equipping our vehicles and maintaining our equipment at a proper level. That is depressing for the troops who must fight with that equipment.
My last point is about training. I get a feeling from senior officers with whom I deal that they are disturbed that economies mean that adequate training cannot be carried out. Adequate training means that one must practise and shoot, one must use equipment and spend money. I am concerned that a lack of training means that members of our forces will not react instinctively at times of pressure.
These are the things that are worrying about our basic military and political balance in Europe. None of them matters alone, but taken together—and if they get worse—this could give rise to a doubt in the minds of our opponents about whether the system would work if they put it to the test. That is the problem. If a doubt arises in their mind our defence effort is not worth while.
It would help Parliament and the country if there were more open discussion of these matters. There is no point in saying that there must be secrecy in these things. We are concealing them from the electorate and the public. I have told senior officers that if they are worried they should tell the public, but they shelter behind the constitutional convention that they are responsible to the Minister and that they must not say these things. If the senior officers who know the facts and who may be worried cannot discuss them in a non-political way in public, hon. Members cannot find out information easily.
There is not sufficient public discussion or debate. Discussion is confined to a small group of people in the know. That is why hon. Members are always open to accusations that they are talking about the wrong tanks and are misleading or upsetting people. When I made some remarks a while ago and said that senior officers were worried, some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway commented that officers always want more, but sometimes one feels that the worries are genuine.
Sometimes educationists or medical people put their worries to the public, but in defence matters there is no adequate method of communication.
It would be helpful if the Government set up a full-time Select Committee on Defence—not merely a sub-committee of the Expenditure Committee. Then the Chiefs of Staff could be summoned and

they would not feel constitutionally obliged to say nothing that would disturb Ministers. The responsibility would be taken off their shoulders. Of course, the Chiefs of Staff should not set out to disturb Ministers, but to explain the situation and then hon. Members could cross-examine them, listen to their views and compare them with those of Ministers and of serving officers. Civilian experts in defence could also be summoned.
Only if we get a dialogue going on these matters shall we be able to assess the feelings of the public, and only then will the public know the dangers. If the public were as worried as are some people who have looked into the matter, perhaps they would be prepared to pay more for defence. The whole case for NATO and for political military balance in Europe has gone largely by default. We have had 30 years of peace and security, and of a system that has worked. The great danger is that people now take that for granted. They fail to understand the basis of the system, why it exists, and how we have maintained it. I hope that the Minister will set up a Defence Committee, because it is in the interests of both sides of the House and of the public that there should be proper discussion.

7.38 p.m.

Mr. Antony Buck: I agree with what has been said by the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh). It is vitally important that far more of this debate should be brought into the open. I am glad now to see sitting on the Treasury Bench not only the Under-Secretary for Defence for the Army, who will no doubt reply at the end of the debate, but also the Air and Navy Ministers.
The other two Services have much to learn from the Navy. This is an Army debate, but the Navy is the one Service that propagates the kind of information to which the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian referred. It has a "Know your Navy" team. I suggest that similar teams relative to the Army and Air Force should be organised to lecture throughout the country. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army looks sceptical, but the matter has been much contemplated and it has been considered whether this should be


done. From time to time the Navy is big enough to learn from the Army. When the Seebohm Report was published, much was learned about support matters by what was done in Colchester and the garrison there for the support for those serving in Northern Ireland.
A "Know your Army" team, touring the country, going to schools and so on, would be extremely efficacious in pointing out to the public the dangers that beset us and in ensuring that the case for defence does not, as the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian said, go by default, as it is in danger of doing because of the effectiveness of NATO during the last 30 years and because we have had the longest period of peace for a long time in our history. I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian on what he had to say about that. Too often, hon. Members say that they will not follow the arguments of the hon. Member who preceded them, but I shall try to follow the points raised by the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian in his succinct and able speech.
How right the hon. Gentleman was to be worried about force levels. It seems that this is one area in which the Government are on target. The original reduction in the size of our forces envisaged in the first of the White Papers and intended, in the words of one Minister, to set a pattern for 10 years—although a further reduction was announced only weeks later—appears to be on target.
It is alarming to note that various tables show that by 1979 the strength of the Army will be down to about 165,000, including 6,000 Gurkhas. Unless there is a major improvement in the situation in Northern Ireland so that we shall not need such a heavy commitment there by 1979, does the Minister think that the Army will be able to sustain the multifarious tasks which we put upon it?
What effect will this have if the situation in Northern Ireland does not change? There are not many signs of a vast improvement. We all hope, pray and strive for an improvement, but we cannot be sanguine about the prospects of it. If force levels continue to be reduced, how often will units have to serve in Northern Ireland? Some units are on their fifth and even sixth tours, and the

Royal Marine Commandos also serve there on a rotation basis, although the cuts have reduced their numbers.
Can the Minister tell us, when he replies, how he sees the pattern of overall Army service?
Where there is no vision, the people perish.
If we do not give those who are minded to join the Army more than the prospect of repeated tours of duty in Northern Ireland with an occasional visit to Alder-shot or Colchester—though not, one hopes, to the military corrective training establishment there—interspersed with a very occasional visit to another part of the world, the career will not seem very attractive.
I hope that we may have a "sitrep"—Ministry of Defence jargon for a situation report—on current thinking about the number of tours of duty in Northern Ireland and how frequently they will come round if the force reductions envisaged in the first White Paper of 1975 are adhered to.
I thus join the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian in expressing concern about force levels. With the build-up of Warsaw Pact countries, an Army of 165,000 which includes 6,000 Gurkhas will be an inadequate force to meet our needs by 1979, particularly in view of the possibility of continuing difficulty—to say the least—in Northern Ireland.
I shall not speak at great length because I was fortunate enough to catch Mr. Speaker's eye during the two-day defence debate last month. I see that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Navy is here, and I thank him for what he said about my speech in that debate. I spoke about general defence matters although there was some specific Army content, for example about the difficulties in Malta, where not only the Royal Marine Commandos face problems but a unit of the Green Jackets is due to be removed.
I thank the Under-Secretary for dealing with some of the points that I raised, but I wonder whether we might return to the old practice of dealing in correspondence with those matters that the Minister, understandably, cannot deal with at the end of a debate. I have been speaking to some of my hon. Friends about this custom, and it is useful for Ministers


to go through the speeches of hon. Members and deal in correspondence with matters to which replies were not given in the later speeches.
In the defence debate I raised the continuing vexed issue that has caused something of a breach between the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army and myself, namely, the Colchester Military Hospital. The subject was relevant in the defence debate and is perhaps even more relevant today.
I have drawn the attention of the House to this matter on a number of occasions, so I shall not speak about it at great length. I presented a petition to the House containing more than 50,000 signatures from people in my constituency and outside, and the problem continues to exercise the minds of those who are worried about the situation in Northern Ireland and are concerned about the welfare of the soldiers there and their families and civilians who live in that part of Essex.
Time and again we pay tributes to the troops serving in Northern Ireland, and how right we are to do so. I have been there eight times, and on every trip my admiration for their performance grows. However, it is no good uttering these words if we do not follow them up with real action. The Government's decision to close the Colchester Military Hospital is an example of paying lip service to concern for our Armed Forces while taking decisions that are undoubtedly wrong and harmful to them.
It is true that Sir Clifford Jarrett recommended the closure of the hospital in 1973, but the Ministry decided not to implement that recommendation, probably because Sir Clifford was considering the rather narrow basis of the reorganisation of the Royal Army Medical Corps.
Thousands of civilian cases are being dealt with at the hospital. At a time when our civilian facilities are under the greatest pressure, it would be lunatic to close the hospital, particularly when more than £250,000 has recently been spent on it. This money was spent partly because a theatre was burnt out, but it is not only a matter of refurbishing. Fundamental improvements were being carried out until only a few days ago. It is not just a lick of paint, but refurbishing of wards to the highest standards. This

expenditure has been going on until a very short while ago.
There is not only this shocking waste of taxpayers' money. There is also the fact that the Minister, in the short document which he has published in answer to the petition, points out that a medical centre will be created in Gujerat Barracks in Colchester. The cost is not set out but it will be £100,000. The Minister, in his answer to the petition, says that transport will have to be provided between the Central Military Hospital in London and possibly the Royal Air Force Hospital in Ely, all of which will be wasteful.
I hope that the Minister will look again at this. The Army has been too generous in the past to the civilians in Colchester. In the past there has been no contribution from the funds of the Department of Health and Social Security to the upkeep of the military hospital. There ought to be the same sort of arrangement as there is with the Royal Air Force Hospital at Ely, my original home town, where I had a cartilage taken out of my left knee after a ski-ing accident. The cost of that operation did not fall on the Defence Votes and was contra-accounted by the RAF. It ought to be the same with the services provided by the Army hospital. I am sure that the Minister will agree, if he goes into it even more thoroughly and with an unbiased eye, that this hospital should continue and that the cost should be shared.
The hospital has been offered to the Health Service. The Health Service is in difficulties about manning. The Minister also says that the Royal Army Medical Corps is in difficulties about manning. That may be so. I hope that he will take the opportunity later, if he gets the leave of the House to make a winding-up speech, to deal with the position of the Royal Army Medical Corps. The White Paper states that the recruitment of qualified doctors remains below target. It is one of the reasons for the Minister suggesting that the Colchester Military Hospital has to be closed. I hope that he will tell us more about this lack of personnel.
There is a lack of doctors in Northern Ireland, and a continuing need exists there. The Navy and the Royal Air Force have sent doctors to help the Army


there. I hope we shall have something rather more expansive than there is at present in the White Paper about the position of the Royal Army Medical Corps. I do not think it can be said that any State secrets would be given away in supplying this information. If there is a shortage of doctors, let us have a massive recruiting campaign. In all three Services we are getting people to university. This is paid for by the Services, and the people serve in our forces for a relatively short while thereafter. There must be room for an expansion of that sort of arrangement. How short are we of doctors?
Let us have a reversal of this decision or at least a postponement of it until we have a new hospital in Colchester. Then it might make sense for the military hospital to be closed. If we had a big new general hospital, a wing of it could be used for military purposes. It does not make sense to close a hospital which has just had over £200,000 spent on it. There is a very great deal of feeling about this, not only in my constituency but also among Service personnel at all levels. We must also consider the possible adverse effect on the morale of those serving in Northern Ireland.
I hope that one of the results of the debate will be that we shall find the Minister reversing this decision and giving some back up to the words of praise which he uttered, quite rightly, at the start of the debate about those who serve in Northern Ireland.
I share the views expressed by the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian about force levels and the need to keep them up, as well as the need to get away from the targets set in the original White Paper, which proposed a too massive reduction in our forces.
Recruitment is important, and if there is an upturn in the economy I think it will bring about an improvement in this direction. I see that the Under-Secretary appears to agree with me in this. It would then be possible to improve the terms of service of our troops, I support what has been said about the need for improving the terms of service of those serving in Northern Ireland, not based on the extra danger—that is an added factor already taken into account in military pay—but because of the high cost of living in Northern Ireland. That ought to be

looked at, because it will have an effect on recruiting overall. Units are constantly going back to Northern Ireland, and if there is a reduction in a person's standard of living, in addition to his being put in the very gravest danger, there may well be an effect on morale.
From what I see of the Armed Forces—both the naval personnel whom I meet because of my former connection with the Navy, having been a Minister, and the Army personnel, having the privilege as I do of representing a garrison town—it is indeed true to say that their calibre and their morale are still as high as any in the world. But more and more disturbance is being caused by the reputed defence cuts.
One had great sympathy with the Government's original concept of having one major defence review which was to set the pattern for 10 years and for there not to be the ad hoc cuts which undoubtedly took place under the Conservative Administration, which could be legitimately criticised on that account. But we have now had a major cut and, since then, more and more cuts. They are far worse than those which we indulged in. There is a fear among serving personnel that they will die the "death by a thousand cuts".
Let us have an end to this. Let us now have some stability. If there were to be further reductions they would have a major effect on Service morale and might well undermine the whole MBFR syndrome and the whole possibility of our getting force reductions on a balanced basis. Why should the Russians make concessions if we are making unilateral defence cuts?
Let the Minister give us a firm assurance that there will not be any further cuts. Let him do something to help those who are serving in Northern Ireland, financially and also by seeing that they are provided, as in my constituency, with the very finest of supportive services, including the finest hospital services.

7.58 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Kershaw: I am very glad to follow my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck), and except for the matter of his local hospital, I shall be dealing with much the same matters. I want to deal particularly with the problem of our reserves and reinforcements, because so


much of our plan on the central front depends on our use of these to supplement our Regular forces.
In our plan we assume that there will be time available for the political decision, and the political decision may not necessarily come very quickly, because it will be difficult to balance the argument whether a decision to mobilise will exacerbate the situation by angering the other side or whether it will quiet it because it will show that we are in earnest. Both factors will be present in the minds of the Ministers who make the decisions, and they may take a little time to make up their minds.
The second decision to be taken concerns the physical movement of the reinforcements. The hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh) was wrong in thinking that reinforcements would move after the hostilities had started. The idea is that they should move before. It depends, of course, upon getting the warning. I shall come back to that in a minute. Then, when this decision is made, we are apparently to operate a policy of graduated response. Somehow or other we shall have to induce the Soviets to alter their minds—perhaps by the degree of hostility which we show to them when war has broken out.
This graduated response was a very good tool for getting increased conventional forces acceptable to the public as a whole, but I wonder whether the time has now come to examine it again. The first thing to be said is that it offends against one of the great principles of war—namely, the concentration of maximum force at the decisive time and place. We may buy political advantage with it, but let us not kid ourselves: we are incurring a military penalty. Furthermore, if the period in which conventional weapons are used is prolonged, I believe that public morale in the democracies may collapse and not sanction the use of nuclear weapons if conventional weapons fail to do the trick.
That having been said, why should the Russians fall in with this scenario of ours? Is it imagined that they will in some way blunder across the frontier by mistake? Certainly not on the central front. No one could cross that frontier by mistake. Anyway, it is ridiculous to imagine that

people as cautious as the Russians would blunder in large numbers over a frontier.
Would they do it to test our nerve? At one time there was an argument that the Russians would take out Hamburg to see what we would do. I do not believe that for a moment. The Russians are cautious people—especially Russia's present leaders, who went through the last war. I am not too sure about the younger ones. However, I am sure that Russia's present leaders would find that far too dangerous a ploy and would not do it. If the Russians come, they come in strength and with surprise.
The Russians believe in mass and momentum in military matters. I venture to quote to the House one or two passages from "The Officer's Handbook" of the Russian army issued in 1971:
Soviet military doctrine has an offensive character … The Soviet Union … will conduct the war which the enemies impose on them in the most offensive manner in order to attain the smashing of the enemy in short times.
Soviet military doctrine allocates the decisive rôle in contemporary war to nuclear weapons. At the same time it considers that along with the nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical character, the armed forces will employ conventional armament.
The Soviets believe that the war will be short and that, therefore, it must be violent in order to bring the matter to a conclusion.
I quote again from "The Officer's Handbook":
As for the means the imperialists have of unleashing war, Soviet military doctrine considers most probable a surprise attack of the aggressor without a declaration of war. This precisely is the main thing the imperialists are counting on. They have repeatedly resorted to such means of unleashing war in the past.
Whether or not that is true, it is clear to me at any rate that "The Officer's Handbook" is ascribing to imperialists the quality that the Russians think is necessary to win a war.
For the first time in recent years the Russians have gained the capability of surprise, because the numbers of troops now held well forward can be moved without previous mobilisation and without discernible previous movement. I do not believe that NATO would agree with my last statement. It reckons that it will


be able to tell whether the Soviets have any intention of making a full-scale attack, not necessarily by perceiving the movement of troop trains and such things about which the hon. Member for Berwick and East Lothian talked but by the movement of naval vessels and other arrangements in different parts of the world which the Russians would find it necessary to make to sustain a full-scale war.
I wonder whether we can be so sure. After all, if I am right, this advance of the Russians will need to have a tremendous effect on only a small area. They will use the maximum force in the decisive time and place. They will advance not only with the nuclear weapons which "The Officer's Handbook" mentions, but with chemical weapons as well.
Furthermore, there will be a mass breakdown of radio communication. Everybody knows that that can easily be obtained for a short period over a fairly large area by an atomic explosion in the ionosphere. That will put out all radios and means of communication for the time being. Of course the Russians will suffer equally, but it will not matter so much to them because they will be the aggressors. They will be proceeding on fixed, rigid lines of order from which no deviation will be allowed, so the absence of radio communication will not matter. However, it will matter enormously to the defensive State.
It matters particularly, in the last analysis, to our control of nuclear submarines, because for the time being there will be no control of the nuclear riposte. We can forget them unless we assume that a nuclear submarine commander is prepared to loose off his volley against Moscow merely because he notices that Radio Luxembourg has gone off the air, leading him to believe that something has gone wrong. But that is not a credible situation. Therefore, for the time being we can forget the nuclear riposte.
In that situation, if my scenario is anything like correct, the reserves will not arrive, nor will reinforcements. Therefore, our Army plan on the central front should include the option that the Army there will have to fight alone without reinforcements in a chemical and nuclear environment and without any further orders reaching it. I wonder whether

we have those plans in hand. I have no doubt that we have. Certainly that ought to be done.
Assuming that we have the 20 days' warning and manage to get all our reinforcements over there, there are still some deficiencies to which I should like to call attention. We have a marvellous professional Army, but it is only at half strength. The other half, which is not professional, is Territorial and Army Reserve. Whilst we can boast, and have done and should, about the excellence of our professional Army, we should realise that when fully mobilised it will not all be professional.
We have anti-tank shortages. I shall not labour that point, because it has already been mentioned. There is a shortage of helicopters. We have a shortage of anti-tank helicopters. We have a shortage in communications, perhaps not so much a shortage as inferior communications equipment. Our ammunition stocks are too low. They are based on a rate of utilisation which I believe to be unrealistic. One reason is that some of these missiles cost an enormous amount. I can understand the Under-Secretary not encouraging people to pop them off all round the place, because that would cost millions before the training season was over. But the absence of the opportunity to fire these expensive weapons has to some extent limited our professional people from being as highly trained as they should be. In view of these limitations and the limitation of reinforcement, I must pronounce upon the situation and say that in my view ours is becoming a second-class Army. This is a heavy responsibility upon the Government of the day.
I pick out one small item, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) also referred. It concerns the battle groups which are to be hived off because we do not like brigades. My hon. Friend made a certain amount of fun of it, I think quite legitimately. One of the problems will be the officers who command. They are to be the garrison commanders. But a good garrison commander should come from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps or from the Royal Engineers. They know how to run garrisons. A good commander in a battle situation does not necessarily find himself chosen from those corps, and he


would probably be an appalling garrison commander. The gallant cavalry brigadier knows nothing about maintaining vehicles or about pay and would probably make a real "horlicks" of garrison commanding. On the other hand, the garrison commander who knows all about pay could not be counted on to make a real success of commanding a perfectly strange group which the poor fellow had never seen before taking over, apparently almost in the middle of a battle. He would have to be Alexander the Great to make anything at all of it.
The Territorial Army is 80 per cent. recruited, which is very good. But 25 per cent. have only just joined and will not be taken overseas. If it is to go overseas 100 per cent. recruited, the Territorial Army should be recruited 125 per cent. What is more, some of its equipment is bad. I can speak about that from the point of view of my own regiment, which is not one of the reinforcements which are to go to Germany. Its equipment is lacking and out of date. I also think that the bounty should be looked at again. It has been steady for some time. It has fallen well behind the cost of living. Some increase in it would be one way in which we could at a stroke improve recruiting to the Territorial Army.
The numbers of the Army as a whole are too low. I make a special plea, which I know will be useless at the moment, that we should no longer mess about with the Gurkha Battalion on Brunei by trying to abolish it. Again, when the Commando in Malta leaves, it should be not disbanded but added to the mobile force.
When the Under-Secretary gets in a bother about his Vote and about asking for so much money, will he look again at military pensions? I do not suggest that they should be cut. We know the difficulty that there has been and will continue to be about them. But on the Vote of the Ministry of Defence generally there is the sum of £345 million to pay military pensions. The civil servants who work in the Ministry do not have their pensions on the Defence Vote. I do not see why military pensions have to be on it. If he had an additional £345 million to play with, the Secretary of State could produce a great many satisfactory results.
I deal finally with Ulster, and in doing so I shall not repeat what has been said so forcefully by other hon. Members. It is to the shame of the whole House that we ask our Service people to operate in ways which are not comparable to what we think they should be and what their comrades elsewhere have.
I wish to make two brief points. The first concerns the 50p a day which a soldier receives for being in an operational sphere. I got 10s. in the war, which was a long time ago. Could not the 50p be increased? Even compared with three years ago, it should have risen. It should be increased greatly.
Secondly, I wonder whether the military salary is now thought to have been such a good idea. Both the parties thought so when it was first introduced, but it does not appear to have worked out very well. When we have people receiving rent rebates in respect of their married quarters, it is clear that it has not worked at all well. In matters of pay, of course, the Armed Forces are always behind the rest. At the moment they are about 20 per cent. behind in what they should be receiving to make them comparable. The military salary is not working very well, and in my view it should be looked at again.

8.15 p.m.

Mr. Julian Critchley: One of the awful anxieties of this place is having to sit in this Chamber all afternoon and evening only to find that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) has made my speech. If I had the courage of my convictions, I should rip it up and make a completely different one. But, as it was to be a speech for only five minutes and as my hon. Friend made an excellent contribution to the debate, perhaps I may be allowed to try to reinforce some of his arguments.
The increasing Soviet military strength in central Europe means that the gap between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces will not be closed until the early 1980s. But that fact has meant a change in Soviet strategy, and that change is very much one for the worse. It is also a change which largely has gone unnoticed, not simply by the British public but by this House itself.
It is now a fact that Warsaw Pact forces, if they wished, could begin a war


from a standing start—that is, without the need for reinforcement beforehand. NATO, on the other hand, requires adequate warning time, measured at least in weeks, to permit the Alliance to mobilise and to deploy its forces forward.
It is vital for NATO that the Alliance adapts its present strategy of flexible response into one of forward defence. To do so, we need to improve our fire power, our mobility and our command and control systems. NATO's warning time is now down to days, not weeks. The Warsaw Pact is now capable of mounting a sudden attack launched with overwhelming local superiority.
Since 1973, when the MBFR talks began, the Soviets have increased their forces in central Europe. They have added a new armoured vehicle, the T72, and they enjoy a three-to-one superiority in armour. They have re-equipped their motorised divisions with a new mechanised infantry combat vehicle. They have radically recast their air force from a defensive to an offensive force. They have equipped themselves with theatre nuclear weapons of a heavier yield than those which NATO possesses.
If that is the Soviet picture, what are the weaknesses in NATO? First, a high proportion of NATO's forces are badly deployed. They are deployed west of the River Rhine and in the far south of Germany. The French have announced that they are to reduce their forces in Germany by one-quarter. The Dutch and the Belgians have moved their forces back from the Iron Curtain into their own countries. The British Army of the Rhine is weakened by the need to serve Northern Ireland. There is a shortage of fire power. We need more armoured fighting vehicles, more artillery and more missiles. Ammunition stocks are grossly inadequate.
We suffer from the vulnerability of stocks which are already in position in known locations in Germany, from the vulnerability of airfields and our ground-to-air missile systems to interdiction by the Soviet air force. There is a shortage of surface-to-air missiles. Most serious of all is the inadequate inter-allied command control and communications systems, a weakness which has been described by a senior commander as

the fundamental deficiency within NATO today.
What, then, is our present strategy? How could NATO begin to cope with a Soviet attack—even an attack of which we had received adequate warning in order to mobilise and deploy? Phase one of the NATO strategy would be a holding operation by about one-third of NATO's forces which are at present stationed far forward. Phase two would be a counter-attack by the masse de manoeuvre. Phase three would be the introduction of allied nuclear weapons were the battle to have gone against us or a counter-attack were we to have won the major battle.
Let us examine that plan—phases one, two and three—in the light of reduced warning of a Soviet attack, the new Soviet strategy. Phase one would probably mean the loss of a large slice of West German territory, enough to demoralise German civil and military authority. Phase two—the counter-attack—would be asking for another "miracle of the Marne". It was not so much the French who won the miracle of the Marne but the mistakes of the German invading army in 1914—mistakes which the Germans did not make in 1940. But clearly, under our present strategy, we would need a miracle of the Marne in phase two in order to come back from the likelihood of a massive initial defeat up front. In phase three, therefore, supposing that we were defeated in phase two, would we not be inhibited from the first use of theatre nuclear weapons, given the inevitability of Soviet retaliation and the fact that we would be using our own weapons against occupied allied territory and hostage populations?
The point of my speech is this. If we are now given little or no warning time, NATO must win the battle of the frontiers because there will be no other battle. Phase one, therefore, can no longer be a holding operation. We can only hope to win up front by redeploying forces eastwards, by the adoption of a form of hedgehog defence, by swift improvements in NATO fire power, armour, and command and communications, by increasing stocks of ammunition, spares and fuel, by paying more attention to reserves and reinforcements, and by a decision to make an early first use of theatre nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet sudden


attack, so that if we failed to defeat such an attack those weapons would be used on the Soviets in East Germany rather than on our own side. Most important of all, perhaps, we must improve within NATO the procedures which exist within the Alliance to seek the authority for swifter mobilisation if the warning time is reduced from months down to weeks and now almost to days.
We can only guess at what the Soviet Union may wish to do, but we must know what it is capable of doing. It is difficult to judge the extent to which the Soviets may be prepared to alter their policies, given the adoption of a new strategy which appears to offer a real prospect of success. Even if they were not to attack, the very fact that we know that they have the capability of launching a sudden attack against which there is no meaningful allied response will, from the Soviet point of view, exercise tremendous leverage within the whole context of the East-West balance and affect the whole political future of Europe itself.
Shall we have the will to prompt the Alliance into making all the necessary alterations and changes? Shall we play our part? It is vital that we should do so, but we are faced with apathy, disbelief and appeasement—vices that are not confined to this country.

8.24 p.m.

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: I am sure that hon. Members on the Opposition Benches will forgive me if I do not follow them into the strange world that they are talking about and the possibilities of world war. They spoke as though of some gigantic chess game. It is frightening to non-military people like myself to hear such descriptions of dealing with the lives of countless thousands of human beings. If the situation they describe is true, the British Army cannot be very relevant, and could not be even if it were twice its present strength. In all the post-war situations—for example, Suez and Cuba—we have seen that when the chips are down only the super-Powers really matter, and in the sort of scenario that hon. Members have described the British Army could have little relevance.
Of course the British Army may have relevance as part and parcel of NATO, and I am surprised that hon. Members

opposite have not spoken more about the problems of uniformity and standardisation in NATO in order to make it more efficient. But really, the only solution must be to stimulate and produce negotiations that will make and must make impossible such a scenario, for otherwise that scenario must at some stage lead to the end of civilised life on earth as we know it, and none of us likes to envisage that.
This does not mean that I believe that the Army has no rôle to play. It must maintain something of its present strength in order to carry out many of the very important tasks which it has. In addition, few of us would argue against some of the major technological defence work which provides much spin-off to industry. Those of us who have been involved in industry know full well the advantages to industry from technological spin-off from defence work.
My real worry is that the Army is being less than efficient in the way it is spending some of the money already allocated to it. I have had the unfortunate impression in recent months that it is not looking after the pennies, let alone the pounds. My hon. Friend will remember that I have brought to his attention the question of the amount of housing in this country provided for Service families but not occupied. No one quibbles about the fact that Service families should be provided with decent accommodation—both sides of the House strongly support that aim.
I have found that there are large areas in the country in which there are complete estates of houses that were at one time allocated for defence purposes but which have remained unoccupied for a long time. People have written to tell me of more cases since I first raised this matter. The answers that I have been given on this subject by the Ministry are far from satisfactory. The Ministry has suggested that the housing may have been occupied at one time or another in the past 10 years, but that is an admission that a certain percentage of the houses have not been occupied for years.
When talking to many of the people involved I have had the horrible feeling that even if the housing has been occupied it has been for periods of only two or three days, to break up long


periods when the houses have been unoccupied. An Army that is efficient must not hold on to assets like this, which it does not need, when there is a crying housing need in the country and the houses could be sold, made available to local authorities on a temporary basis, or dealt with in some other way.
The Army's difficulties are not confined to these areas. I have also found that the Army's recruiting arrangements are strange, to say the least. At present, recruiting offices occupy prime sites in most major town centres. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary told me that these recruiting offices cost about £10 million a year, and the total cost of recruitment, if my memory serves me correctly, is between £25 million and £26 million. This means that it costs more than £500 to recruit each member of the forces.
I feel that in the present economic climate it would have been easier to use other recruiting methods. I see no reason why recruitment for the Armed Forces should be segregated from recruitment for industry generally. There seems to be no reason why job centres should not also deal with military recruitment. I realise that job centres would not have the necessary expertise to advise would-be recruits about the nature of service in the Army, Navy or Air Force as the case may be, but there seems an overwhelming case in favour of this suggestion, rather than having recruitment offices in town centres that sometimes have only two or three calls a week. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary has told me in answers to parliamentary Questions that the number of actual recruits at some recruitment offices varies from nought to two a week.
It would be far more efficient to have someone at the job centre dealing at local level with recruitment and sending on to depots representing the three Services the more serious recruits. We would probably get more recruits, because we would be going to the places where people naturally go to seek employment, and the system would cost much less than at present. No industrial firm would operate a system under which it cost £500 to recruit each individual. That is an absurdity. The Army should not operate in this way.
One of the things operating against Army recruitment is the sort of class barriers that still exist in the structure of the Armed Forces. We have argued about this previously and I have been told by some of my hon. Friends that the problem has been reduced, but we still have a division between the officer class and other ranks. They have different messes and different facilities of every type. All of us who have worked with the problems of management in industry know that one of the basic pieces of advice given to firms to improve efficiency is to reduce divisions between employees by reducing the number of toilets or dining rooms whose use is restricted to only one section of employees, so that people feel they are part of a team. Things have not yet moved far enough in this direction.
Recruitment would benefit if there were a move towards democracy. We could make the institution more democratic, rather than simply having someone coming to the cookhouse and asking "Any complaints?". Perhaps we could have an extension of trade union activity within the Armed Forces. These are the sort of things that would improve recruitment. We still have absurd class divisions.
I was told that the officer class of the Queen Alexandra's Nursing Corps had to go to Savile Row and were offered coats at £400 each. I am not sure whether that figure is correct, but I am sure that it is much more expensive than what is doled out to other ranks in the forces. This sort of division does not help recruitment.
One area of colossal waste of money for the Army is in the British Army of the Rhine. It is quite intolerable that it should be costing more than £500 million to the balance of payments for us to keep British troops in Germany when Germany is making good economic progress and Britain is in economic difficulties. I am not entering the argument of whether our troops should be in Germany. My point is that it is absurd for Britain to have to borrow money while in effect giving our friends in Germany about £500 million. The Government must pressurise the German Government to come to a quick solution to this problem.
There is probably a strong argument for defence, but even more important


than defence is economic survival. Some Conservatives may feel that the two go hand in hand. It is vital for the Army to get the money it needs to do its work, but if it is to get that money it must be able to show that it is prepared to trim its sails as everyone else has had to do in recent months. If it does that it can be sure of getting the resources it needs from this House to fulfil its essential task.

8.37 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Mayhew: The hon. Member for Cannock (Mr. Roberts) referred to recruitment, and it would be interesting if a study were carried out to discover the efficiency of the recruiting offices. The Army is as anxious as anyone else to save money, and if ways could be found of doing that so as to avoid cutting into the more important aspects of its expenditure they should be explored.
The hon. Member was pursuing a much weaker point when arguing against the organisation of the Army messes. The important thing is to ensure that there is a practical scheme of promotion from the ranks to commissioned rank. I was glad to hear what the Minister said about that. There is now, on a vastly greater scale than used to be the case, a means of going up in one's own regiment or, more widely, into another regiment from the ranks into commissioned status.
In the field—I am thinking particularly of the Rhine Army and Northern Ireland—officers, non-commissioned officers and men for the most part eat from the same cookhouse, live under the same bivvy and make common cause in the way that the hon. Member has in mind. I do not believe that there is the slightest desire in the Army to go further in the direction that the hon. Member suggests.
In this most interesting debate, speech after speech has called for realism.
It is essential that we repeat that. We sit here, in the atmosphere of an agreeable debating society, discussing an Army upon which our security, and to a proportion that of our Allies, depends. The great danger that I see is that though we maintain this Army at great expense—but, in my view, not sufficient expense—we are not getting, and it is no fault of the Army, a really efficient defensive tool in

return. I believe that to be the danger, because we are kidding ourselves that we are getting rather more than we are.
We all know that the pressures are on every Government to economise on the Armed Forces. They are traditional, and they go back over the centuries. As soon as we win the war we let our ships rot and the Dutch come sailing up the Medway as they did 300 or 400 years ago. The pressures are the same today, but the cost is much greater in terms of our weaknesses if we follow that course, because the argument that has been put forward by my hon. Friends the Members for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) and Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) is that the warning time is to be measured in days.
I take issue with what the Minister said in the closing passages of his speech. He devoted a disproportionate amount of time to describing the Silver Jubilee parade for Her Majesty the Queen in June or July. It is appropriate that there should be a parade, but to suggest, as the Minister was at pains to do for a considerable time, that the parade will give Her Majesty, or any hon. Member, any practical idea of the effectiveness of the Rhine Army as a fighting force is wholly unrealistic.
Does the Minister believe for a moment that attending that parade will instruct Her Majesty in any way about the availability of reinforcements for the Rhine Army? Will it give her the slightest indication of the availability of spare parts for Rhine Army vehicles and other equipment? Will it help her to discover whether there is adequate capacity for the recovery of armoured fighting vehicles? Will she know what the first-line requirements of stores are for the field units of the Rhine Army? Will she know whether there is sufficient range capacity to enable soldiers to fire their weapons to an extent consistent with achieving minimum required efficiency and becoming familiar with those weapons? Will it help her to know whether it is only because of the Northern Ireland requirement that we are able to aggregate track mileages, and in some instances ammunition expenditure, so that soldiers remaining in Northern Germany get a certain amount of practical training in the field?
Will it help Her Majesty to know to what extent the expensive and, no doubt, by that time highly-polished articles of


equipment paraded before her are used in the field by the soldiers? As for Wombat, will it help anyone attending the parade to know whether one or possibly more live missiles are allowed to be fired in the course of a year by the operators of those weapons? Those are the things that matter.
Most important of all, will the parade help anyone to know how long the Rhine Army is capable of sustaining operations at full intensity? That is the question, and I hope that the Minister will reply to it. How long, in his opinion, is the Rhine Army capable of maintaining operations at full intensity? I believe that the answer, if it is to be measured in days, is a very few days indeed.
We have heard about the massed bands. There is no doubt that they will look and sound agreeable, and I hope that the Minister, as he has referred to them, will take the opportunity to assure us that there are no proposals in the Government's mind to abolish the bands. By far the best argument for retaining them—apart from the fact that the bandsmen are good—is that the men act as stretcher-bearers, and precious little other manpower is available for that purpose.
With an Army that is so desperately overstretched, and whose members know themselves to be so desperately overstretched in relation to the tasks that the Government give them, it is essential that we see that they are properly supported.
I wish to refer to the question of support in peace time and support in war time, and in particular to the peace-time allowances for overseas living and rent rebates. I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to scotch the widespread rumour that there is shortly to be a cut in the local overseas allowance for troops serving in Germany. It would cause the greatest resentment if such a cut were made. I know the complex arrangement for assessing the allowances, but it is always open to the Government, on proper grounds, to override the exact workings of some technical formula.
Can it conceivably be right that the local overseas allowance for Service men in Germany should be cut when the foreign service allowance for civil servants employed in Germany has just been increased by 20 per cent.? I should be grateful if the Minister could confirm

that, although I appreciate that the notice is short. I understand that that is the case. It cannot be seen to be equitable by soldiers that civilians overseas should have their foreign service allowance increased whereas theirs may be reduced.
Do not all Ministry of Defence civilians in West Germany receive a London weighting allowance of £465 a year even though they may be living, with their families, in Germany for years and when at home may not live within 500 miles of inner London? If cuts of the sort which have been proposed are to be made, why should the allowance for Ministry of Defence civilians—perhaps plumbers employed in maintaining Ministry of Defence establishments—continue? I hope that regard will be paid to the fact that civil servants, when serving abroad, do not have to pay for their accommodation whereas soldiers must pay for theirs.
I wish briefly to refer to the question of the rent rebate. I believe that just under 10 per cent. of married Service men in the Rhine Army receive rent rebates. I cannot help thinking that many of them are right in feeling resentful about being obliged to claim a rebate. After all, the charge for their quarters is no doubt fixed on relatively fair, or what are thought to be fair, principles. I appreciate that some of them pay for their furniture, but, having regard to the job that we impose on our soldiers, we should pay them enough to prevent them from having to claim for something out of the rent rebate kitty. It causes considerable regret and, in some cases, resentment.
I turn to the question of the support which we give to our soldiers in time of war—support expressed in terms of concern for their welfare and for their protection. It is inherent in the job of a soldier that he must expose himself to danger in time of war or quasi war. I do not suggest that we should diminish it, but the support which we are offering our soldiers is diminished by virtue of the fact that we are not providing them with sufficient logistic support in the Rhine Army in particular. I hope that the Minister will tell us whether he is satisfied that there is sufficient logistic capability even to lift the first-line requirements for units in the field. I believe that there is not.
Is the Minister satisfied that adequate reinforcements of vehicles and of drivers


are available under his hand? Is he satisfied that proper regard has been paid to the fatigue and casualty factor among drivers? It is no good having one driver per vehicle. May we expect the Army to be supplied with driver reinforcements for operations lasting many days, let alone weeks?
Is the Minister satisfied that the medical services are in the slightest degree consistent with our ability to sustain operations? I believe that the Rhine Army's medical services would break down within 24 hours in the event of full-intensity operations.
The Minister referred to Exercise Spearpoint. He said that generally the outcome of the exercise had been satisfactory. Is he satisfied about the adequacy of the medical services following the experience gained in that exercise last autumn? We all know that there is a requirement for the reinforcement of medical officers. Is he satisfied that he has medical officers available under his hand so that there may be reinforcement? Can reinforcements be supplied quickly? Are they at present serving in the TAVR? If not, what does he propose to do about it?
Are there proposals for the expansion of the Royal Army Medical Corps? Surely one of the most important lessons learned from the last war was that troops will fight with high morale and consequent high efficiency only if they are satisfied that arrangements exist to evacuate them if they are wounded so that they may receive first-class medical attention.
I believe that the honest answer is that we are far away from such conditions. Time and again when we have a defence debate Ministers recite the growing threat posed by the Russian army and Russian forces in Europe. They are very good at that part of the job. They stiffen the sinews and summon up the blood, but they only emulate the action of the paper tiger.
I am afraid that in all the talk about the Silver Jubilee parade and how marvellous our Army will be seen to be we are taking refuge in talk and not addressing ourselves to the real issues. I believe the truth to be that the Rhine Army today is not capable of sustaining operations because of the cuts that have been made time and time again by the Government. Unless the trend of the Government's

stewardship of the Army is abruptly reversed, they will succeed in making the Army a paper tiger too.

8.53 p.m.

Mr. Marcus Lipton: The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) asked a few hundred questions, and it will be quite impossible for my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State to answer them unless we stop here all night.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock (Mr. Roberts) referred to the class distinction that still exists in the Services. My hon. Friend's comments reminded me of an announcement that appeared in a local paper in the North. In large headlines it was announced that a miner's son had been commissioned after three years at Welbeck. My hon. Friend will know the place where the father works—namely, Boldon Colliery. It was regarded as remarkable that a miner's son had been commissioned in the Army and was going to Sandhurst for his final training. It occurred to me that if someone from Eton or Harrow had been commissioned not one paper would have bothered to mention the fact.
If a line were drawn across England between the Wash and the Mersey, it would soon be found that most of the men recruited as Army officers come from the south of that line rather than from the north.
We have been talking about getting value for money. Have we had any value for money from the terrible expenditure of lives that has taken place in Northern Ireland? The troops went there in 1969, since when 327 men have been killed. This includes the Ulster Defence Regiment. A total of 1,257 civilians have been killed. In the RUC the figure is 92. The question I ask is: if the troops had not been sent to Northern Ireland in 1969—while, certainly, the lives of soldiers would have been saved—would 1,257 civilians have been killed? Would 92 members of the RUC have died?
I remember the great fuss that was made at the time when it was decided to take the British troops from India. Mr. Winston Churchill, as he then was, fulminated against the Government for that decision. We knew that the decision


would involve a blood-bath. It is said that one million lives were lost in the communal fighting which took place after the troops withdrew. Does anyone seriously suggest that British troops should have remained to prevent what was likely to be a blood-bath?
All the talk about a blood-bath taking place in Northern Ireland if the British troops had not gone in there in 1969 is grossly exaggerated. There would have been some lives lost. That is one of the prices that has to be paid if people do not agree to reach a sensible solution of their communal difficulties. But are we any better off in Northern Ireland now than we were in 1969? I shall not refer to the cost of keeping the troops in Northern Ireland over that period. I shall not mention the fact that the cost to the Exchequer, apart from defence costs, is running at the rate of almost £600 million a year. What are we getting for it?
The situation is worse now than it was in 1969. I do not see what advantage has been derived. I should like to quote one or two things said in bygone days on this subject by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force but I will be tolerant and will not do so.
The time has come to stop talking about the necessity to find a political solution. While this is going on we have to sacrifice the lives of British soldiers—so that the local population can reach some sort of communal solution. If the troops were withdrawn, the population would jolly soon find that they would have to sit down together and reach a suitable arrangement and one which would not involve the loss of British lives as it has done.

8.58 p.m.

Mr. David Walder: Looking at the audience facing me tonight I am inevitably reminded of that little vignette of imperial history that occurred in 1857, when one of the colonels of a Bengali native regiment was told that his entire regiment was in mutiny and had left to sack, loot and rape in Delhi. A man of great trust, he could not possibly believe this, and said "My men are loyal to me." He summoned the bugler and told him to sound assembly, whereupon

there appeared on the parade ground one loyal sepoy. It has almost reached that stage tonight. I know that there are some members of the front rank present, but I must remind them that, for them at least, this is something of a pay parade.
It is only a few days ago in parliamentary time that the House had a full-dress two-day debate on the whole issue of defence. Today we have one day devoted solely to the Army. Right hon. and hon. Members have attacked the subject from different angles, some taking a broad strategic view and other concentrating on matters of detail.
In happier times there was a great deal to be said for the sort of arrangement whereby we had a two-day debate on defence and then days devoted to each of the Services in turn—the general issue and then the particular ones. Today, that is not quite possible, because successive White Papers have imposed such swingeing cuts on the Armed Forces, in terms of both manpower and equipment, that it is impossible to consider the Army in isolation. It is something of an anachronism to try to do so.
It is very difficult to visualise circumstances in which the Army would operate on its own. Perhaps once it did, but that day has long since gone. It does not even happen in Northern Ireland. There, the Army has the welcome co-operation of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force. In most operational circumstances that one can visualise the British Army would be carrying out its rôle within the NATO Alliance.
Because of that I shall consider the Army in the context of operating within that Alliance when I look at the Government's arguments in support of their present policies. First, there is the GNP argument, which seems to be the most popular in Labour circles. It is most often offered for public consumption, and it seems to be very popular, particularly with the Government's Left-wing supporters. Not only for that reason it is both specious and dangerous.

Mr. John Ryman: Have the Government any Left-wing supporters?

Mr. Walder: I used the phrase somewhat loosely. I am sure that the hon. Member is a better judge of that than


I am. I take a hopeful view of the Government; I believe that they have one or two supporters other than the Liberal Party.
The argument that is popular among what I shall term very loosely Government supporters is that we should reduce defence spending to the same percentage of GNP as our allies. At best, the GNP percentage argument provides only the roughest guide and has no relevance to defence needs. If one looks around the world one sees that Israel—for obvious reasons—probably spends more money, as a percentage of GNP, on defence than any other nation.
At worst, the GNP argument is totally misleading, because our NATO allies do not have the same commitments and their defence budgets are not calculated on the same basis. This argument is always deployed in such a manner as to claim that we should reduce our expenditure to the level of our allies. It always implies a sort of Dutch auction, with each ally edging his neighbour steadily downwards.
This is not an argument that its advocates would advance for any other form of public spending, except defence. How would it sound if it were applied to other fields? How would it sound if we argued that we should spend as little on hospitals or housing as do the Ruritanians? Apparently this argument has respectability only when it is deployed in relation to defence.
Worse even than the quality of the argument is its implications, and those are plain. We, the British, intend within NATO to spend the minimum of the minimum spent by our European partners. The balance we expect to be paid by "Big Daddy", in the shape of the United States. This attitude is not lost in the United States. Recently I had the pleasure and the privilege of meeting in Washington members of the United States Armed Forces Committee. They were quite rightly scathing about the contribution made by their European allies to NATO. They resented, again quite rightly, the suggestion that the United States should ultimately bear the burden of European defence, because that is the gravamen of the GNP argument.
The second argument is a little more respectable and, in consequence, is used by what I might call the higher calibre of

Labour Members of Parliament and Labour supporters. Whether such a man supports the present Government I am not prepared to say, taking up the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman). I use the word "calibre" as indicating the degree of interest in defence. That category of person at least pretends to show some concern in these matters. The argument adopted by those people is that cuts, reductions and slippages—because all three amount to the same thing, namely, an absence of men and weapons—affect only the tail as opposed to the teeth of the Army. That is not borne out by the facts in the White Paper, although as an argument it sounds all right. It was the argument of the great once-and-for-all review embarked upon by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—the right hon. Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason)—when Secretary of State for Defence. In fairness to the right hon. Gentleman, I think that he believed in what he was doing at the time, as perhaps did some of his Service advisers. That involved a once-and-for-all review, a process of pruning. We cannot tell what the right hon. Gentleman and his Service advisers now think when the cuts have been imposed on the trunk and roots as well.
Recent correspondence in The Times—and Sir Michael Carver was one of the writers—seems to support the argument against what he and others called "the khaki bureaucrats". Yet anybody who has ever served in, or concerned himself with, the Armed Forces knows that it has always needed eight bodies in support and services to maintain one gunner, rifleman or tank crew member. That is a ratio that increases with each step taken towards sophistication in arms and equipment. Cut down on logistics and support and cut down on the bakers of bread, the postmen, transport and clerks—for some reason clerks are always criticised and get it in the neck—and one affects the efficiency of the whole Army. Even the toughest and most intrepid young man, who answers all the requirements in current advertisements about "The Professionals", needs to be fed, clothed and—although he might not always believe it—administered. If that does not happen, that young man will rapidly become less battleworthy.
I turn to the third argument—the argument of last resort deployed by the Government. It ignores the facts of overstrain and overstretching, and brushes aside the problems of Service men and their families. Indeed, it was an argument no doubt used by politicians and bureaucrats at the time of the Crimean War. The argument could be described as "Rally round the flag, boys, or patriotism will be the last refuge of the scoundrel". It envisages an efficient and well-trained Army, which is quite true. It also envisages an Army with more combat experience than any other in Western Europe. That also is true, and is recognised by our European allies. It envisages that the men and women in our Army are keen, loyal and resourceful, some of the best products of their generation. That is all true, and these were arguments advanced by the hon. Members for Wallsend (Mr. Garrett) and Loughborough (Mr. Cronin), who apparently have now left us.
All these arguments are, of course true. Service men and women are adaptable and courageous and in present circumstances they have need so to be. The argument is that they can take anything that a Labour Government can throw at them and manage to be efficient and cheerful, despite the cuts that have been imposed throughout the Services and despite the difficulties and strains under which they carry out their tasks. The argument is that with the traditional virtues of the British soldier down the ages they will make do despite the actions of an unsympathetic Government.
This leads me to what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) might well call the "Silver Jubilee syndrome" because that is about the same argument. We are told "Look at these smart, efficient soldiers. Do not bother to count them, by the way, and do not investigate how efficient their equipment is compared with that of their possible enemy on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Look at these splendid chaps and please do not criticise."
I understand that the Prime Minister is about to make—or has perhaps already embarked on—a two-day visit to our troops in Germany. No doubt his chest will fill with pride and he will put on his nice avuncular smile, shake some

hands and try to forget the severe blows to the efficiency and morale of the Army that his Government have delivered and — as I understand the policy of the Labour Party — will continue to deliver. Soft words of praise do not butter quite enough parsnips in this context.
I wish to give one example culled from Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend the Minister for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) spoke with expertise about Northern Ireland and I do not wish to trespass in any way on what I properly regard as his sphere, but the example is relevant and demonstrates graphically the problems of over-stretching that face of the British Army now. The example also demonstrates the speciousness of the argument that points to individual units doing their duty properly and that goes on to suggest that therefore all is right with the whole of the British Army.
The last time that I was in Northern Ireland I stayed with an engineer unit that had been taken from BAOR and that was acting in an infantry role in Belfast. The sappers were doing the job extremely well, certainly as well as the infantry and—if I dare say so—perhaps even better, because it was a change and a challenge for them to operate in that role. In talking to all ranks I found that they were pleased with their performance and they admitted frankly that it was something of a change from their task in BAOR—but acting as infantry is not their proper task. While that unit was in Northern Ireland the job for which those men were trained—which should have been carried out in the United Kingdom or in BAOR—went by default. To that extent our contribution to NATO was lessened.
The truth is that we need eight to 10 more infantry battalions or their equivalent to reduce the strain that has been imposed by the Irish situation on the present infantry, gunners and Armoured Corps soldiers and on those acting in an infantry role in the Province.
So much for the Government's three principal arguments—none of which is valid and none of which gives the true reason for the cuts imposed. The true reason—and this, I admit, has been said by Ministers—is economic necessity, but that is not the end of the story, because the economic necessity is of the Government's own making. The priorities


are of their choosing. It has been said that Socialism is a matter of priorities and also that politics and Government are a matter of priorities. These are the priorities that the Labour Government have chosen. They could have chosen otherwise and abandoned a project for nationalisation, but this is their priority.
There can be no doubt that our contribution to the defence of Western Europe has been reduced. The Warsaw Pact nations have always had a numerical superiority in the conventional sphere, but they often had inferior equipment. They retain their numerical superiority and now possibly have superior weaponry as well. This is no longer cancelled out or even balanced by the air superiority of the West or the ultimate threat of overall nuclear deterrent predominance.
The increase in Soviet ground forces and the increased aggressive pattern of those forces is made admirably clear in the White Paper, yet the Government's response is to make our ground forces less capable of deterring or meeting that threat. This pattern has been revealed in successive White Papers; the dangers are clearly laid out, but the response is not only not relevant but totally inadequate.
I do not want to become too much of an amateur strategist, because we all tend to play that sort of game, but I understand that the scenario in Europe is that of the tank battle. I do not think that any defence expert would disagree with that assessment. All the anti-tank weapons and the support aircraft are there only to keep armoured divisions in business and to repel westward aggression.
What have the Government done to adapt BAOR to fulfil this rôle against the modernised and re-equipped Warsaw Pact forces, which have become almost totally mechanised under their recent reorganisation? The Government have tinkered about with the command structure and dished out one or two new names, and now claim to have reorganised the armoured divisions. These are now curiously balanced, with three infantry battalions with APCs—we need a new one, by the way—and not three, but two, armoured regiments equipped with Chieftains, which are not necessarily the most mechanically reliable tanks and

do not have the fastest firing guns—as I know from personal experience.
The third square is filled by armoured reconnaissance regiments equipped with Scorpions. The span of command has been increased, and the Government say happily that no regiment has been disbanded, but the number of tanks—and numbers are important—has not increased. The reorganisation has been a paper exercise, and I cannot help thinking that it was designed to paper over the cracks. It is not an untypical Government reaction and manoeuvre.
This attitude and approach to defence has been exposed by the Second Report of the all-Party Expenditure Committee, which has said that it is not satisfied with the Secretary of State's assurances in a number of important areas. The right hon. Gentleman has promised a response, and I suppose that members of the Committee wait in hope.
Concern has been expressed by the Committee and by Labour Members on the Committee. Similar concerns have been expressed by our Allies—they were expressed to me when I visited Washington recently as a guest of the Western European Union—by senior Service officers, by every reputable defence and Service periodical that I can think of and in the Press.
It has also been expressed in a number of responsible television programmes—not pessimistic programmes, as suggested by at least one hon. Member today, but programmes put forward realistically by people who are rightly concerned and rightly worried. It has certainly been expressed by my own party, and it is a danger that has been underlined in the Government's own White Paper year by year, but without eliciting a reasonable response in Government action.
Continued reductions and cuts affect the morale and efficiency of a large group of our fellow citizens who make their career the defence of this country. Their loyalty and their efficiency can be relied upon, as we all know, but they are sometimes imposed on by Governments who do not look to their proper interests, and, indeed, seem to be indifferent to their arguments.
We therefore have the position that almost everyone concerned with defence


is worried except, apparently, the Government and one or two others. The hon. Member for Blyth has left the Chamber, but I was going to use the expression "unreliable supporters" without necessarily indicating on which side of the House they might be found.
As I understand it, therefore, one must come to the conclusion that all the people that I have listed—all the people who are concerned with defence—must all be wrong, and that it is only the Government who are in step. Can it really be that only the Service Ministers, for the time being, have got the equation right and really understand the matter, and that all the rest of us who criticise are obsessed with pessimism? I really cannot think that that is true.
Quite frankly, if it were not tragic this situation would be comic. In a sense I have a certain sympathy for Service Ministers under a Socialist Government, left there all on their own, rather unhappily. Perhaps their only consolation—the only one that I can think of—is that now and then they manage to convince each other, because they convince no one else in this House or outside.

9.23 p.m.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: The debate has centred round two principal issues—the Army's equipment and readiness, and operations and conditions of service in Northern Ireland. Perhaps I might deal with these first and then come on to such other points as hon. Members have raised in the course of the debate.
The hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. Walder), who has just resumed his seat, has made the plea which we have heard so many times from the Opposition Benches when the Conservative Party have been in Opposition. I refer to his plea to the Services that we are a set of baddies and that the Conservatives are a set of goodies. This plea is now seen as nonsense among Service men.
I made this precise point in a mess last week. The response I had from a brigadier with about 30 years' service was "Well, on balance, in my time we have probably done much better under Labour Governments than under Conservative Governments." He went on to say "The problem is"—if the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill) can contain him-

self I will come to the crunch line—"that the Conservatives are much better able to paper over the cracks than are the Labour Party." He added "What tends to emphasise the lack of agreement on defence is the fact that there is always a minority in your party which is not prepared to accept this, that or the other that the Government happen to be proposing."
We have had this constant prattle from the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Sir I. Gilmour). The Opposition should not forget that the right hon. Gentleman is in fact Mr. Three-in-One, because he presided over three defence cuts in one year. At constant prices, they were far more vicious than the defence cuts over which we have presided since 1974.

Mr. Buck: If we made defence cuts which we should not have made—I might concede that there were some we should not have made—it makes stronger the case that there should not be cuts now on top of the cuts that we made. We have this argument about the Conservative Government having behaved badly. Perhaps they did. As a former Minister, I might concede that we should not have made so many defence cuts. But if we cut too far, it means that the Minister has much less excuse for making the cuts that he has put before the House.

Mr. Brown: My point is that people are judged by what they do, not by what they say. The Army is not slow to perceive that.
The hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) mentioned certain equipments, decisions concerning which were criticised in the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee's recent report. I should like to deal with those matters in turn. The first is the RS80. It is true that there are no plans for the introduction of an area weapons system to fulfil the rôle envisaged for the RS80. Such a weapon would be extremely expensive, not least in terms of the logistic support required. However, the development of systems in the United States and France is being monitored.
The cancellation of the Vixen wheeled reconnaissance vehicle and reduction in the follow-on orders for the Sultan,


Spartan and Samaritan tracked vehicles has meant that older vehicles—the Ferret and the FV430—will be kept in service longer than was originally planned. We are therefore carrying out a comprehensive series of improvements to these vehicles to ensure their continued effectiveness.
The delays in the introduction of the Milan stem from the need to take into account the results of the defence review, other guided weapons requirements of the Services and the negotiation of a memorandum of understanding which safeguarded the position of the British guided weapon industry and jobs in that industry. As I said in my opening speech, to ensure that the missile enters service rapidly, initial deliveries will be taken from the Franco-German consortium, Euromissile, later this year.
We place a very high priority on the requirements for HOT/TOW. An evaluation is now under way between the Franco-German HOT and the American TOW, and it is hoped to reach a decision in the next few months. Although we have been monitoring the development of HOT and TOW since 1969, I should make it clear that for much of that time they were in an early stage of development, initially as ground-based systems, and only in the later stages as helicopter-borne systems. Also, until 1975, our primary efforts were devoted to the Hawkswing system.

Mr. Churchill: Will the Minister explain why the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee was given an assurance in 1975 that Milan was available off the shelf?

Mr. Brown: The assurances then given were true, because it is coming from off the shelf.

Mr. Churchill: Two years ago.

Mr. Brown: The hon. Gentleman knows that it will be in service later this year.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) referred to a number of matters affecting the Chieftain main battle tank. Although we believe that the Chieftain is the best tank in the world, we are conscious of the need to ensure that it remains the best tank in the world.
There are a number of improvements to the Chieftain, either entering service or in the late stages of development. These include a laser sight and an improved fire control system to ensure that the effectiveness of its main armament is maintained. There has been a continuing series of improvements to the Chieftain engine in the last few years. As a result of trials in BAOR last year, further improvements will be introduced later this year which will, I hope, increase the reliability of the engine.

Mr. Goodhart: The Government have said that they do not intend to fit the Chobham armour to the new Chieftains coming along. Will the Chobham armour be fitted to any vehicles in the British Army?

Mr. Brown: The hon. Gentleman has not been listening. I have not suggested that there will be any new Chieftains coming along. I said that we intended to uprate the existing Chieftains. The question of Chobham armour on any new Chieftains coming along does not arise. However, the Chobham armour point will arise on a future main battle tank.
Although the current Chieftain gun is highly successful—and its potential was demonstrated in the recent gun trials in the United States—we are already developing an improved version and improved ammunition.
The tank which we are developing for Iran is an improved version of the Chieftain tank and is highly effective in its planned rôle. But it would not be suitable for the British Army and operations in North-West Europe. However, as I said earlier, studies are already under way on a tank to replace the Chieftain in the late 1980s.
I turn next to Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) made a number of thought-provoking statements about the future rôle of the Army in Northern Ireland in the years to come. They were echoed by the right hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Craig). I hope that I shall be forgiven if I do not follow those hon. Members down all the paths which they tried to explore.
The first comment that I make is that I do not share the apparent pessimism voiced by the right hon. Member for


Belfast, East and by my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough about the progress that we are making in dealing with violence in Northern Ireland, especially from the Provisional IRA. I can see some hopeful signs that we are making real headway. Most of the indicators of violence—for example, the statistics of deaths and injuries caused by terrorists—show a downward trend compared with corresponding periods for earlier years. I make no attempt to gloss over the continuing toll of suffering, but we must not let this blind us to the real progress that we are making. Significant arrests and convictions of terrorists continue to be made. The effectiveness of the police continues to increase.
The strength of our present policy is that it rests on the law—on criminals being caught and convicted of criminal acts proved beyond reasonable doubt in open court. We are convinced that we will succeed in bringing a final end to violence. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that we will pursue this policy with the utmost vigour. We will continue to pursue the terrorist through the courts, we will actively foster co-operation between the police and the Army, and we will build up the full-time strength of the Ulster Defence Regiment. The hon. Member for Beckenham raised this point in particular. As I told the House originally, we look on the expansion of 200 as a first instalment, and we will be looking at the prospects for the timing and size of any further expansion in the light of progress with the initial increase.
In response to a point made by the right hon. Member for Belfast, East, I emphasise that this increase will not mean any change in the relationship of the UDR with the RUC or in the basic nature of the force, which will remain a regiment of the British Army—a regiment which is making a most valuable contribution to the security of Northern Ireland based on the hard work and devotion to duty of both its part-time and its full-time members.
It has been suggested that there should be a bomb disposal clasp for the Northern Ireland medal. I listened with appreciation to the tribute paid by the hon. Member for Beckenham to the selfless devotion to duty and the bravery of those who have to undertake the defusing

and disposal of terrorist bombs, and I am sure that the whole House endorses that tribute and acknowledges the debt owed to these brave men by the people of Northern Ireland. However, we must be careful that we do not, by invidious comparisons, belittle the bravery of all our soldiers in whatever form their engagement with terrorism takes, brought painfully to mind by the high price being paid by all units in lives lost and injuries suffered.
Members of bomb disposal teams are, of course, included in the half-yearly gallantry awards for service in Northern Ireland. I get lists of recommendations on my desk, and I am never surprised when I see recommendations for members of the bomb disposal squads. They feature frequently in the gallantry awards for Northern Ireland, and I think that that is the best way in which to recognise their excellent and gallant service.
I was grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) for the tribute he paid to the way in which our soldiers in Northern Ireland are carrying out their difficult and dangerous tasks. I appreciate the interest of the hon. and gallant Gentleman and his Sub-Committee in the welfare of soldiers serving there, both in the financial problems that some of them face and in the many other aspects of welfare which are very important in maintaining the morale of the Army. I shall be very interested to receive the comments of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee on the financial aspects of Army service in Northern Ireland. I value the support and interest of other hon. Members who have expressed their concern on this subject. I shall take account of all these views when I examine the report for which I have called as a matter of urgency.
It is fair to say that the hon. Member for Petersfield (Mr. Mates) was long on the problem and short on solutions. The question he posed was an over-simplification of a complex and many-sided problem. I can only assume that he hopes to make some party point by asking it, because, clearly, he could not expect me as a Defence Minister to give him a straight "Yes" or "No" answer now to a complex issue. He knows well enough that the issue is extremely complex. I have said that I am looking at the problem urgently, and I am not prepared to


go any further than that tonight. That is a reasonable approach on a matter which has so many potential repercussions, both on Army pay and conditions under the pay policy and on the pay policy itself.

Mr. Mates: rose—

Mr. Brown: I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I must forewarn him that I have no intention of going further than that tonight.

Mr. Mates: I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman was not listening to me. I conceded at the beginning that any review of the pay structure was a very complex matter. I said that I disagreed in detail with one or two remarks which had been made about there being a simple solution. There is no simple solution. But if the hon. Gentleman has briefed an inquiry to look into the question of the financial conditions of service in Ulster, surely at the heart of any inquiry is the fundamental question I asked—and it is a simple question. Are the Government determined that no soldier shall suffer a financial penalty as a result of service in Ulster? Surely the Government Front Bench, full of Defence Ministers, can give an answer to that now.

Mr. Brown: No, I am going no further, as I warned the hon. Member. We have to look at the issues long and coolly. If the hon. Member reads the report tomorrow, he will realise that I chose my words very carefully when talking about what should be done and what could be done when we get the report. I do not want to repeat myself, but he knows well enough that we do not know any more than he or any other hon. Member does what will follow phase 2.

Mr. Mates: Surely every hon. Member in the House can see that it has nothing to do with phase 2, 3, 4 or 5 or anything else. We are not talking about pay rises. We are talking about compensation for penalties. Surely the Minister can concede that principle.

Mr. Brown: That shows the mistake of giving way to hon. Members. The hon. Member for Petersfield is oversimplifying the issue. Allowances are all part of pay policy. He must understand that. Some simple statements have been trotted out and people have suggested "We can

increase this by x or that by y." The hon. Member for Beckenham made one of these points when he said "Reduce the rents." The hon. Gentleman knows that under the present policy, if we reduce rent by £X per week, that will have to be reflected in the ultimate settlement this year for the forces. There is no point in giving with one hand and taking away with the other, which is what the hon. Member for Beckenham was really suggesting.
Hon. Members have ranged far and wide tonight, so I think that I should best leave the subject of Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough raised the subject of offset. The maintenance of British forces in Germany involves us in substantial foreign exchange costs, with a corresponding benefit to the German economy. That is why we think it right that there should be some offsetting arrangement between ourselves and the Germans. We remain in touch with the German Government, and both sides are confident that with time a satisfactory solution will be reached.
I am sure that the House would not expect me to divulge the details of delicate negotiations such as those. As I have said, we are confident that a satisfactory conclusion will be reached. I say to the hon. and learned Member for Colchester (Mr. Buck) that we have no plans to reduce our forces in Germany in advance of an agreement on mutual balanced force reductions. British forces are stationed in Germany not solely for the defence of the Federal Republic, but as part of NATO's strategy of forward defence.
My hon. Friend the Member for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh) has apologised in advance for not being able to listen to my reply because he is having dinner with General Haig, and no doubt he is asking him some awkward questions.

Mr. Churchill: He might learn something.

Mr. Brown: It is a pity that the hon. Member for Stretford was not at the dinner. He might have learnt something too.
My hon. Friend raised questions about our ability to deter the Warsaw Pact and bring the British Army on the Rhine


to its war-time strength. First, there is no evidence to suggest that deterrence is failing or that the Warsaw Pact is contemplating aggression. Although sudden attack cannot be ruled out, and the state of preparedness of the Alliance is kept under continuous review to ensure that NATO cannot be caught off its guard, we think that it is far more likely that a period of warning would be available.
Our reinforcement plans are also kept under review, and they include arrangements to return individuals out of the theatre on leave and training. I would like to remind the House that we are committed to returning units from BAOR deployed to Northern Ireland within 72 hours in a period of tension.
On our war stocks. I would only say that these are consistent with NATO requirements.
The House will not expect me to go into detail about warning time. However, simple military indicators are not the sole guide of national intentions, and the NATO Alliance believes that we will have a period of warning. The state of preparedness of NATO is kept continually under review. We have achieved improvements in our reinforcement times for BAOR and are studying how to improve them still further.
The hon. and gallant Member for Eye mentioned his visit to Marchwood military port and the desirability of making early progress on its modernisation. This is a complex plan which has to be considered in both an operational and an economic context. In the current financial climate, with cut-backs in works expenditure in particular, delays have been unavoidable, but we are pressing ahead with the planning of this redevelopment. Current plans envisage that work on the first state of the redevelopment will begin in the period of 1980–85.
My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough and the hon. Member for Windsor and Maidenhead (Dr. Glynn) mentioned the problem that some soldiers face in finding council housing when they leave the Army. I recognise that this causes difficulties for some soldiers, and advice on housing forms an important part of the advice which is available to soldiers before their discharge.
My Department also maintains close liaison with the Department of the Environment, which has issued a circular asking local authorities to give sympathetic consideration to soldiers applying to them for housing. I recognise that local authorities have many demands on the housing they provide, and I much appreciate that many of them are extremely co-operative and sympathetic to applications from ex-Servicemen. I regret, however, that other councils are not and that they place impossibly high residential demands on service men, an attitude which I deplore and which I use every pressure at my disposal to to diminish.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens), in spite of the views he might take on defence, is certainly a doughty fighter for his constituents, and these include ex-Service men. He raised with me the sad case of a man who had spent many years in the Army and who was leaving it at the end of his time. The Epping Forest Council told him that he must have a residential qualification of two years before he could go on to the housing waiting list.
That is nothing short of outrageous. It is a damned nonsense. I hope that councils which insist on that type of residential qualification will realise that even if a man has 22 years' service it is almost a physical impossibility for him to meet a residential qualification of two years in order to go on a waiting list.

Mr. Lipton: Treatment of Service men on release from the Services varies considerably between one local authority and another. There is no uniformity of treatment.

Mr. Brown: I am grateful for that intervention. I understand fully the grave difficulties facing many housing authorities. They should, however, be able to come to some civilised arrangement by which a man can opt, two years before leaving the Service, for an area in which he wishes to take up residence.
The hon. Member for Beckenham and the hon. Member for Windsor and Maidenhead inquired about our progress in implementing the Spencer Report. Although the Army Board has rejected Professor Spencer's proposal for an Army social work service, we are taking steps to test all practical alternatives. We hope


to run two one-year pilot schemes. One would assess the possibility of expanding the existing Sailors', Soldiers' and Airmen's Families Association to enable it to take on some of the tasks envisaged by the Committee for an Army social work service. The other would examine ways of improving links with local authority social services departments. Eventually, a combination of those two approaches may meet the Army's needs.
Discussions on these two schemes are continuing. In particular, good progress is being made on the second of them. More generally, as I announced in November last year, some of the committee's other recommendations have already been implemented or are in hand. Those that have implications for all three Services are being studied further. I am happy that we are adopting a positive, practical and pragmatic approach to the problems that Professor Spencer's valuable work has highlighted.
As the hon. and learned Member for Colchester knows, I have corresponded long and earnestly with him on the question of the Colchester Military Hospital. I repeat that the hospital is not cost effective. It is too small to gain recognition for postgraduate medical training, and junior doctors cannot be posted there. The volume of clinical work is less than the consultants who have to work there are used to, and they do not have the accustomed support of junior housemen. Running costs are also extremely substantial.
We have to take our decision in the light of what will best meet the needs of Service men and their families. We did, however, consult the Department of Health and Social Security about the closure, and we offered the NHS authorities the use of the hospital for civilians. They told us that the existing hospital building cannot be adapted for NHS use at a reasonable cost.
With the best will in the world, one might well question the amount of expenditure carried on the Defence Vote in the name of the health, education and welfare services, and I would question whether, on reflection, any hon. Member could really say that it is any duty of the Defence Vote to carry the cost of providing what, in effect, would be a National Health Service hospital.
This hospital was offered on a plate to the health authority in the area, but it is not prepared to take it. Having said that, I fail to see why, with the best will in the world, I personally should receive the big stick that I have received from the Colchester area. I should have thought that the Colchester people would be better served by getting on to the members of the area health authority than by making rude remarks about the present incumbent of the post of the Minister responsible for the Army.

Mr. Buck: It is unfair for the Minister to suggest that I have been rude to him, but I am now frightfully tempted to do so. He spoke about getting the big stick. Big mistakes need the big stick, as everyone in the area, irrespective of political party, agrees.

Mr. Brown: I do not think that we have time to argue this further this evening. I have consumed much of the time of the House, and I regret that I have still been unable to deal with the whole range of points raised. I thank the House for taking this opportunity to debate the subject so soon after the recent defence debate. I think that it is a compliment which, I assure hon. Members, the Services fully deserve.

9.53 p.m.

Mr. Joseph Harper (Comptroller of Her Majesty's Household): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Mr. Mates: With the leave of the House, I apologise for coming back to a point—

An Hon. Member: No.

Mr. Mates: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that someone shouted "No". No one may speak without the leave of the House. One refusal is enough to stop an hon. Member from speaking again, and one hon. Member has said "No".

Mr. Mates: I asked for leave to speak again.

Mr. Speaker: It was refused.

Mr. Mates: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. An hon. Member shouted "No". I am sorry, but the hon. Member may not speak again.

Mr. Ian Gow: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Ian Gow, to raise a point of order.

9.54 p.m.

Mr. Gow: I did not rise on a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I rose to contribute to the debate.
The first thing that I wish to do is to comment upon the astonishing speech of the Minister. It was within your hearing, Mr. Speaker, that the Minister said that there were a number of points that he had not covered in his reply, and then, to our astonishment, at about seven minutes before 10 o'clock he sat down.
This is an astonishing confession even for the present Government, and even for this Minister. He says that he has left many points unanswered, and then, without answering them, and with a great deal of time to spare, he resumes his seat. He did so in the presence of the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence for the Liberal Party. What kind of impression will this make upon the Liberal Party? Will it not put in peril the terrible alliance that was disclosed to the House by the Prime Minister on 23rd March? Perhaps, with the leave of the House, the Liberal Party Shadow Secretary of State for Defence would like to address us on this subject.
My hon. Friend the Member for Peters-field (Mr. Mates) asked the Under-Secretary of State specific questions about Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman failed to answer them, even though there was time. The House would willingly give him leave to answer them now, and if the Minister indicates that he would like me to give way to him so that he may answer my hon. Friend, I shall gladly resume my seat. But, of course, the Minister will not do that. He was gravely embarrassed, because there was still time but he did not know what to say to my hon. Friend. As we have had no reply from the Minister, it is reasonable that I should put to him again the forceful arguments adduced by my hon. Friend.
Members of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland are serving under a grievous penalty. Three years ago the Government introduced the special payment of 50p a day for all members of the Armed Forces serving in Northern Ireland. The Minister will confirm that

today the value of that 50p is in excess of 80p. Why do not the Government do that which they know they should do, namely, restore—

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Frederick Mulley): My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary made clear that pay and allowances are considered together under pay policy. These matters are before the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. I agree that 50p on 1st April 1974 will be worth 82p, or something like that, today, but the hon. Gentleman might reflect on how much the Conservative Government paid from 1970 to February 1973, when our troops were fighting in Northern Ireland. That figure, if zero, would still be zero.

Mr. Gow: The Secretary of State is getting himself into hot water with his hon. Friends in the Liberal Party, because he has put forward a most disreputable and discreditable argument. He is sheltering behind the review body.
The Government have it in their power to put right a grievous injustice, namely, the steady erosion, because of the inflation over which the Secretary of State and his Government have been presiding, of the value of the 50p. The matter could be put right. The right hon. Gentleman is sheltering behind the review body because he has not the guts to do that which he knows he should do, namely, remedy this injustice for our Service men.

Mr. Mates: I remind my hon. Friend, who has kindly allowed me to intervene, that the Secretary of State has got it wrong. We are not talking about the Armed Forces review. I tried to make the matter clear in a non-partisan and reasonable way. We are talking about a situation that is special and different. All that I was asking the Secretary of State to say was that he would abide by the principle that no one would suffer a financial penalty for serving in Ulster. If the Secretary of State cannot answer, he should not be the Secretary of State.

Mr. Gow: If my hon. Friend wishes me to give way again so that he may make a further intervention, I shall gladly do so.

It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Orders of the Day — TOXIC AND DANGEROUS WASTES

Motion made, and Question,
That this House takes note of Commission Document No. R/1966/76 on Toxic and Dangerous Wastes.—[Mr. Harper.]
put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.), and agreed to.

Orders of the Day — MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CHIEFS OF POLICE

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]

10 p.m.

Mr. Charles Morrison: Every week since the beginning of February, without exception, I have been endeavouring to obtain an Adjournment debate on the subject that I wish to raise tonight. I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity to do so. In the intervening period I had hoped that my request for an Adjournment debate might be overcome by the course of events, namely, an acceptance of the justice of the pay claim of the chief Police Officers of the Ministry of Defence. By their oath of service the police undertake never to put their own selfish interests before the public good, but in consequence of the reasonable quid pro quo the Government should be expected to keep faith with the police in matters of pay, status and recognition without need of recourse to unco-operative measures.
What I have said applies to the police generally but even more so to any specific or small group such as the 10 Ministry of Defence chief police officers who are the subject of the debate. I emphasise that they are only 10 in number. The Government have not kept faith with them, and the more that I have read the correspondence that has passed between them and the Government and the records of meetings that have occurred the angrier and the more full of revulsion I have become at the treatment that has been meted out to these men.
The dispute originates with the 1975 police pay settlement, announced in June 1975, to take effect from 1st September

1975, but it stems with equal if not greater importance, from a letter dated 15th May 1974 from the Civil Service Department to the Chairman of the Ministry of Defence Chief Police Officers' Association. That letter established the pay link for chief police officers for the future. In particular, it stated:
For the future we propose to express the pay link for the chief officers as a vertical one with the federated ranks with the Ministry of Defence police.
I emphasise the word "vertical". The letter continued:
The aim will be to maintain the relativities created by the announced settlement of the pay for both federated ranks and chief officers.
That is clear and explicit.
Following the 1975 settlement the increase for chief police officers would have seemed a matter of course. The Chief Police Officers' Association, on 16th June 1975—again, the date is important—requested formally the application of the new rates as from 1st September 1975. The Civil Service Department did not reply to the letter, so a reminder was sent on 10th July. Perhaps the Secretary of State for Defence will listen, as his Department is concerned not least. The Department did not reply to a third letter of 30th July. The Department did not reply to any of the three letters until 14th August when, to the astonishment of the Chief Police Officers' Association, and its anger, it was informed that the only increase allowed would be £6 a week maximum, under the terms of the White Paper entitled "The Attack on Inflation", Command 6151.
This approach by the Civil Service Department was immediately contested by the chief police officers. It was on the basis of paragraph 8 of the White Paper, which states that
settlements may also be implemented for groups which, before the date of publication of this White Paper, have reached agreements for annual settlement dates not later than 1st September, provided that they have had no principal increase under the existing TUC guidelines within the last 12 months.
Any normal person, let alone any fair person, would understand and accept immediately that the chief police officers satisfied the requirement of that paragraph. They had an agreement, and it was effective not later than 1st September. The claim had been made prior to 11th July. Perhaps the Minister will


recall the date of 16th June, which was the date of the first letter written to his Department. The White Paper was published on 11th July.
The Government are not normal; neither are they fair. Thus, the Civil Service Department interpretation was different from that of the chief police officers. At worst, the Department's interpretation demonstrated a blatant desire to persecute the chief police officers for some unknown reason. At best, it was splitting the smallest of hairs. But the Government are the slave masters. So far they have shown no mercy and no common decency, in spite of the stream of letters from the Chief Police Officers' Association to various Government Departments and separate meetings between representatives of the chief police officers and the Minister of State. My hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave) was present at a meeting, as was my right hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Mr. Macmillan). The Minister of State will recall better than I what took place, because I received only a report of the meeting. He will remember that the knowledge of my right hon. Friend, given the fact that he was once in charge of the Department of Employment, was of considerable relevance to the course of the discussion because he had had to deal with not dissimilar problems.
Apart from the meeting with the Minister of State the chief police officers have had meetings with the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence and with the Lord Privy Seal. I do not think it unfair to say that the reports of these meetings—reports that I have seen—reflect ministerial sympathy. At each meeting the officers have had a fair hearing, but nothing has happened. This must mean either that Ministers are receiving advice with which they disagree but lack the courage of their convictions to overrule that advice or, putting it bluntly, that they are being two-faced.
What are the consequences? First, there is the question of total pay and relativities. It must be remembered that federated ranks of the Ministry of Defence police received the full 1975 settlement. It may be recalled that federated ranks up to the rank of thief superintendent total about 5,000 men.

Since 1st September 1975 the Chief Police Officers' Association members have been receiving less pay than their juniors two ranks below. It is rather as though the Secretary of State were receiving less pay than the Under-Secretaries in his Department. I have a suspicion that he might grumble if he did.
Even if the White Paper £6 had been accepted, the chief police officers would now be on a par only with federated ranks two grades below. There is, therefore, first the question of total pay and relativities. The second consequence, which is of even greater and more immediate concern, is that three of the 10 chief police officers retire in the next six months, one, I am told, on 30th April, one in June and one on 30th September. Under present arrangements all three will come out with totally inadequate pensions based on long out-of-date pay scales. They and their dependants will be saddled with this situation for life unless a retrospective settlement is achieved very swiftly.
However, it has been clear so far that the Government care not a jot. Only yesterday there was yet another meeting between the Chairman of the Chief Police Officers' Association, accompanied by the secretary, and the Lord Privy Seal, accompanied by the Minister of State, Civil Service Department and the Minister of State for Defence. To judge by the report that I have heard, the Minister of State for Defence made a fool of himself. It was perfectly clear that he had not done his homework. He thought that the salaries being discussed were in excess of £8,500. They are not, and the Secretary of State knows that as well as I do.
In the light of the incompetence of the Minister of State for Defence, of which I hope the Secretary of State will take note, I advise the Minister of State, Civil Service Department not to try to defend him. It would be unwise for him to do so, and it would not help the situation one bit. I am told that at the meeting the Minister of State, Civil Service Department merely looked embarrassed, as well he might. The Lord Privy Seal turned down flat the representations of the chief police officers, including consideration of pensions.
As grounds for turning down the continuing requests, he said that it would


be damaging to announce a 36·8 per cent. pay increase. No regard was paid to the fact that the pay requests—if I may put them that way—had no relevance, in reality, to 1977, but every relevance to what happened two years ago, in 1975.
The Lord Privy Seal said that the situation was very different today from what it had been in 1975. Too right it is different, and whose fault is that? He can say that again. We are concerned that the social contract, which was meant to solve all our problems, has done a fat lot of good so far, both in particular and in general.
The weakness of the Government's case is demonstrated by their undertaking that any chief superintendent who is promoted will have his pay protected so that it remains in excess of his current superiors'. I believe that that is a very important point. It is an admission of weakness of the Government's own case—an admission of the abject and craven stand of this Government over chief police officers' pay.
Finally, perhaps the Minister would re-read the replies that he has given to parliamentary Questions from a number of hon. Gentlemen. I see that the Minister of State for Defence has come into the Chamber—he would wait until the very last moment before coming in. Also, I hope that the Minister will look at the replies that other Ministers have given to my hon. Friends who have in their constituencies members of the Chief Police Officers' Association. He may care to recall the comments that he has made about a swift conclusion to this matter in the letters that he has written to hon. Members. He may care to decide whether he is proud of those replies.
Secondly, perhaps the Government will ask themselves and their consciences whether they would have acted as they have done if, instead of 10 chief police officers, they had been dealing with a similar situation and conditions coupled with the name of Jack Jones and 1 million trade unionists. Perhaps the Minister of State would consider that matter.
Against that background, the Minister may tonight have one more chance of redeeming himself. Will he now do so?

10.16 p.m.

The Minister of State, Civil Service Department (Mr. Charles R. Morris): I

am grateful for the opportunity of replying to the formidable and lucid case presented by the hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Morrison) on this matter. I appreciate that this is an important and difficult subject. As he rightly said, it concerns a small body of men, amounting to 10 in number, but the matter is no less important on that account. As the Chief Police Officers' Association, which represents them, has been assured by Ministers to whom it has presented its case, the Government have considered the matter, have reconsidered it and are still reconsidering aspects of the case with sympathy and concern.
The hon. Gentleman has on many occasions contributed to debates in this House in a modest and worthwhile manner. I felt that in the course of his contribution this evening he made one or two disparaging comments—not only about ministerial colleagues, who are able to defend themselves, but about the issue itself. I believe that on reflection he will agree that those comments were, to say the least, injudicious. It would not have made any difference to the Government's or the Minister's stance on this issue whatever union represented these officers.
As for my parliamentary replies to other hon. Members on this issue and the reference that the hon. Member made to my use of the word "swift" in relation to these negotiations, I have been concerned to elicit swift conclusions from the outset. But in the nature of things on such a difficult and important issue, time inevitably has been involved.
The problem is not an easy one, as I hope to show in the course of my contribution. The Government and Ministers have been endeavouring to find a reasonable solution to the anomalies which have arisen. It is taking time, which is regrettable, but, unfortunately, unavoidable. I must stress that this is not a question of the Government's lack of interest in or understanding of the personal position of the officers themselves or of the management problems that arise.
The hon. Gentleman referred to one matter in particular relating to the promotion situation that inevitably will arise in September. Equally, we are mindful of the personal position of the officers themselves.
I suggest that it has not been merely a question of any failure to negotiate. The simple point is that the Government have to decide what can be done consistently with national pay policy. The difficulty is not in defining the problem but in finding solutions which are consistent with the Government's pay policy.
Let me start by setting out the facts. The chief police officers are a group on their own for the purpose of pay determination. The agreed method for determining their pay is through a vertical pay relationship with the chief superintendent in the ranks below. Specifically, this provides that the chief officers receive at all levels the same percentage increase as may be awarded to the chief superintendent at the maximum of that pay scale. The pay of these lower ranks is determined separately through a horizontal pay relationship which has had the effect of maintaining identity of pay scales with the Home Office local police forces rank for rank. The settlement date for both groups is 1st September.
Thus, when the pay scales for the Home Offices forces are adjusted, two separate arrangements come into operation for the Ministry of Defence police force. The lower ranks receive a consequential pay adjustment by reason of their horizontal pay link. The chief officers receive their increase by reason of their internal vertical pay link with the lower ranks.
But for the publication of the White Paper "The Attack on Inflation" on 11th July 1975, this sequence of events would have resulted in the payment of an increase of 36 per cent. from 1st September to all chief police officers of the Ministry—that is to say, pay increases ranging from about £2,000 a year at the maximum for the assistant chief constable to about £3,250 a year at the maximum for the chief constable.
These adjustments could not be brought into effect before 1st September 1975. Moreover, they were dependent upon the settlement for the lower ranks and could not be agreed before the publication of the White Paper on 11th July 1975. They therefore automatically fell to be considered within its terms. It has been said that as the claim was made by the Chief Police Officers' Association in

mid-June it should have been settled before then. I think the House will agree, however, that it would have been wrong for the Government, with their prior knowledge of the contents of the White Paper, deliberately to advance events in order to avoid problems that might otherwise arise for part of the public service.
The claim had therefore to be considered against the provisions of the White Paper. The crucial issue in this context has been whether it could be dealt with under the transitional provisions. If not, no more than £6 a week within an upper limit of £8,500 could be allowed.
Much of the time that the Government have spent over this case, and for which we are now being criticised, has been spent on genuine attempts to find a solution that could be applied without serious risk to national pay policy. The application of the pay policy limits not only creates problems for the officers themselves but gives rise to acute management difficulties. It would not help simply to seek to resolve these at serious risk of repercussions to the national policy. That we have taken so long to seek a solution even though in the end we have not been successful is a measure of the efforts we have made. I cannot accept that the present situation has arisen by default or that the time taken, regrettable though it is, has been unnecessary.
I should remind the House of the key points of the agreed policy set out in the White Paper. As part of the effort to meet the grave economic and industrial situation, a flat-rate approach to pay increases was accepted. An important element of that approach—embodied in the flat-rate concept and the £8,500 cut-off—was that the heaviest burden should be borne by those best able to make sacrifices, the higher-paid. It also avoided the complication of separate provisions for particular groups through traditional pay links or comparability claims. One inevitable result was a compression of pay differentials, and hon. Members will have noticed recently the pressures that have built up as a result.
These considerations are pertinent to the way that the Government have applied the transitional provisions. They have been strictly applied so that the only


groups with settlement dates not later than 1st September 1975 which have been allowed increases are those which made agreements as to amount—and that is a significant point—before 11th July 1975 or which were linked to such groups with pay scales within the scales of the groups to which they were linked. That is to say that the transitional provisions have not been allowed to cover groups in a way that would preserve existing vertical pay relationships simply by reason of their pay linkage with lower-paid groups. To allow the chief police officers their increase would do just that and would introduce an interpretation of the transitional provisions that is not only inconsistent with the intention of the policy but that would place at risk one of its main objectives. I hope that the House will forgive me if I dwell on this point a little longer.

Mr. Morrison: Will the hon. Gentleman reply to the point that I made about the letters from the association? The first letter of 16th June and the second letter of 10th July were both written before the publication of the White Paper. The third letter, sent because there was no earlier reply, was not written until after the White Paper appeared.
Do not those facts seem to give the lie to what the Minister is saying?

Mr. Morris: I accept that the letters were written before the publication of the White Paper, but the implications of that White Paper would inevitably influence the Government's reaction to the claim. In order to allow the claim, the Government would have to depart from the way in which the transitional provisions have been applied.
There would be risks involved in that. In principle, the chief police officers' case is not unique. Other cases, which may differ in degree of anomaly or on technicalities, still have similar general merits. Moreover, if we are seen to be prepared to make one type of concession to overcome anomalies, why not others? Also, the chief superintendent rank in the civil police received a much higher percentage increase than the equivalent ranks above. If, under a pay policy concession, this is reflected upwards into the higher ranks of the Ministry of Defence

force, they will receive increases of 10 per cent. to 12 per cent. above those that were granted to similar ranks in the civil police outside.
This is an important consideration that the hon. Gentleman and others who have understandably expressed concern should bear in mind. The Government's judgment is that to depart from the way the policy has been applied so as to permit pay increases ranging from around £2,000 to around £3,250 a year to a relatively highly paid group would create an unacceptable risk to the policy. I recognise that this decision provokes an understandable reaction from the officers. The Lord Privy Seal, the Minister of State, Department of Defence and I met the general secretary of the association and his deputy yesterday. I appreciate their disappointment, but I can assure the House that we have gone to considerable trouble to satisfy ourselves that there is not, and could not have been, a solution consistent with the objects of the policy, through the use of the transitional provisions.
Nevertheless, the Government recognise that the effect of applying the pay policy limits in this case is to create very severe anomalies. These officers have not received pay adjustments in 1975 of the kind received by similar ranks in other forces whose settlement dates were before the issue of the White Paper. Within their own force, the assistant chief constables receive less than the pay rate of a subordinate rank. Differentials for others have been severely eroded. This has consequences for management and for recruitment and promotion. It also creates problems for those who have to retire on pension.
My ministerial colleagues and I are concerned about these aspects. We want to take the earliest opportunity to ease the most acute anomalies. Hon. Members will be aware—

The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.